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The Study on Establishment of Accounting 
Principles, sponsored by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, convened on Wednesday morning, November 3^ 
1971, in the meeting room of the Institute at 1700 Broadway, 
New York, New York, at ten-ten o'clock, Francis M. Wheat, Esq., 
Chairman.
Committee members present were:
Mr. John C. Biegler, CPA, senior partner of Price 
Waterhouse & Co.;
Mr. Arnold I. Levine, CPA, national executive partner, 
management of J. K. Lasser & Co.;
Mr. Wallace E. Olson, CPA, executive partner of 
Alexander Grant & Company;
Mr. Thomas C. Pryor, CFA, partner and chairman of the 
investment committee of White Weld & Co.;
Mr. Roger B. Smith, vice president-finance, General 
Motors Corporation;
Dr. David Solomons, FCA, professor and chairman of 
the accounting department, Wharton School of Finance and 
Commerce, University of Pennsylvania;
Francis M. Wheat, Esq., Attorney-at-law, Chairman 
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: The only thing I have to say at the 
outset this morning is a word of appreciation from myself and 
my colleagues, for the time and trouble you have all taken to 
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come and meet with us. I hope we can keep these proceedings 
relatively informal; I think we will gain more from them 
that way. We're most grateful to every one of you, in 
case we don’t have a chance to repeat that comment each 
time you come to the microphone to talk with us.
So thank you on behalf of all of us; I hope that 
you will feel ultimately that your participation, and the time 
and effort you have put in will have been worthwhile.
You all know why we’re here. I don’t think that 
any further remarks on my part are necessary, unless any of 
my colleagues have anything to say at the outset.
They stand mute, for the moment, but look out 
later.
Our first witness in the box this morning is our 
eminent colleague, Mr. Robert Trueblood, who is chairman 
of the parallel study which some people think, quite correctly, 
is a seminal study and we're the technical one.
He is, as you all know, the chairman of the study 
on the objectives of financial reporting, and in addition 
to that he's the managing partner, I believe, of Touche Ross, 
and I think he brings us a message from Touche Ross. Perhaps 
he’ll say something, too, about the progress of his own study, 
which I’m sure will be of interest to all of you. Bob!
MR. ROBERT TRUEBLOOD: I will be glad, Chairman 
Wheat, to answer any questions about the progress of our own 
group, of the objectives study group, but I think it should be 
abundantly clear that I do state this morning only for Touche 
Ross of which I am chairman of the board.
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The first official statement Touche Ross made on the 
matter of the contribution of the APB was a speech over my name 
made two years ago, "Ten Years with the APB.” This has been 
supplied to the Commission, but is not today a matter of our 
formal submission.
Touche Ross representatives met with the Wheat 
Commission in Chicago on June 25, and issued a formal 
statement which is available in printed form today. We do 
not intend to enlarge upon that rather brief statement, but 
I would summarize it for you so that you, if you wish, may 
let me stand questioning.
Very briefly, Touche Ross believes that the best 
solution to the problem of establishing accounting principles 
holds with the creation of a small, full-time accounting 
principles board. Such a group would be chartered to deal 
with new developments involving accounting and accountability 
as they emerge; to conduct a significant level of research, 
and development of an underlying conceptual framework of 
the accounting discipline; and to anticipate future accounting 
needs that will be imposed upon the profession by the public.
First in terms of the board itself, we contemplate 
a small group of five to seven fully-paid members, members 
that would be without regard to firm affiliation or membership 
in the Institute, but with considerable appreciation of 
practice considerations.
Each member would be required to dissociate himself 
from his prior affiliation; a business firm, a practicing
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firm, or a university.
Most importantly, we think that a small, top-level 
board should be supported heavily by competent staff, and 
would require significant involvement with its peers in the 
financial, business and academic communities.
The scope of its activities would be broad, 
ranging from the formulation of objectives to the enunciation 
of principles, to consideration of practice pronouncements.
As sort of a peripheral idea we feel that the 
historic separation of accounting and auditing within the 
framework of the American Institute is not supportable 
logically and should not be maintained. So that the forward 
work of the board would also have some influence on direct 
auditing matters.
We concur with the current practice and procedure 
of involving the business community in early discussions 
and projected opinions.
As to levels of performance, we might describe 
our position this way: we presently conceive the board as 
a kind of inverse pyramid, with a lot of effort at the top; 
with a very small underpinning of research either in the 
purchase sense or in the activity sense.
We like to think that ideally the structure of the 
board would really be pyramidal, in the sense that there 
would be a small group of top people, heavily supported by 
competent staff, and heavily supported by formal research.
We have made rough estimates that this procedure 
could cost as much as eight or ten million dollars, but I 
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will have a few comments on that later. Most importantly, 
on the cost side, we feel that at least 50 per cent of the 
total effort should be devoted to research.
This statement we make constructively, in the spirit 
and vigor of youth and growth, without any institutional or 
proprietary bias. We put it forth as a suggestion for the 
consideration of the Commission; we do not take the position 
that any single one of our proposals should be inviolate.
I would like to talk very briefly about two aspects 
of this. There has been some criticism already that we do not 
put enough score on the requirements of practice involvement 
on the part of members of the board. I feel very strongly that 
given a reasonable term, a reasonable cycling of terms, that 
day-to-day involvement with client matters is not necessary, 
and even could be a positive aspect of our proposal.
And just one word about relative cost as between the 
present situation and our proposal. I think if one really does 
cost out what we're presently doing, including the contribution 
of time, imputed implied costs, that there is really not that 
much difference between our present proposal and our present 
experience. But enough for that.
One comment relating to the profession which 
is not covered in our official submission is the matter of 
discipline and enforcement. We regard this whole subject as 
somewhat outside the direct concern of the Wheat Commission; 
we do feel very strongly, however, that particularly 
in its professional interplay with the SEC the matter 
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of discipline and enforcement is a very 
critical forward problem. It’s a past problem as well, 
but it must be handled in the future.
Our firm, Touche Ross, has large disappointment 
in the outcome of the so-called "Seidman Resolution" which 
has not yet been worked into canons. We think it should. 
But most importantly, we simply feel that it is imperative 
that the profession undertake a higher level of interest, 
a higher level of concern, a more timely effectiveness in 
the enforcement of its technical conclusions in the entire 
discipline of accounting.
Mr. Chairman, that’s all I have to say at the 
moment.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me propose a procedure, 
which will involve all of us, to the extent that we have 
time. The panel will have some questions for Mr. Trueblood, 
and then if we have time before we move on, I would like to 
invite any of you who are present to pose a question or two 
which Mr. Trueblood, I'm sure, would be glad to try to 
answer. If none of you have any specific objections we will 
try to follow that procedure throughout the hearing.
On the other hand, if any of you do have any specific 
objections, I would ask you to let me know and we will, of course, 
accommodate your wishes.
Let me ask a question of you. As you know if you 
have looked at any of the papers we have received in 
advance of this hearing, there are a number of eminent 
commentators who have drawn a sharp distinction between 
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so-called accounting principles, basic, fundamental matters 
of a higher nature, and what you refer to as practice pronounce­
ments.
They recommend that there be two entirely separate 
bodies; body number one (perhaps even under separate auspices), 
which would deal with matters of accounting principles; and a 
separate body--of a somewhat lesser stature, I take it--which 
would be charged with dealing with practice pronouncements and, 
if you will, what some people call detailed standards.
In view of your comment that you envisage your board 
dealing with both of these, and particularly in view of the 
fact that you have had the benefit of the experience of chairing 
the committee which is trying to search for basic principles, 
I wonder if you would give us your comments on that proposition 
and your reactions to those proposals?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: I regard, and the Touche proposal 
regards, the subject matter at three levels--broad objectives, 
principles and procedures. How each of them is dealt with is 
a difficult question. I think the Touche position is that we 
must have a compatible and consistent set of broad objectives 
which, I believe, our paper presumes to ultimately come from 
the board, as a sort of companion piece to the work of our 
present objective committee.
The principles are the broad statements of 
applicability to accounting as it is done; the practice 
statements are the more or less procedural aspects of the 
situation.
8
First I would point out that the Board in its 
present method of operation tends to make some distinction 
between what they call the principle level and the practice 
levels in that frequently, if not always, an opinion is 
followed by a series of interpretations at the detail level. 
So the present Board has already made some such distinctions.
In our own proposal, we suggest that the board 
confine itself to objectives and principles, and that these 
procedural implementations and interpretation kind of things 
come either or both from practicing firms or from the staff 
itself.
I think the distinction which was made in one 
paper I read is quite appropriate. I have only recently 
read that paper; I do not care to comment on the structure 
or the organization, which it explicitly proposes, but the 
distinction between the two matters is completely appropriate 
and completely consistent with the Touche position.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me follow that up just a 
little bit. You address yourself primarily to the 
distinction, possibly semantical and otherwise, between 
these different kinds of pronouncements. What concerns me 
more than that is the question as to whether or not in your 
Judgment it would be a desirable form of organization to have 
a separate body dealing with the one under different auspices, 
as in one proposal, and another body attempting to deal with the 
other; whether or not a distinction can be made so sharp that 
there will be no problem in having two separate bodies trying 
to coordinate between each other.
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That concerns me and I wonder if you could give us 
your reaction?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: That is my explicitly withheld 
judgment as a result of my brief exposure to that 
proposal on the organizational structure. I think 
there is a distinction; I think they should, however, be 
blended together; they have to work hand-in-hand, and I 
would be somewhat disturbed if one didn’t have to report to 
the other or they didn't have to coordinate together, and 
so on.
But the distinction is completely appropriate;
I can't conceive that the organizational framework could not 
be worked out.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me just ask one more question. 
You draw this explicit distinction between the principles 
and the procedures or practice pronouncements. I have been 
puzzled by that distinction from the beginning, but that's 
understandable since I am not a professional accountant.
On the other hands I would like to give you one 
example and ask your opinion. You indicated that the present 
Board does draw a distinction between what you refer to as 
principle and what is referred to as procedure in relation 
to its process for interpretation.
Let me give you an example of an opinion; I believe 
it's 18, which deals with the equity method. Would you regard 
that opinion as dealing with a matter of principles or a 
matter of practice pronouncement?
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MR. TRUEBLOOD: I would say that that portion 
of the opinion which deals with the conceptual correctness 
of picking up equity in an associated company is a 
principle. All the detailed rules and procedures about 
percentages and circumstances and caveats, ought to come 
out as a practice bulletin.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Do you really think it's 
feasible to have one organization announce the principle 
and then a totally separate organization attempt, without 
having had the benefit of the debate, concern and 
philosophical discussion that goes into the formulation 
of a principle, to take that as a given affair and fill 
out these details. Do you visualize that some lack 
of coordination might creep into that?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: You're pressing me on this.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I am. I don't have an answer 
which is quite satisfactory.
MR. TRUEBLOOD: I have taken the position that 
there must be, by one arrangement or another, a high degree 
of coordination, cooperation and collaboration. After all, 
it's the profession that has responsibility for all three 
levels of pronouncement, and one way or the other, the 
profession must find a way for them to hang together.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me just follow that for a 
moment. You would prefer to see Opinion No. 18, instead 
of being contained in one single integrated pronouncement, 
separated out into various and sundry parts which 
would be issued separately at separate times?
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MR. TRUEBLOOD: I think the substance of 18 could 
be stated in at most a paragraph or two. The interpretations 
and detailed rules sort of follow on naturally in most cases. 
I submit that in Opinion 11 there is a very long series of 
interpretations and questions and analytical decisions about 
details, many of which were not even on the table for 
discussion; they came up later.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Trueblood, is it really possible 
for a group of men to sit on high and pronounce on matters of 
principle without considering and being enmeshed in the 
problem of how they would be applied--whether or not the 
principle really works in practice? In other words, can you 
really separate these things and say, "We're going to announce 
this principle, but it's up to somebody else to worry about all 
the details?"
MR. TRUEBLOOD: You cannot sit in this room and talk 
about principles without thinking about impact. You cannot 
sit in this room and draw up 125 detailed applications without 
considering what went on in relation to principles.
But my point is really that one follows from the 
other. And I want to go back one step further and say that 
it is the Touche position that objectives are fundamental; 
principles follow from objectives, and practice implementation 
details follow from principles.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: My questions, as you understand, 
are not designed to press you too much. But as a layman and 
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a practical lawyer trying to figure out whether or not it’s 
feasible for somebody to pronounce on matters of principle 
without having to have his nose rubbed in the problem of 
practice and whether or not these principles will. work, I 
am concerned about separating the two, 
MR. TRUEBLOOD: There is no question that a high 
degree of coordination is required. In the Touche proposal 
we do not make that separation as between bodies, but we 
contemplate a separation as between responsibilities for 
these two issues. The principle, as between the Touche 
proposal and the one you’re talking about is not inconsistent. 
The organizational framework is different from what we 
contemplate.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: There’s one point, Mr. 
Trueblood, that doesn’t come out quite clearly in your 
statement. You say that your reconstituted board would 
consist of the best professional accountants in the country; 
you say that the practicing profession can neither share 
nor delegate the main responsibility for this matter. It 
isn’t quite clear from your statement whether you envisage 
your new board as continuing to be an arm of the AICPA or 
whether members of the board will have to be members of 
the AICPA. Also, how do you respond to the view that 
because accounting is so important to the whole economy, 
the board should not be composed exclusively of professional 
accountants ?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: I think the intention of that 
statement, and I believe I submitted a clarification of 
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that statement, is that we regard the board as properly 
consisting of accountants, but not necessarily CPAs. And 
in my own personal view, not necessarily members of the 
American Institute, because that’s an interlocking problem. 
As distinguished from a proposal which might include men 
from other disciplines such as the behavioral sciences, I 
think the Touche proposal contemplates that that kind of 
input would best be secured from two sources: either purchased 
consulting or membership of other disciplinary people on 
active project advisory committees, support committees, etc.
The second part of your question had to do with 
public sector versus the private.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: I think I was concerned about 
bringing onto the board disciplines other than accounting.
MR. TRUEBLOOD: Yes. Did I answer that satisfactorily? 
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: Yes, thank you.
MR. PRYOR: I have two questions. First, would the 
accounting profession support the opinions rendered by a small 
board of the size you described? Secondly, could you describe 
a little more specifically what you visualize in terms of 
these broad objectives?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: In response to your first question, 
I think I would say categorically that the practicing profession, 
as I know it, would support the opinions of the smaller board, 
even though it means that certain firms would not always have 
representation on that board, or might never have representation 
on the board.
14
I think this goes back to one of the reasons 
we’re here. The profession wants a strong, viable, accepted 
group which will establish opinions for use of the profession 
I have no concern on that score.
Your second question, about the distinction 
between objectives and principles is a little bit more 
complex and one which the objectives study group is reviewing 
every day and finding difficult. One can say simply, that 
the objective of financial accounting or financial statements 
shall be that they shall give all necessary and useful 
information to all users. That’s a broad statement of 
philosophy about which we could have no problem.
Then one runs into a series of what we might 
call institutional constraints, one of which is independence, 
for example. Then you go to a third level or characteristics 
such as causality, comparability, consistency. Next, I 
think one goes down one step further to prescriptive char­
acteristics, such as fair-value accounting versus historical 
cost.
This is the philosophical, conceptual underlay 
for methods of accounting, as distinguished from rules 
and regulations.
MR. OLSON: Do you regard the appearance of 
independence to be an important factor in suggesting a 
smaller, full-time board?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: It’s not critical to my thinking 
about a full-time board. As far as I'm concerned, and 
Touche is concerned, we know enough about the workings of 
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the Board and have been so heavily involved that dependency in 
fact is not a valid criticism. I do feel that the automatic 
seats, the automatic representation of certain firms does 
create a problem which relates to the appearance of independence 
from the public point of view. That is not a significant or 
major reason underlying the Touche proposal.
MR. LEVINE: Mr. Trueblood, carrying that a step 
further, how do you anticipate that this board will be appointed? 
Have you given this any consideration?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: Not in the detailed organizational 
sense. Presently, Board appointments are made, I believe, on 
recommendation of the Board of Directors with approval of 
Council--am I correct, Mr. Savoie? Is that how it is?
MR. SAVOIE: The President appoints with the approval 
of the Board of Directors.
MR. LEVINE: Are you suggesting that the selection 
would be under the auspices of the Institute?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: Yes, I presume that the selection 
would be under the auspices of the Institute. I presume that 
recommendation would come from other professional groups, such 
as Financial Executives Institute.
MR. BIEGLER: Mr. Trueblood, one point is not 
absolutely clear to me. What fundamental feature is involved 
in your proposal that would suggest that the end product of the 
effort of this board will be any better or any more acceptable 
than the end product of the present Board, which is strictly a 
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voluntary operation. This Board has out of its eighteen 
members the equivalent, certainly, of more than seven 
full-time persons.
MR. TRUEBLOOD: My concerns on that point are 
threefold: First, given a part-time, volunteer boards in 
most cases, if not in all, the individual members of the 
board are devoting a great deal of time and attention to 
the affairs of the board in a very dedicated, thorough and 
admirable way. But, at the same time they do have clients 
to take care of; they do have telephone calls, and the like. 
This is a distractive process, and it tends to take away 
from their total involvement with the board.
Also, I really think that as an organizational 
matter, as a psychological principle, total involvement 
with any procedure, is significantly different than casual 
or part-time involvement with that same project, no matter 
how sincere the effort.
I can further attest that in our own experiences 
on our objectives group, where we are presently working with 
total full-time staff as distinguished from a part-time 
staff, the difference in the production and attitude is very 
apparent and the result is very apparent already.
May I make one more point: Although you  
may regard the main thrust of the Touche proposal to be the 
smaller board, an equivalent thrust is enlarging the face 
of this parameter in terms of staff, competent, expensive, 
and full-time, and research, purchased from or contracted 
with the best people in the world who can do that piece of 
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research. And that, in terms of the ultimate output of the 
board, is equally important to Touche as the reconstitution 
of the physical body.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: That part of your proposal is 
not inconsistent with the present Board, which could have a 
broader staff base.
MR. TRUEBLOOD: But they do not.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: But they could have.
MR. TRUEBLOOD: Yes, they could have. This is how 
our conversation got started. It is our view that many 
opinions go out without any empirical research; any fundamental 
research; sometimes with relatively little conversational 
research. This is one of the things we are urging you to 
consider seriously and to make whatever suggestions you wish 
regarding it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Trueblood; almost all of the 
discussion we have had has had to do with the mechanics of the 
process of arriving at principles and pronouncements on practice. 
In 1964 the Institute adopted a Council resolution indicating; 
generally, that the objective was to narrow the range of 
alternatives in generally accepted practices; and thus to 
narrow all the choices that were then present in preparing 
financial statements.
Do you still regard that objective as a primary one, 
and is it your general observation; and the basis upon which 
you make your proposal, that this work should proceed more 
rapidly and effectively in the future than it has in the past?
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MR. TRUEBLOOD: When you tied in 1964, were you 
speaking explicitly of the Seidman resolution and the 
discipline part of it, or were you speaking of the broader 
question?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: The broader part.
MR. TRUEBLOOD: There is no question in my mind 
that we must proceed further and faster in making like 
things look alike and making unlike things look different; 
narrowing the differences, or however you want to put it. 
We have made some progress, but not enough. We must 
proceed.
Along with that we should have enforcement 
procedures, too. It’s not your business, but an important 
part of the issue.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me comment on that. It is 
our business, in a sense, because we have had eminent and 
experienced people advise us that in their judgment the 
task of establishing these principles and practice 
pronouncements ought to reside in the Government. It is 
not the business of the accounting profession to do this; 
it is a public matter which should be handled by an inter­
disciplinary group such as the Securities Exchange Commission. 
The SEC has this responsibility under statute and ought to 
pick up the ball and do the job. They say we ought to put 
an end to this business of trying to do the job in the 
private sector. A part of that proposal, of course, is that 
this would bring together the organization which is doing the 
enforcing and the organization which is doing the pronouncing.
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It would, therefore, ensure better enforcement than we 
have today.
I wonder if you would comment on that?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: The constrasuggestion--the Government 
suggestion--is certainly logical and viable. In our 1969 paper 
we took the position that the profession had two alternatives. 
One was to withdraw completely and let the Government do it. 
The other was to get with it and do it creditably ourselves 
and work along in the historic manner with Government agencies.
I have two comments. The first is somewhat trivial, 
I suppose, but it has certainly been our experience in accounting 
areas that where certain agencies have taken over the rule­
making process completely, the experience has tended to be bad 
in the sense that there is a lag, an inflexibility about detail 
governmental rules and regulations.
More importantly, I think the transfer of the function 
from the private sector to the government sector raises some 
very broad philosophical questions which you must consider. 
The best source material on this I have ever found is the late 
Flexner, who did the study on the medical profession and 
education in 1912, '14 and '16. He has an explicit article, 
which I think runs from about 1920, in which he attempts to 
define a profession. And one of the five or six cardinal 
characteristics he sets forth is that if the subject matter be 
professional, and if the discipline is properly handled in the 
private sector, one of the principal characteristics is self­
discipline.
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So if accounting is truly a profession^ then 
self-discipline must come from us. It seems to me that 
that is going to be the test. We get with the self­
discipline or we lose a lot of other things.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I wonder if anybody in the 
audience has a question for Mr. Trueblood? You are 
welcome to ask him. Mr. Gibbs has a question.
MR. GIBBS: How long a term would your men serve?
MR. TRUEBLOOD: We did not go to that level of 
mechanical implementation. There have been several 
suggestions of three-year or five-year terms, with no more 
than one repetition; and seven-year terms with no repetition. 
There are quite reasonable parameters which would be 
acceptable to us.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Any other questions?
We thank you very much.
MR. TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much for hearing 
us again.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Next on the program was
Mr. Bernard Maas of the American Stock Exchange, but unfortunately 
he found it impossible to be here. So if Mr. Etra is here, 
we would proceed with him. I hope he’s here.
Mr. Donald Etra of the Corporate Accountability 
Research Group, Washington, D. C.
MR. DONALD ETRA: Thank you, Mr. Wheat.
It certainly is a privilege to be here this 
morning because the accounting profession holds a high 
responsibility to the public. Both the courts and the
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profession itself have come to recognize that the accountant's 
primary responsibility is to the public as opposed to the 
management group which hires him and pays his fee.
I myself am a public interest lawyer from a firm 
of four public interest lawyers. This last year we organized 
what is known as The Company to Solicit Questions on Professional 
Responsibility. As a result we've received letters from the 
professions--law, medicine and accounting--from individuals who 
have expressed criticism of their own profession.
I would like to bring you, this mornings in touch 
with some of the ideas that individual accountants have brought 
forth to us. I would also like to present four challenges to 
the accounting profession:
Firstly, the challenge to strive for greater 
uniformity in accounting procedures;
Secondly, to reassert the independence of the 
accounting profession;
Thirdly, to accept liability--a better word might 
be responsibility-- for the work of each individual accountant;
And fourthly, perhaps the most exciting challenge, 
to accept a leadership role in innovating for the public good.
Firstly, on this question of uniformity. What the 
accounting profession has strived for over the past couple of 
years is a conceptual framework. Why do accountants do the 
work that they do? What use is made of financial statements 
to which accountants certify? Investors make use of these 
statements, creditors, labor groups look at the statements to 
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see if they're getting a fair share of the profits; 
consumers look at the results of the corporation to see if 
the prices which are charged are just prices, and government 
regulators make use of these financial statements to compile 
aggregate data to evaluate performance of the economy.
Are financial statements comparable? At the 
moment, unfortunately, no! And this is where the problem 
lies, because if financial statements are to be useful to 
the above-mentioned groups, an investor must be able to 
compare the performance of one company against another.
The availability of alternate procedures makes 
it a hard task to compare the financial statement of 
Company A to the financial statement of Company B.
In short, perhaps what is needed is an "esperanto," 
a common language for the accounting profession. If 
uniformity is not possible on an across-the-board basis, 
then I suggest that the AICPA take a leadership role in 
suggesting uniform accounting standards within industry 
groupings. Industry groupings can be based on the Standard 
Industrial Classifications. If that doesn't work, refine 
these classifications.
The Small Business Administration finds it very 
difficult to analyze the performance of companies when they 
can't compare financial statements of one company or 
another.
As you know, the Government last year conducted 
a feasibility study on the establishment of uniform cost 
accounting standards, and Congress felt that cost accounting 
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standards and uniformity in that area were feasible. In fact, 
it was estimated that out of the $70 billion of business the 
Government does in contracting with defense contractors, 
perhaps $2 billion could be saved if the Government were able 
to compare the statements and compare the cost estimates of 
those companies with whom it contracted.
Should not similar savings be available to the 
private sector? Comparability and usefulness would be one way 
of ensuring that financial statements would again become 
relevant to those who rely on them.
My second challenge is one to reassert independence. 
This challenge is related to the question of uniformity. If 
an accountant can choose among alternate accounting procedures, 
then management can say, "Paint me a picture which will show 
that I have done a good job," and management will tell the 
accountants"You can do it because you’ve got the alternate 
procedures available."
We’ve got to create uniformity, restrict the 
alternative procedures available, and that will be one way 
for the profession to reassert its independence.
I’d like now to present to you a hypothetical 
situation. For instance, I propose a suggestion, you follow 
my suggestion and then you come to me and say, "How did I do 
by following your suggestion?" I've got a proprietary interest 
in my answer, because I made the suggestion which you 
subsequently followed.
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This, Gentlemen, is the situation which exists 
in the accounting profession when accounting firms also do 
management consulting work.
Professional. Ethics Opinion No. 12 is entitled, 
Independence—Auditors’ responsibility to avoid relationships 
which to a reasonable observer might suggest a conflict of 
interest. The opinion concludes that an accountant can 
give management advice as long as in doing so he does not 
impair his objectivity.
The crucial question is, does the giving of 
management advice impair an accountant’s objectivity? I 
know that the AICPA has taken the position that playing a 
dual role does not impair a CPA firm’s objectivity. But 
how does the public view an accountant who plays a dual 
role?
Professor Abraham Briloff conducted a study on 
this issue. The conclusions of his study, after polling 
investment analysts and other men in the financial field, 
was that 58 per cent of those polled felt that objectivity 
was incompatible with accountants’ giving both accounting 
advice and management consulting advice.
A potential conflict of interest exists with any 
group that’s on two sides of an issue.
I make no charges that a real conflict of interest 
exists. I do assert, however, that we should at least have 
the opportunity to see what are the results of an accounting 
firm playing a dual role.
Therefore, I suggest to this body today that you 
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require disclosure of those clients of accounting firms, to 
whom the accounting firms give management advice. At least 
let the public see that the accounting firm is playing a dual 
role; let the public judge whether the accounting firm can be 
as objective and independent as it asserts that it is.
I also suggest to this body that it examine the 
financial statements of those companies who use the same 
accounting firm that certifies the statement as the accounting 
firm which gives management consulting advice.
The Corporate Accountability Research Group is 
disturbed by the trend over the past few years--and this 
brings me to my third point--that the AICPA has sought to 
restrict the liability of accountants. The AICPA, in its 
amicus curiae brief in the Continental Vending suit, stated 
that as long as an accountant adheres to generally accepted 
accounting principles, he should be free from liability.
On one hand, one can see from the accountant’s 
point of view it is perhaps wise for him to cover himself and 
say, "As long as I'm within the purvue of GAAP I’m okay; no 
one can assert that I'm breaching any fiduciary rules.”
However, I'd like to suggest to the AICPA at this 
hearing today that a policy of strict liability be imposed. 
It is not enough to say that you simply follow generally 
accepted accounting principles, if those principles themselves 
do not provide a reasonably prudent investor with that which 
he wants to know.
In short, there is a credibility gap in generally 
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accepted accounting principles, and this credibility gap 
does not reflect honor on a profession which has been 
known throughout history as an honorable profession; as a 
profession with a high degree of integrity; a profession 
that accepts responsibility for its work.
My fourth challenge to this body today is the 
most exciting one. I ask the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, and I ask each individual 
accounting firm here today, to take a leadership role in 
innovating for the public good; to try to expand the 
interpretive indices available to accountants; to analyze 
the social consequences of some of the corporate actions 
that we see in the world today.
Gentlemen, I ask you to analyze the costs of 
producing an unsafe car. What is the cost in terms of 
life? What is the cost to society and communities in 
terms of failing to put pollution-restricting devices on 
chimneys and after-burners? The true costs of these if 
reflected in accounting statements would heighten the 
public interest. Investors and stockholders would then say 
to corporations "All right, men, we see that there’s more 
to profit than money. We also want a better environment; 
we also want better cars; we also want safer streets for 
our children.”
Yes, General Motors can make more money by putting 
a fancy hood ornament on a car. But consider the brain 
damage to little children when their brains are penetrated 
by these dashboards and the hood ornaments which run into them. 
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There is more to analyzing costs than mere profit and money; 
pollution, safety, environmental factors.
This profession can innovate and develop these new 
interpretive indices.
I ask the AICPA to take a stand on the disclosure 
hearings, on the issue of product-line reporting. The 
Small Business Administration, small businesses, the Government, 
would like to know the specific areas where large conglomerates 
are doing business and making profits.
This is important to the financial data the Government 
assembles; this is important to the small businessman; and this 
is important to the consumer and the public, because corporations 
today do not exist within a vacuum; they have a tremendous impact 
on the public and on the communities in which they exist.
I ask the profession to assume an attitude of 
preventive medicine. It does not reflect credit on the 
accounting profession when so many brokerage firms went under 
during the past two years. Accountants are privy to the goings 
on in corporations. They are aware of many of the financial 
decisions. Why shouldn’t the accountant step in and say, "Stop!” 
Eight months from now the public is going to find out what’s 
going on, we can halt the situation now before innocent consumers 
are hurt.
Therefore, Gentlemen, I present to you four challenges: 
One, to strive for greater uniformity; two, to reassert your 
independence; three, to accept responsibility for the work of 
individual accountants, and four, to take an exciting leadership 
role in developing new interpretive indices in working for the
28
public good. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I might comment on two points. 
One of them has to do with this business of accounting for 
social costs and things of that kind. I’m sure you. are 
aware of the fact that Mr. Trueblood’s committee is in the 
very process of considering that aspect of the objectives 
of accounting. I am sure, therefore, that you will want to 
deliver your views to that committee, which is just starting 
its interviewing process.
That really is probably more in the area of their 
effort than it is of our task.
The second comment is on the subject of line of 
business reporting--breaking out the separate segments 
of the business conglomerate. I believe that it’s 
appropriate for me to comment on the fact that the Accounting 
Principles Board has that subject on its very active agenda, 
and is in the process of studying the question.
I think the question boils down to this: The 
Securities and Exchange Commission today has certain 
rules requiring the breaking down of the financial 
statements of a conglomerate into its various segments. 
However, the disclosure requirements of the SEC do not 
require that the product-line information be certified by 
independent accountants. And the basic question, I think, 
is whether or not that process can be regularized to the 
extent that it can be covered by the auditor’s opinion and 
standards developed to a greater extent than they are today.
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MR. ETRA: I would hope so. I would hope that even 
before the Trueblood Committee does come to its conclusion that 
we in this room today would exert an influence on management in 
terms of asking them to analyze more carefully the true cost of 
what they’re doing on the product-line issue. Unfortunately, as 
the situation exists today management can decide what product­
lines it feels it has, and perhaps this vitiates somewhat the 
progress made along these lines. I think the AICPA could at 
least take an unofficial or an official stand for greater 
disclosure as a whole, this being merely one aspect of the 
disclosure issue.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I would like to ask you one question 
as a matter of clarification. I’m sure that you're aware of 
the fact that the word "uniformity" is kind of a pejorative 
word in accounting circles. One of the reasons is that uniformity 
is associated historically with so-called uniform systems of 
accounts.
I’m sure you’re familiar with the recent report of 
the staff of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce relative to the Penn Central situation, and the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and its jurisdiction over the 
accounting of railroads and railroad subsidiaries. If not, 
you will want to look at it.
The Interstate Commerce Commission busies itself 
with uniform systems of accounts, which don't always produce, 
in terms of financial reporting, the kind of results one 
might wish.
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There have been other examples in Government 
of pinning everything down to a certain rigid formulation 
and then putting numbers into slots. Too often, that is 
the vision that is conjured up by the term "uniformity” 
in accounting. Whereas, I believe that you had in mind 
as you explained the matter--and I just want to be sure-- 
a reduction in the number of alternatives that can be used 
in the same situation covering the same circumstances. This 
would reduce the number of choices that can be utilized to 
flavor the accounts in a different direction--is that what 
you had in mind?
MR. ETRA: Exactly--the reduction in the number of 
alternatives. What I was getting at was that the former 
mentor of the SEC, Mr. Carey, explained that there were many 
areas where there were alternative procedures to produce 
materially different results.
He listed some of them back in 1964 and some of 
these alternate methods still exist--depreciation, income 
tax allocation and inventories. This lack of uniformity 
seems to be a frustration that the SEC and many of the 
observers of the accounting profession have. There is no 
comparability, and, therefore, the usefulness of the 
accounting statement to the layman is somewhat vitiated.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: My only suggestion is that the 
word "uniformity” is unfortunately not a very specific word 
and doesn't really mean, I don’t think, what you have in 
mind. I think clarification here is important, because we 
want to be sure we’re all talking about the same thing.
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Gentlemen of the panel?
MR. LEVINE: I’d like to ask one question about 
independence in management services. Could it not be equally 
said that the fee itself influences the independence? To 
what extent do you go in trying to evaluate independence? Isn’t 
independence in essence a state of mind and a condition that 
exists in a profession; something that has to be upheld regardless 
of the other influences upon it?
MR. ETRA: The idea of receiving a fee is inevitable. 
It's hardly likely that people will work for nothing, but the 
idea of——
MR. LEVINE: But could it not influence the 
independence?
MR. ETRA: I think that question would have to be 
thrown open to the floor, to those people who receive fees. 
Do the accountants here today feel that the mere receiving 
of a fee influences their decision; influences their professional 
judgment?
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: It seems to me that everything 
you've said, or very much of it, is slightly tangential to the 
main thrust of this group. You have addressed yourself to 
certain questions of professional ethics which fall into the 
area of the Institute's Ethics Division; you are dissatisfied 
with what we presently regard as generally accepted accounting 
principles, and that is very much the concern of the Trueblood 
group.
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We’re principally concerned here with the method by 
which those principles are formulated. I didn’t see anything 
in the paper which you distributed at the beginning of the 
meeting, that could be described as suggestions for improving 
those methods.
Do you have anything to say in response to that 
specific point? What kind of machinery would you like to see 
replace the present machinery for the formulation of accounting 
principles?
MR, ETRA: I would concur with those proposals that 
have to do with a full-time board. I would add to those 
proposals that representation on that board not be restricted 
to accountants and a few academicians, and that investors, 
creditors, labor, consumers and Government regulators be on 
that board itself.
The gist of my comments is not necessarily the 
composition of that board, but what the board comes up with. 
Is the board capitulating to management by encouraging a 
great deal of alternative accounting procedures?
Mr. Solomons, you talk about the tangentiality of 
my remarks. I think what’s wrong is that accounting standards 
lack a conceptual framework. What I’m trying to do this 
morning is to point out certain philosophical underpinnings 
which are vital to the accounting profession-independence; 
restricting available alternatives; accepting liability and 
accepting a role in developing new social cost accounting.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I was going to comment that you 
heard my last question to Mr. Trueblood regarding his reaction 
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to the basic task of whatever body we have--the body which he 
recommends or the Accounting Principles Board--to continue to 
narrow these differences and eliminate alternatives.
I take it you don’t have any exception to his comments? 
They would be similar to yours.
MR. ETRA: My comment would be similar regarding the 
SEC's acceptance of its jurisdiction as given by the Securities 
Act. The history of it seems to be that each SEC chairman 
speaks at an accounting meeting and says, "You fellows do it, 
and we'll go along.” That's all very well, but accept the 
challenge and do the job of serving the public.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: What you're saying, in effect, is 
that you do regard the accounting profession as a profession, 
and that you would ask that the accounting profession and its 
institutions get with it and do the job.
MR. ETRA: Exactly, with respect to expertise. And 
I would hope independence could be added to the expertise.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me comment on one very interesting 
point that you raised. I happen to have with me a summary of 
Mr. Carey's testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce and 
Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 
1964 to which you referred. You will recall that Mr. Staggers, 
chairman of the committee, instructed Mr. Carey to submit a 
report on what were the alternatives and which ones the SEC 
considered to be significant. You correctly referred to some 
of them.
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But there is another point that it will be 
interesting to touch on; there were eight areas that were 
specifically referred to by the SEC in its submission.
The first area was the valuation of inventories, 
which I think you mentioned, an area which I don’t believe 
has been fully dealt with yet.
The second area was depreciation and depletion, 
which is another area that remains on the agenda of the 
Accounting Principles Board.
The third area, income tax allocation, was 
essentially dealt with in APB Opinion No. 11, as I recall. 
This rather full and detailed analysis and opinion has been 
followed by the profession, I understand, almost without 
exception.
The fourth area was pensions, where business had 
much leeway in deciding what amount they wished to put into 
their pension fund. This area was studied extensively and 
dealt with by the Board in Opinion No. 8 which narrowed 
significantly, I believe, the areas of alternatives in 
pension plan accounting.
The fifth was research and development costs. 
This remains on the agenda of the Board, with a research 
study under way.
The sixth was goodwill, which was, as you know, 
dealt with in Opinion No. 17, which requires amortization 
over a maximum period of forty years, I believe.
The seventh was a broad question: When is income 
realized? This subject has been dealt with in a number of 
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areas by the Board. I refer particularly to a recent Opinion, 
especially applicable to real estate matters, on accounting 
for receivables and payables. Some people refer to this as 
the imputed interest Opinion. It's a technical Opinion, yet 
very controversial and deals explicitly with the subject.
The eighth is the all-inclusive versus the current 
operating performance income statement. I believe that was 
dealt with in an Opinion several years ago. Mr. Barr perhaps 
can refer to the name of it--
MR. BARR: Number 9.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Opinion No. 9. This was a basic 
objective which was largely realized in Opinion No. 9. 
That is the list of principal matters which was 
referred to by the SEC and the Congress in 1964. I leave it to 
you and the audience to judge whether or not there has been 
some marked progress, but in addition some important areas not 
yet dealt with.
MR. ETRA: If fifty per cent of the task remains to 
be done, and you can accomplish it in the next few years, I 
would hope that the purpose of our meeting here today would be 
served.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Now let me ask the audience if they 
have any questions for Mr. Etra. Would anybody like to comment 
on what he said or ask him a question.
(There was no response.)
I guess we have a relatively silent audience today. 
Mr. Etra, thank you very, very much.
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MR. ETRA: Thank you, sir.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I'm glad to see that we're 
running ahead of schedule. We will try to stay that way, 
but we want to allow maximum time for those who are on our 
program and for anyone here to ask his fill of questions. 
Our next speaker is Mr. John Rapp of Louis Sternbach & 
Company. I hope he is here because he was scheduled at 
eleven forty-five.
MR. JOHN RAPP: In dealing with the questions 
that have been suggested for this meeting, we construed 
our brief, rather narrowly. We have attempted to follow 
rather closely the group of questions arranged under five 
main subdivisions as a primary responsibility, rather than 
to go into the more abstract and philosophical fields.
I do want to remark, in reply to the question 
concerning use of principles of financial accounting or 
reporting standards, that we side rather strongly with the 
use of financial accounting and reporting standards.
To us, principles while absolutely essential 
conjure up something rather abstract and we are concerned 
with the workability of What comes out of the deliberations 
of the Accounting Principles Board.
Principles and procedures must be researched and 
explored. But if we deal with principles from the purely 
academic point of view, we may possibly not be as much help 
to the users of financial statements as we would like to be. 
To the extent that we are practicing accountants, we might be 
a little out of our depth as compared with the academicians.
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I don't want to downgrade the fact that there are 
broad fundamental principles underlying any kind of procedures. 
I think, however, that we must strive for the development of 
workable standards within the overall philosophical thinking 
that is probably common to most of us in the profession--the 
basic fundamental of what financial statements should be. 
Procedures should point to the most desirable way of implementation 
but not prescribe them. I am rather taken back when at times we 
verge on the rule-making process.
It may sometimes be inevitable to veer a little bit 
that way, but I think we have to be very careful that we do 
not prescribe operating procedures in such detail that we tend 
to put out cookbooks. We must leave plenty of scope within 
well defined parameters for the profession to exert its fullest 
professional Judgment.
I draw attention to the uniformity that was described, 
for instance, by certain regulatory agencies or the uniformity 
that prevails in countries other than ours. I believe the 
public is ill-served when there is such a situation. In 
certain countries in Europe there is in force at present a 
system of forcing things into prescribed bases.
I believe in at least one of the countries the so- 
called opinions read in accordance with the law, or in 
accordance with such-and-such regulations. We have something 
to protect.
Now, I may sound like a one-man cheering section when I 
come to who should have the primary responsibility of performing
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the task. I think the task should remain in the Accounting 
Principles Board, possibly with slight revisions and additions. 
I think the responsibility should be that of a professional body 
rather than that of a governmental agency or governmentally 
appointed body.
I do not want in any way to downgrade or belittle 
the mission given to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
I am concerned that when responsibility for accounting 
principles is taken out of the private sector, it becomes 
colored by political considerations, consciously or unconsciously.
It might swing this way or that, according to the 
prevalent views of the philosophy of the government of the day. 
I’d like to see standards formulated to stand for a long time 
by people who know what they are about and who will do so 
without fear or favor and not be swayed by political or semi­
political considerations; by people who, besides their expertise 
in accounting techniques, should bring additionally the expertise 
of the surrounding disciplines, such as economics and finance 
and various others that contribute to making this meaningful.
I certainly would want to continue a very close and 
harmonious working relationship between the Accounting Principles 
Board and the SEC, because I think there has been a wonderful 
amount of professional understanding and give and take. I 
believe this is something not likely to be superseded. I 
would like to see that relationship extended. Those people 
that have problems with the SEC should more readily ask for 
consultations, rather than inviting a letter of deficiency at 
some later date.
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As to the composition of the nongovernmental standards 
boards we would like to see representation from accountants other 
than CPAs, maybe one or two of those who have demonstrated 
leadership and imagination in working towards more adequate 
reporting.
As to the CPA composition, I think there should be 
a good cross-section in the sense of public practice, non­
governmental practice, and industrial practice. And within the 
public practice sector, I would like to see some representation 
from the local or regional firms in addition to people from the 
very large firms. While the affairs of large corporations are 
influenced by large firms, ninety or ninety-five per cent of the 
businesses that are not that large are guided by the smaller 
professional firms. I think they should have a voice in the 
deliberations.
In some of these smaller regional or local firms the 
spirit or alertness and inquisitiveness is just as great as some 
of the larger firms.
As to whether this should be a paid or unpaid board, 
we would like to see the present volunteer board continue, 
because we think the very distinction of serving on such a 
volunteer board would be sufficient compensation to the person 
serving.
One way in which this could be made practical would be 
that partners of firms could be sent to the board for a certain 
term, so that they could be free from distractions.
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I would like to see a lot more support from 
people just below full board stature. They could come in 
and help the Accounting Principles Board on research, maybe 
on a share basis--where their firm pays half and the AICPA 
pays half.
In that way you could, over a period of time, 
find material for succession to the Board.
I would like to see the entire profession finance 
the Board. If it means a large increase in dues, I think 
that's the way it should be, because the profession has a 
stake in the financial support of the Board and its activity.
While we would not discourage contributions from 
a research foundation, we would like to see the financial 
support as broadly based as possible. In this way the smaller 
man has a very great awareness of his stake in what is going 
on.
The procedure of the hearings, I think, is desirable 
and adequate. One thing occurred to me when I saw an opinion 
passing by a vote of 12 out of 18; would it be possible to 
review such opinions after a lapse of two or three years, to 
see whether they would have achieved something like a 75 or 
80 per cent majority. Or, to see whether the application of 
these rather touchy, controversial opinions have sort of 
proved or disproved themselves in the first year of practice.
It was asked in the questions, I recall, if there 
should be provision for an appeal procedure from opinions. 
I do not think that anything smacking of an accounting court 
would be advisable because it would introduce too much rigidity.
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I think the appeal should come from good communications from 
and to the board.
To me accounting has a dual character: it is in 
part a science; but also an art and thus nearer 
to the essence of reality.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you, Mr. Rapp.
At the very outset you touched on a matter which is 
of great interest to us. It is the matter of elusive analysis, 
and it came up very briefly when we were talking with Mr. 
Trueblood. It is this business of drawing fine distinctions 
between principles, standards and practices. This causes me 
some concern, and I was particularly interested in the comment 
that in your judgment the primary job of the Board is to 
develop workable accounting standards. And that by and large, 
these high principles are matters which accountants pretty well 
know and recognize.
There seems to be a bit of disagreement over these 
matters, and I am not sure that they are all matters of semantics. 
But I know that some part of this confusion may have been 
engendered by the name which this organization has always had-- 
the Accounting Principles Board. In fact much of what it has 
dealt with has not been one-sentence or one-paragraph principles, 
but more detailed matters such as the illustration I gave 
Mr. Trueblood, Opinion No. 18.
I just read--and I hope I’m not anticipating-- the 
comments of the National Association of Accountants. On page 6 
of those comments this Association makes the following comment:
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"We recommend that a new name be created for this 
body to make clear that there is a complete change in, and 
departure from its current procedures." Suggested designations 
included, The Council, on Financial Reporting Standards, and 
The Financial Reporting Standards Authority. The name 
"Financial Accounting and Standards Board" has also been 
suggested by at least one other person.
What is your reaction to the question of confusion 
which I raise? Would there be any merit in making a change 
of name, here, under these circumstances?
MR. RAPP: My reaction to the change of name would 
be favorable, because it would more clearly indicate what in 
our view this board sets out to do: narrow the areas of 
differences in accounting and reporting treatments, and, 
therefore, arrive at something more workable, more informative, 
and more in the public interest.
To me it would correspond much better to what I 
perceive the role of the board to be.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: We had some questions earlier in 
our discussion about whether or not it is feasible or desirable 
to allocate to this same body the task of setting forth a 
conceptual framework, i.e. a set of basic principles, if that 
can be done. Or should that task be wholly separated from 
the body which has the basic task to do. I would appreciate 
it if you would let us know your reaction to that.
There is a rather sizable number of people who are 
concerned and who believe that the job of setting forth the 
conceptual framework is important. As you know, it is a task 
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the existing Board has been struggling with since it was formed. 
It has not yet successfully produced a set of basic principles to 
which everybody on the Board could adhere.
What is your comment on whether this should be a 
continuing responsibility of this board, or should be wholly 
separate?
MR. RAPP: It would depend on whether we see this 
board as purely a reporting or accounting standards board. 
The question of the underlying framework is something that goes 
deeper than that. It might possibly be the province of some 
other bodies, or drawn from the representative membership-- 
a parallel study similar to the one put out by Mr. Grady a 
good many years back. This study was very informative and 
illuminating, but not really an APB pronouncement. It was done 
by another part of the Institute.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me ask you just one more question, 
for the moment. You indicated that you wanted a professional 
body and that you felt a volunteer board would continue to be 
desirable. There has been, as you know, serious question raised 
with us about the appearance of independence.
Some say that when you have a volunteer board, it 
appears that members of the board may be subservient to strong 
client pressures. They say this appearance is unsatisfactory 
and the whole process may break down as a result.
I take it from your conclusion that you would not 
regard that as necessarily true, and that in any event you would 
regard the volunteer board as the better solution. Is that 
correct?
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What is your comment on this independence problem 
we have to face?
MR. RAPP: I would regard independence as a state of 
mind which is very difficult for the outsider to evaluate.
I would consider that people of sufficient leadership caliber 
to serve on this board, would have enough independence not 
to be subservient; not to be pressured. To the extent that 
continued firm affiliation during tenure on the board might 
cause an appearance of lack of independence, perhaps some 
mechanism could be found for these people, during their tenure 
on the board, to take a leave of absence from their firm. They 
could return once their term is over. This would make it 
clear to the public that they are dissociated from the operating 
decisions of their firms.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: That suggestion might conflict, 
might it not, with your desire to be sure that important and 
experienced accountants from local and small firms are 
adequately represented on the board. It would be extremely 
difficult for such gentlemen to sever their relationship 
from their firm.
MR. RAPP: It might be difficult but not impossible. 
It would all depend upon the degree of public spirit that the 
particular person had and the extent to which he would be 
willing to work for the improvement of principles and standards. 
I can see where certain persons might be glad of a chance to 
spend time away from operating decisions in the interest of 
improving the profession.
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MR. BIEGLER: Mr. Rapp, in response to one of the 
questions, you agreed with the thought that perhaps some 
clarification would result from renaming the body to something 
like, the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Proceeding from there, would it be your thought that 
a similar clarification would follow if the reference in the 
accountant’s opinion was changed from generally accepted 
accounting principles, which tracks the Accounting Principles 
Board, to some other reference?
MR. RAPP: I think that would be quite necessary. 
That would lead me to some other areas of unhappiness I have 
with the present wording, namely accepted by whom.
We may possibly think now of revising the short form 
opinion; some clarification might be in order.
MR. BIEGLER: I'll ask one other question in quite 
a different area: In your paper you refer to the possibility 
of the board having approximately twenty-five people. The 
present board is eighteen; we heard earlier from Mr. Trueblood 
a suggestion for a board of seven. Do you think it is practical 
for twenty-five board members to reach a decision or decisions on 
a timely basis; or don't you consider that a problem?
MR. RAPP: I would like to see within that somewhat 
larger board; constant work on the part of smaller subcommittees 
with frequent meetings of the full board to evaluate, praise, 
criticize, and reject.
If it calls for more frequent meetings, then so be it.
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Maybe it would be good public relations to know that this 
board is now meeting every month, so that the people that 
complain about nothing being done know that something is 
being done and somebody is regarding this as a matter of 
urgency.
For this to be workable they would have to have 
very good staff.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: As a point of clarification, I 
think it might be worth noting that the Study Group has 
examined into the history of the Board, including the time 
consumed on projects and the frequency of its meetings. As 
you point out, Mr. Rapp, there has been an evolution here.
In the first year of its existence the Board met 
three or four full days in the year. This current year 
meetings which have been held or scheduled will consume 
about thirty full days of work.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: It's not quite clear, Mr.
Rapp, why you think a board of twenty-five men would be more 
effective than one of the present size or even smaller.
MR. RAPP: I suggest the possible enlargement of 
the board to accommodate representation from non-CPA 
accountants in industry who have shown leadership in 
financial reporting, and representation from the smaller 
regional firms.
I do not want the board to be too heavily weighted 
by these additional elements. Otherwise, there may be a 
possible injustice in the composition of the board.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: In your written statement you 
spoke of having an increase in the membership so that the public 
interest is served. Mr. Etra also wanted to see the public 
interest served, but for him those words meant something very 
different than I think they mean to you. In your statement, 
the public will be served by having only accountants on the 
board; not necessarily CPAs. You’re somewhat contradictory, 
because you say in one place it should be composed of CPAs, 
and you say elsewhere that there should be one or two executives 
who are not CPAs.
MR. RAPP: Non-CPAs who have shown leadership should 
be invited. What I really meant was that the balance should be 
CPAs.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: What do you have to say about the 
public interest being served by a board of this kind?
MR. RAPP: To me the matter of financial reporting is 
a matter for accountants, provided that they are sufficiently 
broad in outlook and training, and have support from related 
disciplines. I think they are the ones who would be able to 
police and regulate, instead of having people with other 
interests come in from the outside, whether they be attorneys 
or financial executives. I think it is a case of accountants 
putting their house in order to lead the profession strongly. 
It should be a continuing self-policing, self-disciplining 
effort.
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PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: About members of the board 
being on leave of absence from their firms, in universities 
we make important distinctions between paid leave and 
unpaid leave.(Laughter)
MR. RAPP: I was hoping that it might be a paid 
leave of absence from the firms. I did not fully investigate 
this, but I would hope that firms willing to have members 
work in the general interest of the profession would not 
cut off the money.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: That also raises the point 
that the Chairman mentioned before--if a man is on paid 
leave, is he, in the eyes of the world, really any more 
independent of his firm that he was before?
MR. RAPP: Maybe each situation would have to be 
judged on a case-by-case basis. If the person concerned 
would be in a position to render the service without being 
paid by the firm, maybe that might be done. The firm would 
support him only as necessary.
But again, I am mainly concerned with the actual 
presence of independence. While I don't believe in 
concealing things, it does not have to be publicly announced 
that a member of the board is on a paid leave of absence 
from his firm.
MR. PRYOR: I’d like to understand one thing a 
little more clearly. As I understand what you were saying, 
in order to improve the quality of the decisions by enlarging 
the group and broadening its base, you would be willing to 
accept such greater inefficiencies as might develop from the
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expanded size. Or don't you think that would be the result?
MR. RAPP: I don’t think the additional number of 
people would necessarily cause more inefficiency. But, it 
might be desirable to study what’s going on within the Board 
as it has been performing, in order that it become as 
efficient as possible.
We think of a twenty-five-member board, for 
instance, as one that could have five or six working sub­
committees at the same time.
MR. PRYOR: Of course, they use subcommittees now.
MR. RAPP: I know, but with a larger board they 
could have more subcommittees, and could go into details of 
structure and timetables. And even though it would have 
greater and more comprehensive representation, that in itself 
would not necessarily cause added inefficiencies; it could 
work the other way.
MR. OLSON: Mr. Rapp, while you’ve made a number of 
suggestions in your paper, I get the impression that you don’t 
characterize yourself as a severe critic of the present APB 
operations.
If that impression is wrong, I wonder if you might 
focus on the prime area that causes you concern with the 
present setup.
MR. RAPP: I am indeed not a severe critic; I 
think the APB has made great strides towards narrowing 
differences in accounting practices. I know there’s a lot 
to be done in many areas, and I think rather than trying to 
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toss out what the past has brought us, we should capitalize 
on what we have. Possibly by fairly mild and not so mild 
reforms, we could go on with what we have.
I am afraid of a lot of complications and 
unwieldiness in the case of restructuring, and also afraid 
of a lot of confusion on the part of the public. I think 
the public has gotten used to the fact that there is 
something called the APB. If that existing body can be 
made into a sharper more precise instrument than it is, 
I would prefer that.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Rapp, you may recall 
Mr. Trueblood's comment that he does not think it is any 
longer feasible to separate the formulation of accounting 
standards from auditing standards. He would like to see 
the auditing standards and financial accounting standards, 
under one roof, so to speak.
There is an intermediate position which has been 
suggested to us, and I think it might be particularly important 
to get your views on this, in view of your comment about the 
auditor's short form opinion. Some say that although auditing 
standards should remain under the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on Auditing Procedure, the language used by the 
certified public accountant in rendering his opinion upon the 
financial statements ought to be a matter of concern to the 
standards board; it should be placed under its jurisdiction, 
for such reform or revision as might be indicated.
What is your view on this?
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MR. RAPP: My view of this is a strictly personal 
one. I would like to see the responsibility for the auditor's 
opinion remain where it is. However, I would want to see the 
Committee on Auditing Procedure have its thinking affected by 
whatever goes on at the APB, or however we name it.
In other words, there should be continued cross­
fertilization of ideas and probably exchange of views from 
one to the other. I don’t think much will be gained by putting 
things under different hats. Maybe I'm too much of a gradualist, 
but I believe in judiciously pushing evolution.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Your comment about the opinion of 
the auditor was of great interest to me. There have been a 
number of suggestions, and I would particularly comment on the 
paper submitted to this Study Group by Mr. Carl Tietjen.
The general thrust of his comments, and others of 
similar character, is that the certifying accountant should 
state, in his opinion, that he has approved, in essence, the 
presentation as being a fair presentation, rather than stating 
that the financial statements are fairly presented in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles. This is not 
quite the same as saying fairly presented, but a somewhat 
ambiguous mixture of the two. Mr. Tietjen and others have 
suggested that what we need in the accountant's opinion is a 
statement that the principles and practices used are the 
appropriate ones for this situation. This places the responsibility 
on the certifying accountant; what is your reaction to that?
MR. RAPP: My reaction is quite positive. To the 
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extent that it makes the certified public accountant live up 
to the standards of his profession, so be it. When rendering 
his opinion, he should be expressing it on fairness.
The opinion could be cross-referenced to the work 
of the APB or the standards board, by stating that there 
has been no significant departure from the reporting 
standards prescribed by the profession. Maybe two things are 
necessary: approval as a certified practitioner, and a 
statement that there has been no material departure from 
reporting standards.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I take it that your comment 
recognizes that there may be cases in which a departure 
from a particular opinion or standard might be justified 
because of peculiar circumstances, with the departure 
giving a better presentation and avoiding some misleading 
point.
MR. RAPP: That is really why I phrased it the way 
I did.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: So that the departure would be 
disclosed?
MR. RAPP: Yes.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I want to see if I understand 
perfectly what you're saying. What you are saying is that 
the accountant's opinion might state two things: one, that 
standards announced by the standards board have been followed, 
unless a departure is justified; and that he approves, as being 
a fair presentation, the standards which have been applied in 
areas not yet covered by standards.
MR. RAPP: The language must be polished up considerably, 
but basically I think these two ideas should be included.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Now, are there any questions from the 
audience? We have two; would you identify yourself for our 
reporter, please?
QUESTION: My name is Don Zima from Daytona Beach, 
Florida.
Would you explain why you feel that a separation of 
the principles board from the practice and procedure section 
wouldn’t be feasible and of ultimate benefit? Might it not 
be a limit on interpretations or representations of these 
procedures?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I regret that I have given the 
impression that I feel very strongly about that, because I 
don’t. I am seeking information and sometimes lawyers seek 
information, as you well know, by propounding a view and 
asking what the reaction is to it.
I did not intend to indicate that I felt strongly 
about that.
Do you? (Laughter)
MR. ZIMA: I believe as you do.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I haven’t indicated how I feel. 
(Laughter) I'm not doing very well.
MR. ZIMA: I think there should be a separation.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: It’s not my job to indicate to you 
gentlemen how I believe. I'm hopefully going to conceal that 
for the time being, because I have not made up my mind, nor have 
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any of us. We are here to gain enlightenment rather than to 
project our individual viewpoints as they might be. I would 
hope that our minds are open; we are here to learn the views 
of those who are appearing at this hearing. So I would 
repeat again, this is a matter in which I am interested in 
viewpoints.
QUESTION: I am Luke Patrick, President of 
Continental Gas Pipeline Corporation, Houston, Texas.
Mr. Rapp, I understood you to say that you felt 
generally that independent accountants should continue to 
establish accounting principles, and that they should put 
their house in order. I'm interested in knowing why you 
conclude that the business of establishing accounting 
principles is their province exclusively.
MR. RAPP: Accounting standards should be 
established by those primarily concerned with the task of 
accounting reporting. They gain an insight into what is 
fairest in accounting practices among widely different 
industries, occupations and circumstances.
I believe that independent accountants might 
be better placed to formulate such standards than highly 
skilled accountants in a particular industry or group of 
industries. They might possibly take on the color of their 
particular industry or industries.
I think the range of the professional accountant




MR. PATRICK: Speaking of the responsibilities of 
the business accountant however, for properly reporting and 
recording the results of his business, wouldn't you grant him 
some equal expertise and knowledge in the area of accounting 
principles?
MR. RAPP: I am in favor of having on the standards 
board representation from non-CPA accountants in industry 
who have shown leadership in that particular area. And by that 
to make the weight of their leadership, their insight, and their 
acumen felt.
MR. PATRICK: Then I understand. I misunderstood 
your answer to the previous question. You didn't intend it to 
be entirely the province of independent accountants; it's the 
house of all accountants.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Yes?
QUESTION: George Sorter from Chicago.
Mr. Rapp, I'm interested in your proposal of a full- 
time, twenty-five-man board.
MR. RAPP: I didn't advocate a full-time board.
I was advocating a volunteer boards heavily part-time; not 
a full-time board.
MR. SORTER: One of the criticisms of a part-time 
board is that it does not permit the interaction, the total 
involvement,, this sort of symbiotic relationship toward a 
joint product. This is the position that Mr. Trueblood took 
earlier today.
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You tend to get fragmented and sort of non­
cohesive positions. Don't you feel that would be accentuated, 
if you enlarged the board to twenty-five?
MR. RAPP: I can see the dangers you outline, but 
as I said before, it doesn't have to be that way. It all 
depends on how much imagination and effort you put into it. 
If people living in different parts of the country want to 
get together, what is to prevent them from catching a plane 
and having a meeting face to face?
MR. PRYOR: With your volunteer board would you 
want a full-time paid chairman? You didn't mention that.
MR. RAPP: I did not address myself to that question 
and have an open mind on it. It might possibly be necessary 
under the circumstances. I have not specifically suggested 
an answer because my thinking has not yet crystallized.
MR. PRYOR: But you don't rule it out?
MR. RAPP: I do not by any means rule out a full- 
time, paid chairman.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Ladies and Gentlemen, let's 
break for lunch and plan to reconvene promptly at one- 
thirty, or a little earlier if possible.
(The morning session ended at twelve-ten o'clock.)
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WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION 
November 3, 1971
The afternoon session of the meeting of the Study 
on Establishment of Accounting Principles convened on Wednesday, 
November 3, 1971, at one-thirty o'clock, Chairman Wheat presiding.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Next we will hear from Arthur Andersen 
& Co., represented by Harvey Kapnick and George Catlett, who is 
an experienced member of the Accounting Principles Board. We’re 
delighted to have you both.
MR. HARVEY KAPNICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would 
like to identify the fact that our brief, which has been presented 
to you, represents the firm's viewpoint on the matters before your 
Study Group, as well as my personal viewpoint, as chief executive, 
and George Catlett's as Chairman of our Policy Committee.
I would like, if I could, to take just a little 
different tack from some of the presentations this morning. In 
opening I'd like to identify why we are here and why we have 
taken the position that we have in our brief.
First of all, I think we should all recognize that 
we're here for one basic purpose: In most respects we are the 
ones that are responsible to the public for proper financial 
reporting. There is a public interest involved in this subject; 
one of the most sincere public interests that I think exists 
anywhere in the world today.
The second reason we're here is because we have 
elected to have self-regulation. In any type of self-regulation 
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problems can become more severe, and accountability for 
responsiveness to this public interest can become much 
greater.
There are four points I would like to cover with 
you this afternoon.
The first is that in any type of self-regulation, 
in any type of public interest, the need for criteria for 
decision-making is almost overwhelming. They should be 
identified and published so that everyone can understand 
what the decision-making criteria are. I strongly want this 
to be part of the record. Obviously this is not part of 
your study, but is part of the entire problem. Unless the 
criteria can be determined, I feel strongly that the issue 
of self-regulation may well be academic. If we were to go 
to the public sector--in other words to the SEC--these 
criteria, would not, I believe, be as important because a 
regulatory body, under laws of the country, can do what they 
decide without relating to the logic of a decision.
In self-regulation, however, every decision we make 
must be logical, and must be tied to the type of criteria 
that was previously developed.
I go from there to the next point: in self-regulation 
we must have three additional points other than the criteria. 
First, we are not self-appointed arbitrators; we are responsible 
for the determination of sound accounting. But all interested 
parties should have a right to be heard and have their views 
considered by whatever body is determining what principles 
should be.
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I can relate that to the SEC if we were to go into the 
public sector. Obviously they do have a procedure whereby all 
interested parties can be heard, and differing viewpoints reconciled.
A second point that I would like to make in this area 
is that a record of the views and the pertinent background and 
reasoning for the decision are absolutely necessary in any type 
of self-regulation. It is an understanding of the reasoning 
and background, and the reconciliation of viewpoints which gain 
their acceptance or non-acceptance.
There is a third point, about which we talked a little 
bit today, that is the need for the appearance of complete 
independence. I would say that the further we go into self- 
regulation, the greater the need for appearance of independence. 
The key issue in the entire deliberations may well rise or fall 
on the issue of independence.
There are many areas of this question of independence. 
Many years ago--and I think you can talk about many of these 
ramifications for some of you may have questions--when the 
profession was discussing ownership of securities by independent 
auditors, the same questions and considerations were discussed. 
We elected as a profession to self-regulate our independence.
I think this is the same issue we have today.
I want to make sure that the record is clear. I am not 
in any way saying that members of the APB today or in the past 
have not been independent per se. I think that anyone who has 
read the newspapers and participated in discussions, however, 
must recognize that there have been questions raised with regard 
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to the appearance of independence. That is the context in 
which I would like to leave it.
The question of whether or not the present APB 
or the past APBs have been independent will only be answered 
by history. It is not necessarily a subject that we should 
explore further unless, of course, you want to.
With those remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would be 
happy to answer any questions you might have with regard to 
our proposal, and my comments.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you very much, Mr. Kapnick.
Mr. Catlett, do you have any comments you want to 
add?
MR. CATLETT: I think I'll wait for the question 
period.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Kapnick, you referred at the 
outset of your comments to the fact that the accounting 
profession is responsible to the public for proper financial 
reporting. Your emphasis was on two things: one, that the 
independent accountant has the basic responsibility to assure 
that the public receives the very best financial reporting; 
and two, this responsibility lies very heavily upon the indepen­
dent accountant in the function that he has to perform.
At a later time you made a comment that I'm not 
certain is entirely consistent with that. You said, "We are 
not the self-appointed arbiters.” I would certainly second 
that comment, and add that it appears to me that the Securities 
Acts of 1933 and 193^^ particularly the latter, indicate a 
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a conscious choice by Congress to interpose the independent public 
accountant into the process of disclosure to investors, rather 
than having Government send out auditors as was originally 
proposed. The choice was made in the Congress, after the 
eloquent intervention of some leading members of the accounting 
profession, to delegate to the profession the task of protecting 
the public and making certain that the financial statements meet 
the highest standards of disclosure and fairness.
I would take it, therefore, that the accounting 
profession--and I would ask you if you agree with this--is not 
a self-appointed arbiter at all. Rather, it has been designated 
by a special Congressional philosophy and by the intent of 
Congress to play a very significant role in making sure that 
financial statements are in accordance with the highest standards 
of disclosure.
It was determined at the very outset that this essential 
function did not have to reside in a group of governmental 
accountants.
Would you comment on whether or not that is a fair 
analysis of your statement?
MR. KAPNICK: There are three observations I would 
like to make on that. First of all, we’ve got to separate the 
attestation function from the development of accounting principles.
In that regard, the attest function under the law clearly 
belongs to the public accountant. It is my recollection that 
the law does not identify the accounting profession as the one 
responsible for the determination of the principles that are
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followed. I think that we have to clearly establish that 
as a point of fact.
If we are going to determine accounting principles, 
which, as indicated in our brief, we think we should, then 
we have to assume and execute that delegated responsibility 
with the very highest degree of professionalism available to 
us .
Therefore, when I indicated we weren't the self- 
appointed arbiters, it was in the context of needing as much 
input from everybody as possible.
Any new organization must have that as a criterion 
and as a part of the program, or we are going to fail in this 
role. It was in that context that I wanted to make that 
remark.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I think I understand your position 
more clearly, but, let me see if I can clarify it a little 
more in my mind.
On page 21 of your brief, you say that during the 
past forty years "...the accounting profession has borne a 
significant responsibility in the development of accounting 
principles. We believe that the basic responsibility for 
developing accounting principles should continue to rest 
within the accounting profession as represented by the AICPA." 
You go on to point out the need for a restructuring which 
emphasizes independence.
I take it that your view is a twofold one; first, 
that the basic responsibility, although you recognize that it 
is heavily upon the profession, should remain with the 
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profession. However, you would want to make sure that better and 
more constructive arrangements be developed for input between the 
business community and those who are particularly affected by 
these matters. In this way, there would be no question about 
complete due process and the coverage of all viewpoints.
In addition to that, you emphasized the need for a 
relatively public record of steps that are taken and whatever 
influences there are.
MR. KAPNICK: Absolutely.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I have a question that relates to 
pages 23 and 24 of your brief, where you discuss the suggestion 
that there be a full-time group of top quality people who would 
be members of this restructured APB. I wonder if you have given 
some thought to the question of how these people would be 
obtained; from what segments of the profession; what compensation 
ought to be paid to them in order to get the type of people you 
want.
MR. KAPNICK: I think in one section of our brief we 
do explain how we would go about obtaining or nominating in 
the selection process. The selection process that we visualize 
would have the American Institute, the Board of Directors through 
its President, appoint a fifteen-man commission.
The commission would be made up of leading authorities, 
partially from the AICPA and partially from industry, Government 
and others. This commission would select the men that would be 
on the fully-paid board. After they were nominated by the 
commission, they would be ratified by Council. If there has 
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been great dissension over a person, it can be expressed by 
this means. Council does represent a broad spectrum of the 
profession and the academic world and business accountants.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: What I am particularly concerned 
about is the question of what level of salary would or 
should be paid in order to meet your criteria.
MR. KAPNICK: I think the real question is what 
level of salary is required to obtain the top guy? I think 
you’re talking in terms of a minimum of $75,000 to $100,000 
a year for this man.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: In other words, this would be a 
level substantially below the level of compensation of 
important partners of major firms, isn’t that correct?
MR. KAPNICK: I can’t speak for the other firms-- 
(Laughter).
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Wouldn't it be a fair statement to 
say that $75,000 to $100,000 would be substantially below?
MR. KAPNICK: If you're going to get into this line 
of reasoning, you have to put it in context with a time frame; 
with the reputation that the position carries with it; with 
a man's motivation and career. I'm not so sure that those 
who have discussed behavioral sciences relate everything to 
dollars and cents. I think an income of $100,000 in the most 
prestigious part of the profession could well be compatible 
with many people within the profession, if you put it within 
a time frame.
The time frame I'd put it in would probably be past 
the age of fifty. First of all, I would like to see a wealth 
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of experience in this person. I would like to see his maturity 
of judgment and other personal attributes at a mature level. I 
would also like to see a time frame of five to ten years, which 
would almost be the final position a man would carry.
So I personally see this being completely consistent 
with a professional career, and I think that many judges do the 
same thing.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Take, for example, the gentleman in 
the accounting profession who has reached the age of fifty. At 
that point he is very close to the top of his firm, let’s say, 
or he has reached the point where during the next ten years he 
is going to be at the peak of his profession, and presumably at 
the highest earning point of his lifetime.
Do you think you can get this man to leave his 
profession at that point in his career, at a substantially 
reduced compensation and essentially no opportunity to return 
to his firm?
MR. KAPNICK: Why do you say he can't go back?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: You're talking about a relatively 
long period of time. Wouldn't it be difficult for him?
MR. KAPNICK: I'm concerned about the practicality, 
also. I think, however, that we have to ask ourselves the 
same question as it relates to Government. People who go to 
the SEC resign from very substantial positions and take even 
a bigger decline in income than probably I am suggesting.
So that we have the experience in other sectors of 
our life where people, because of various motivating reasons, 
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have given up positions for less income. I think this is 
obviously a key question in any full-time, paid board. But 
I don't know that it is necessarily a controlling factor, 
because we can look at Government and see what is happening 
in the selection of SEC Commissioners, and so forth.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: That raises two questions: SEC 
Commissioners, as you know, are paid at about the level of 
$36,000 or $37,000 a year and they do have massive public 
responsibilities cutting across the area of accounting.
Suppose you established a five-man commission 
in the private sector, with each of the five men being paid 
$100,000 and give them responsibility for establishment of 
accounting principles. Do you visualize any problem at all in 
that men in Government who have basic responsibility will 
note that they are being paid $36,000 or $37,000 a year, 
whereas these gentlemen in the private sector are being 
paid $100,000 a year for a small slice of that responsibility? 
Does that give you any concern or pause at all, about the 
likelihood that such a structure might rather swiftly move 
the whole task into Government?
MR. KAPNICK: Mr. Chairman, I think there are 
several ramifications to your questions. I think first of 
all, we've got to recognize that the SEC has the responsibility 
and the authority for what we have been discussing.
Therefore,, it is to their best interests to make 
sure that the accounting profession does this as well as it 
can be done, or else they will have to take it over themselves. 
If salary is the issue, then I think, as I said earlier, it’s 
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probably there already. We are going to need some type of a 
salary, and there’s no way that I can see of going to $36,000 
on this. It becomes completely incompatible with the type of 
situation we’re looking at. If we don't move in the direction 
of as much independence as the people in the public sector have 
for this, then we are going to move it into that sector anyway, 
and it’s only a matter of when,
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Of course, when we’re talking about 
self-regulation, to which you key this task of the accounting 
profession, we have certain analogies; the New York Stock 
Exchange and other stock exchanges, for example; the integrated 
Bar Association in some of the states; the National Association 
of Securities Dealers.
In none of those instances are the responsible boards 
and groups paid at salaries which would command the top leaders 
of their respective industries or professions. You would have to 
pay roughly the same or more than you have suggested--in the 
neighborhood of $100,000 to get somebody full-time.
What we have had to date in the field of self­
regulation has been essentially volunteers of higher education 
and experience who have been willing to take substantial time 
off from their professions or occupations but who might or might 
not have been willing to divest themselves and serve full- 
time .
I wonder if past experience doesn't suggest that 
the volunteer arrangement comports a little better with the 
question of self-regulation. I'd like your reaction to this.
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MR. CATLETT: I might comment on this briefly. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to all the 
different ways of going about this. I think we all 
recognize that. The question we’re really addressing 
ourselves to is what on balance will give us the best 
approach.
I think in the long run it is likely to rise 
or fall on how good a job has been done. I recognize 
very well the point you are making; I suppose there is 
a little danger there, but I feel there is a greater 
danger in not doing the job well enough. In my thinking 
the number one consideration is the organizational 
structure that will do the very best job. To me, as 
between the two, a full-time group has a much better 
chance of doing a much better job.
As you know I've been on the Board for about 
six years and will shortly be going off. Therefore, I 
may have certain biases. It would be my observation that 
the present organizational structure is not efficient 
enough. This group--as others have said--works harder 
than anybody has a right to expect them to, A great 
effort is going into this work--but the very organizational 
structure and the way in which it operates are terribly 
inefficient.
A great deal of time is wasted; the time lag 
between starting something and finishing it can be shown 
by the record to be too long. I think more and more
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Government agencies and many professional and public organ­
izations wait this long. The reaction period is a very 
present problem; it’s a year before the Board can even get 
something on the agenda.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: We’ve made a study which would 
tend to indicate that after the completion of a research 
study the reaction time of the Board has not been terribly 
long. The great delay has been caused by the enormous time it 
takes to get research studies completed.
Would it be your view that at least a substantial 
part of the problem of efficiency has been that of getting 
research done effectively and quickly so that the Board could 
then have the benefit of it?
MR. CATLETT: That is certainly part of the problem. 
But even beyond that are the subjects the Board should have 
taken up and never did.
Right now there are a number of subjects the Board 
should react to; people need guidance from the Board and we 
can’t give it to them. It’s not because people don't want to, 
but it’s the cumbersomeness of the entire mechanism. There are 
things that possibly could be handled in three or four days if 
they were handled properly.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Catlett, you’ve been stressing 
the question of efficiency and the ability to get things done, 
which was also stressed by Mr. Trueblood this morning. However, 
Mr. Trueblood said that he did not consider this question of 
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independence--the appearance of independence--as critical 
in his judgment. He did not think that lack of independence 
was a valid criticism of the present Board.
I take it that you are in total disagreement 
with Mr. Trueblood on that point.
MR. CATLETT: I wasn’t comparing the efficiency-- 
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I didn't mean to put it quite 
that way. You had indicated that you had no question 
about individuals on the present Board. But I take it that 
there's a fundamental disagreement between you and Mr. 
Trueblood on this question of independence.
MR. CATLETT: I think we put a slightly different 
emphasis on it. We're not saying that Board members aren't 
independent. I think what we're saying is that the public 
interest in this area is very high, probably higher than 
most areas of the American Institute, and that everything 
should be done to achieve maximum independence, both in 
effect and in appearance. That ought to be one of the 
major considerations.
MR. BIEGLER: Mr. Kapnick, in your comments you 
made a statement, if I heard it correctly, that said we— 
and I assume that is the accounting profession--are 
responsible for the determination of sound accounting 
principles.
On page 36 of your brief you say almost the same 
thing: that an accounting profession which retains, on a 
merit basis, the right to develop accounting principles in
This suggests that thea professional manner is desirable.
right could be taken away and put in somebody else’s hands.
I’d like to speculate with you for just a moment, 
and ask what you think might happen if, for example, this 
Study Group were to conclude that everything should go on as 
it is now. What do you see down the road?
MR. KAPNICK: I think that the accounting profession 
will not solve its problems by merely continuing with what it is 
now doing; I have to start with that premise.
Secondly, I think that the press and users of financial 
information have become aware, in the last decade, of the public 
interest in accounting. I can go back not so many years ago 
when there was very, very little interest in accounting or the 
differences between the various alternatives. People accepted 
a balance sheet or an income statement because it was footed 
properly. That day is over.
I think the user groups are now questioning the need 
for more and more disclosure and better and more information 
for their own purposes. Therefore, I think that you’re going 
to see more public interest.
Where is that public interest coming from? I think 
we have seen in recent months what ten years ago would have 
been debated as hotly as anything we had in the profession-- 
Congress stepping in and saying that uniform cost accounting 
standards should be developed not only for Government contracts 
but essentially for all of industry to follow.
You have that in the record. You have further in the 
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record, I think, the fact that Commissioners of the SEC have 
been questioned on this; and even Congressmen are becoming 
interested in knowing why the FPC is doing this and the SEC 
is doing that. They all relate to Penn Central, and say, 
"Hey, there must be something in accounting that we don’t 
understand."
I think you're going to see a greater assertion 
on the part of the Congress as to what has happened in the 
profession. Unfortunately, I think if the economy does 
continue to have its problems and more and more bankruptcies 
occur, there has to be an acceleration of this type of 
questioning.
There was something in The New York Times this 
morning and as I read it I thought,"I hope that doesn't 
happen to us." I think the headline went something like 
this:
"Congress Questions SEC About Why It Took Two 
Years to Do Certain Things in the Securities Industry."
At what point is Congress going to question the 
SEC as to why it took so long for the accounting profession 
to do its Job. There is no question in my mind that even 
though the SEC has always maintained that they wanted this 
Job in the profession, and I think they're sincere in this, 
there is a point in time when they must look to their own 
authority and responsibility as outlined in the Securities 
Acts. I think at that time you're going to see the SEC start 
moving in on an issue-by-issue basis and setting good accounting.
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This is nothing startling; they can do it this 
afternoon and they have done it, on occasion, when the profession 
hasn’t acted. So that would he where I would say it would go.
MR. BIEGLER: Thank you.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: That New York Times headline 
is another straw in the wind to what you’re saying, Mr. 
Kapnick. The SEC is a rather small, full-time body with 
substantial staff. Yet it really doesn’t guarantee a timely 
and speedy response to the public needs in the field of 
securities regulations if the Congressional criticism is 
justified.
What guarantee is there, therefore, that a small, 
full-time APB would be more timely in its response than the 
present one?
MR. KAPNICK: You never have the assurance of 
timeliness with any group. I think, however, that a full- 
time group dedicated to achieving progress in a specific area 
is a lot different from the SEC where they have a multitude 
of responsibilities--for the securities industry, for the 
accounting profession, for registrants, and many other things.
Further, I would like to make it very clear that 
the number of people involved in the determination of good 
financial reporting under my concept would probably be 
broader than it is today. I do not look at whatever group 
would be agreed upon, whether it’s five, seven, nine, as being 
the ones that would do all the research and do all the back­
7^
ground development. I look to other people being deeply 
involved. The main group would do the motivating, handling of 
priorities, and the final decision-making.
I don’t know that there's a conflict, here, when 
we’re talking about one area.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: What other aspects are there-- 
you’ve referred to the efficiency of full-time versus part- 
time board; you have referred to the problem of independence. 
There is a third dimension, of course, which is of concern, 
and that’s the degree of support the opinions of these bodies 
would command in the profession.
Are you at all concerned that a small, full-time 
board would by its very nature have a smaller, narrower base 
of support than a larger, part-time board would have?
MR. KAPNICK: I made the statement before and I 
make it again, that if people think the acceptability of 
present opinions rests upon the fact that the various firms 
are represented on the Board, then I think they are going 
under a misapprehension.
That is not the basis for acceptability. Speaking 
for my own firm, we would much prefer to follow a well 
developed and reasoned opinion, supported by solid research, 
than to follow a set of rules that might come out just 
because we happen to sit on the Board.
I'd like also to point out for the record that 
firms that have dissented on opinions of the APB, have 
followed them. Therefore, I'm not sure that the question 
of acceptability is important as it relates to whether or 
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not you have a volunteer or a full-time group.
MR. PRYOR: I have two or three questions I'd like 
to ask. You mentioned independence as an important consideration 
in speaking about self-regulation.
In your opinion is the problem of management services 
by accounting firms an important element of the problem of 
independence?
MR. KAPNICK: I think that the question of independence 
on management or consulting work has gotten out of context from 
time to time. If you like, I will try to summarize what I 
think this whole thing leads you to.
First of all I don't think that the question of 
whether or not we do management consulting type of work, which 
we prefer to call administrative services, is really the key 
issue. If we are helping to improve accounting controls, if 
we are helping to develop management information systems which 
produce a better product in the accounting field, this is part 
of our role and a proper role for an independent public 
accountant.
There are certain areas, which I don't think we need 
to talk about at this point, where we feel that management 
services do lose the independence. However, this is a firm 
philosophy rather than a professional position, so I'll leave 
that alone.
If you open up this question, then you have to raise 
the question of fees and their relation to an engagement.
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I would not zero in on management consulting 
per se. If you receive a $50,000 audit fee and $500,000 
for installation of a management information system, it 
might look as though you've lost your independence. But 
I have to look at it in perspective, because if you say 
that, then you are saying a $550,000 audit fee robs you 
of your independence just as quickly.
I get around to the point that the whole issue of 
management accounting is not one of the things that bothers 
me or affects the appearance of independence on the part of 
our profession, so long as we stay out of the decision­
making role.
This is the way in which I analyze that particular 
problem.
There is one problem that has been talked about 
from time to time within the profession, and that is that an 
investment banker, for example, doesn't know the relationship 
of management consulting fees to our total income. Therefore, 
there is no basis to say whether $50,000 or $1 million dollars 
is important in relation to a total firm.
All of this still has to be resolved, but I do not 
consider it as important to the appearance of independence as 
others might.
MR. PRYOR: You mentioned the problem of conflicts 
within Government agencies that have responsibility for 
accounting. Do you think this problem is getting better or 
worse, and how might you suggest that it be resolved if it 
is getting to be more serious?
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MR. KAPNICK: I don't think it's getting any worse.
I think there are conflicts, and I think that the present 
structure is acceptable, so long as the SEC is the sole one 
to determine what is sent to the investor.
When other agencies regulate it, there can be serious 
conflicts between two agencies which at some point in time 
must be resolved. All of us know that the SEC and some of the 
other agencies can insist that certain things be done. But I 
think that over a long period of time a whole new procedure will 
be developed to appeal these conflicts. I’m not sure we need 
to discuss or develop that area at this point, but over a long 
period of time I am satisfied that that issue must be solved.
MR. PRYOR: One last question, and George, I think 
this is for you: What staff size do you envisage being 
necessary to support the smaller board that you've recommended?
MR. CATLETT: I don't know that we've given any 
particular thought to the exact size of staff. It’s certainly 
important to have a very effective staff, both on the research 
side and the administrative side.
The organization and quality of the staff and 
management, and the manner in which subcommittees or task 
forces are used, are very important to the success of any such 
organization. With a smaller number you still have a lot of 
work to do, and the staff would have to do certain things. I 
would prefer the concept of task forces. The Board has used 
subcommittees, but these teams have been limited way too much 
to Board members.
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Originally all the subcommittee members were 
Board members; there are a few subcommittees now that 
have non-Board members on them., but it’s still a minority. 
We’re all on four or five committees. It would be better 
to pick people who are particularly knowledgeable in the 
areas under study.
Present Board members are not experts in all 
areas eithers so that the work would have to be spread.
A great deal depends on the type of management--
MR. PRYOR: Do you think you could still get 
volunteer help to work on these new task forces?
MR. CATLETT: That’s being done now. I would 
in this way bring the knowledge of the profession to bear^ 
by having a hand-picked task force on every subject. These 
people do not need to be CPAs^ they can be whatever you 
need for a particular subject. Much of the work would be 
done by these task forces.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Is it a fair statement that in 
your judgment you would include on these task forces 
representatives of business and industry who have particular 
experience in the area under study?
MR. CATLETT: It certainly would. Some problems 
involve some industries more than others.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: In other words, you wouldn’t 
limit it to lawyers and actuaries and so forth?
MR. CATLETT: I wouldn’t limit it at all. I’d 
have anyone who would make an important contribution.
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That has never been done under our present setup. You could 
have 100 or 120 people working on 15 or 20 task forces; and 
I don’t think it would be difficult at all to get people on 
a volunteer basis.
This leads me to one other thing mentioned this 
morning on which I would like to comment: the question of 
whether practices and procedures should be separated from 
statements of principles. I feel strongly that these are so 
interrelated that it almost has to be an organizational setup. 
That doesn't mean that the Board has to issue all these thingss 
but certainly you can't draw a very precise line between 
principles, procedures and practices.
I think opinions ought to be limited somewhat more 
to principles than they have. The principles ought to be set 
forth very clearly. You can look through most Board opinions 
and not even find the principles; they're all mixed up with 
a lot of rules and practices. Perhaps a principle is buried 
someplace, but you certainly have to hunt to find it. I believe 
opinions ought to be backed up some with a statement saying, 
"This is the principle; this is the; reason we've done this," 
and have another document, or a second section of the document 
with the application aspect.
Some of this could be done by the staff; you could 
have two or three levels of documents. Some interpretations 
are now being sent out, but I think that procedure could be 
improved, too. They should be sorted out and treated on 
different levels, and not combined.
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I would certainly hate to see the thing split 
apart organizationally. You might have two different groups, 
but they would be part of the same organizational setup 
and responsible to the chairman of the board. Once you 
work with this, you realize that the application is all 
intertwined.
MR. LEVINE: I would like to ask two questions 
in regard to the desirability of appeal procedures which 
you apparently are favoring in your brief.
Assuming that the body that formulates accounting 
principles is a properly constituted operating body, 
working with the close cooperation of the SEC, why do you 
feel that appeal procedures are necessary? Secondly, 
what type of appeals do you envision being brought forth-- 
specific or general?
MR. KAPNICK: I think the appeals procedure is 
one of the most delicate that you have to deal with. As 
a profession we are giving to the general public our opinion 
on financial figures. I can find in that responsibility the 
corresponding responsibility to determine what is good 
accounting.
But you go to the next question: the application 
of accounting is not by public accountants. Rather, it is 
by management and by financial officers in management, and 
by boards of directors of companies.
So there is an interest on their part in having 
good financial information presented to them. And as more 
of them get into lawsuits involving these areas, I think
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this is going to become even more important.
Therefore you have to think of it more in the thrust 
of giving industry a way of appealing what we decide is good, 
fair accounting. And if a public accountant disagrees with 
what we are saying, shouldn't he have a way of appealing?
If you get it into that context, then the only way 
to make management follow a rule is to make it the law of the 
land. We, as accountants, can't say, "You must follow this 
rule.” Therefore the whole purpose of an appeal procedure 
would be to give the right of dissent, the right to be heard, 
and reviewed. We have already concluded that most people 
already have this; you could take a problem to the SEC. Then 
you would be outside the permissive power that we have and 
into the actual rule-making powers of the SEC.
Quite often you do not get a proper review, if a 
review at all, in these regulatory bodies. That's when you 
should be able to go to the courts to determine whether or 
not a specific procedure or a specific principle was followed.
As you get into more and more of the sensitive 
areas that need attention in the accounting profession, there 
can be significant dangers in financial reporting.
How does an industry go about challenging that? 
I don't think they should challenge it by threatening to 
change from Firm A to Firm Y. They must have a way to appeal.
MR. LEVINE: I don't understand whether you're 
confining that appeal to a specific set of facts under a given 
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set of circumstances, or you're talking about a general 
appeal from the principle as it is formulated.
MR. KAPNICK: I would say both.
MR. LEVINE: If that's available, it would leave 
something to be desired in the entire system.
MR. KAPNICK: Why?
MR. LEVINE: You appear to be making a case for 
legislation, if, in the long run, principles formulated in 
the private sector are subject to--and I'll use the words 
lightly perhaps--willy-nilly appeal, which is what it 
could amount to.
MR. KAPNICK: If you get a willy-nilly appeal, 
then the whole profession has lost its ability to determine 
good accounting. Then you go back to George's earlier 
statement that it's going to rise or fall on whatever comes 
out of this group.
On the other hand, the alternate to an appeal 
procedure is to say that all industry must follow what we 
decide on, and I'm not so sure that I can buy that. I 
think that you have to allow industry--and let's leave the 
public accountants out, because if we have this as part of 
membership in the profession, then everybody that's a 
member would have to follow that, some way of appealing, 
either on a specific case or general basis.
MR. CATLETT: I'd like to make one comment.
When you get into the appeal area, you must consider that 
people have the legal rights; it's not up to us to grant them 
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or withhold them. Any company subject to the SEC can ask for 
a hearing either on specific applications or on a broad 
principle. They have that right, whether we like it or not, 
and I think we've got to operate with that in mind.
There are undoubtedly going to be court tests of 
some of these things over the next few years. The rights of 
people and the real legal procedures may be determined for us.
MR. LEVINE: I think your brief in essence suggests 
that the type of procedure be altered in some way; that it 
is not a satisfactory procedure as far as you're concerned.
MR. CATLETT: I don't believe we think that.
MR. LEVINE: That's what I'm asking.
MR. CATLETT: No, we do not.
MR. LEVINE: Is the present appeal mechanism 
satisfactory, under the circumstances?
MR. CATLETT: The context in which we wrote this 
brief was that for the present, and as far as the scope of 
your Study Group is concerned, we would suggest that you just 
leave that alone because the right of appeal to the agencies 
exists anyhow. I think the only thing you have to think about 
is how that relates to the legal basis of the operations of 
the board.
MR. SMITH: On page 26 of your brief you say, 
"...we believe that acceptance results more from the quality 
of the pronouncements than from who are the members of the APB." 
With that as background, on pages 20 and 21 you say, "Suggestions 
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have also been made for an APB outside the AICPA... However, 
a group so constituted would not be responsible to any 
organization or entity, and we believe that an approach 
of that type would not be effective.” I wonder if you 
could expand on that a little?
MR. CATLETT: What we’re trying to say is that 
in the present context, the American Institute is probably 
the best organization in which to place this entity. But 
the people who serve on it should be the very best people 
we can find, and that the members of this group need not 
necessarily be members of the Institute. Structurally it 
has to fit into some organization, and the American 
Institute is probably--at the moment, anyhow--the best place 
for it.
MR. OLSON: We’ve been concentrating very much 
on the machinery for setting principles, which of course is 
our prime concern. But Mr. Trueblood this morning seemed to 
give great emphasis to the self-discipline of the profession.
You touch lightly on this on page 31 when you talk 
about the legal aspects of enforcement. But you really 
don’t get into talking about the legal aspects. I wonder 
if you might expand on that a little bit?
MR. KAPNICK: I think the need for self-discipline, 
as Mr. Trueblood mentioned this morning when he quoted from 
an excellent legal authority, is in my mind one of the 
overwhelming criterion for any professional organization.
I think that is a beginning and you go then to the 
question of the individual’s ability for self-discipline.
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When you get into the accounting principles area, there is a 
conflict between the self-discipline that’s needed for a 
profession on the one hand, and the lack of self-discipline 
in the development of accounting principles.
I think you get into even more of that in the legal 
basis. If the laws of the country are such that you are going 
to follow the writing off of receivables, then. I have no 
alternative. But if you ask me as a professional accountant 
what is good in. this area, I have to decide whether it’s good 
from a professional standpoint without the legal basis. If 
we can't get to that, then we're going to have to go back to 
having a legal basis for accounting.
MR. CATLETT: It's certainly our position that the 
Institute, in connection with whatever is done, has to develop 
a disciplinary enforcement procedure to go along with it or it 
will not be effective. We have no quarrel with that.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: This has been a valuable discussion.
Thank you very, very much.
We have held up Mr. Wayne Keller of the National 
Association of Accountants. I hope you'll forgive us.
MR. I. WAYNE KELLER: You're forgiven.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, Ladles and 
Gentlemen: Let me say first that I am substituting today for 
Frank Meyers who is chairman of the special committee of the 
National Association of Accountants appointed to draft this 
report. Mr. Meyers could not be here because of business
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commitments.
I would also like to state that we are deeply 
cognizant of the work of the present Accounting Principles 
Boards and the progress that they have made. And if I may 
interject a personal comment, since I have been chairman 
of the NAA’s Committee on Management Accounting Practices, 
I have developed a much deeper appreciation of the problems 
of the Accounting Principles Board.
I will take time only to emphasize certain points 
which have been made in the report which has been presented 
to you. We think that we should refer to financial accounting 
and reporting standards. In our discussion today we are not 
going into all the ramifications of accounting principles, 
as for example, they may pertain to accounting for internal 
control, pricing and other matters. We’re talking only of 
reporting.
There has been a fair amount of discussion this 
morning as to different levels, if we want to call them that, 
of principles and different bodies. These subjects consumed 
quite a bit of discussion during the early deliberations of 
the NAA Committee. We finally settled on three terms: 
concepts, principles and rules.
Maybe these to a degree parallel what are referred 
to in Statement 4 as pervasive principles, operating principles, 
and detail principles. In my personal opinion, I agree with 
Mr. Catlett that our definitions have been confusing.
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What are we talking about? Firsts a level of basic 
concepts, and maybe understandability-verifiability, 
neutrality, timeliness, this sort of thing.
Then we move down to principles. These may relate 
to obsolescence, to prices, to the accounting entity, to 
residual interest} to exchanges. Next comes a set of rules 
by which these principles are applied.
Concepts would be almost like Holy Writ. They 
wouldn’t change very often. Principles would change more 
often, but not every day. Rules would have flexibility to 
adapt to the changing social and economic circumstances.
With one dissenting vote in the committee, we favor 
a non-governmental body, supported by private funds, 
sponsored by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants. We feel that it is important that this body, 
however it's constituted, be closely associated with the 
Institute as the principal body of the profession.
As to composition, we recommend a full-time, paid 
chairman who would be selected as much or maybe more for his 
executive ability as his accounting ability. And then a 
volunteer body, with three-year rotating terms. We have no 
strong feeling as to three or five year terms, but we 
recommend three.
Not more than fifty per cent of this group should 
be practicing public accountants; and not less than twenty- 
five per cent should be drawn from industry or commercial 
organizations--men who are qualified and are intimately 
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associated with the preparation of financial reports. The 
remainder should be selected from the academic field, the 
financial community, and so on.
Of course, we have placed full emphasis on 
adequate and capable staffs and we also feel that this 
body must operate with a number of committees.
In this connection we believe that there should 
be, at least initially, a committee on concepts, a 
committee on principles--there may be several committees on 
principles, and then committees relating to rules. These 
committees need not be appointed from within the body, but 
might be chaired by a member of the body. The composition 
of the committees should parallel the composition of the 
body that we are recommending.
We think we need a new name to indicate to the 
public that this is a complete change.
We have outlined certain steps, and in these we 
want to emphasize empirical research. We feel that before 
an exposure draft is submitted there should be empirical 
research through simulation, with actual testing in the 
field to determine what the effect of that opinion would 
have been had it been in existence.
This we feel is a most important part of research.
That is a summary of our report. I'll try to 
answer questions from the committee.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Keller, I have just one 
question on your excellent report. On page iii, at the
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very bottom, you mention, as a criticism of the Accounting 
Principles Board, that it has reversed itself on several 
occasions.
One might argue, as one gentleman did this morning, 
that it's desirable for the Accounting Principles Board to 
review after a few years, a controversial opinion on which 
there was considerable dissent, to see whether or not it’s 
really working in practice. And if it isn’t, to have the 
courage to reverse it in the light of that experience.
Do you regard that as a bad practice?
MR. KELLER: No. It’s a matter of how quickly you 
reverse yourself. But again, it’s the opinion of our 
committee that had there been empirical research in some of 
these areas, there wouldn't have been the reversal; the first 
opinion would have been better. They would have had more 
unanimity of agreement.
MR. PRYOR: I don’t think you mentioned whether 
you wanted a majority vote or two-thirds vote?
MR. KELLER: We have not. That’s sort of a house­
keeping thing that we didn't address ourselves to. 1 think 
it would be the opinion of our committee that we would 
certainly have to have a majority and probably a two-thirds 
vote.
I might mention that the Management Accounting 
Practices Committee of NAA requires a three-quarters vote.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: On page 8 we observe that you 
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believe that the new body does not require an appeal 
procedure.
MR. KELLER: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I take it that you would 
generally agree with the representatives of Arthur 
Andersen who prefer to leave the situation as it is.
MR. KELLER: That is correct. We feel that 
there would be no need for a courts because the very 
people who make up the body would carry sufficient 
weight, and because of existing procedures--the SEC and 
so on.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me just ask one last 
question: I take it that despite the fact that there are 
different levels of activity, concepts, principles and 
rules, you believe that they should be under one sponsor- 
ship--
MR. KELLER: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: (Continuing) --who--
MR. KELLER: We had considerable discussion within 
our committee on that and finally agreed that it should 
be one group.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Some have suggested that there 
be a separation. You do not favor that?
MR. KELLER: We do not.
MR. OLSON: Mr. Keller, I assume it's fair to 
conclude that your group is substantially dissatisfied 
with the way things are now.
91
MR. KELLER: Maybe substantially is a bit too strong; 
we feel that there is definite need for improvement.
MR. OLSON: You cited a number of areas in which you 
feel there are deficiencies in the operation of the present 
machinery.
If you were confined to a single observation, what 
would you cite as your major concern?
MR. KELLER: I don’t know if I can cite any single 
one as being the major concern of our committee. We did 
discuss the fact that pressures make fire-fighting necessary, 
and that the way in which the Board has been operating has 
kept it from fire prevention work.
Probably our basic objection would be that underlying 
objectives or concepts have not been developed as a test for 
rules.
MR. BIEGLER: Mr. Keller, on pages 7 and 8 of the 
document you filed with us, you lay out nine essential 
steps that seem to be designed to guarantee very effective 
input from all interested parties. And on page 5 in 
discussing the composition of the board, you recommend that 
not more than fifty per cent of the membership be practicing 
CPAs.
Would you care to amplify on your reasoning for 
this restriction?
MR. KELLER: We don’t think the board should be 
too large. We latched onto eighteen because that's the 
present size. We have no strong feeling about a somewhat 
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larger or smaller boards but we do think that the board 
should have representation from those who are actually 
preparing financial statements and also from the academic 
community.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: When you say that no more 
than fifty per cent be practicing CPAs, this doesn’t imply, 
I presume, that the other members either should or should 
not be non-practicing CPAs?
Let me put my question another way: Is it a 
requirement of your scheme that all members be CPAs?
MR. KELLER: No. These men from industry may 
be CPAs.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: But they need not be.
MR. KELLER: They need not be.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: You envisage a full-time 
chairman, and approximately eighteen voluntary members. 
How would the NAA feel about a body which had more than 
one full-time paid member, but might still consist 
substantially of part-time volunteer members?
MR. KELLER: I think you're speaking now of 
staff.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: No.
MR. KELLER: Our idea was one chief executive 
over the body. Yes, under him you may have a director 
of research--
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: But what about a body which 
had a full-time chairman and two full-time vice chairmen?
MR. KELLER: I can only answer that by saying we 
93
didn’t get into it.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: But you wouldn’t see any 
strong objection to it?
MR. KELLER: Not if you had the broad representation 
in the body; I wouldn't think so.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Does anybody else have a question 
for Mr. Keller? (There were none.)
We’re very grateful to you, Mr. Keller, thank you.
MR. KELLER: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Next on the list is the Accounting 
Policies Committee of the Independent Gas Association of 
America. Mr. Allen, we would greatly appreciate having your 
views on the record.
MR. C. M. ALLEN: Mr. Chairman, as I told you at 
the lunch break, I did not come prepared to make an oral 
presentation today.
On the other hand, for the benefit of those here 
who may not have had an opportunity to be aware of our 
written statement, I offered to summarize it and, of course, 
be available for any questions. Mr. Luke Patrick is here 
to assist in fielding any questions.
Our committee agrees with APB Statement No. 4, 
issued in October, 1970, that responsibility for the reliability 
of an enterprise's financial statement rests with its management.
In recognizing this ethical and legal responsibility, 
financial management must have an active part in the establishment 
and development of accounting principles, and financial
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reporting policies and practices.
Our committee believes that membership of the 
APB, or whatever name might be given to it, should contain 
equal representation from the accounting profession and from 
business financial management; and some lesser number of 
members selected from other groups, such as financial analysts 
and academicians.
In addition, in changing the makeup of APB 
membership, the committee also believes that serious 
consideration should be given to making the APB function 
a full-time activity.
The APB's total membership, in order to be 
effective, should be established with not more than twenty 
and not less than twelve members. Pronouncements or 
opinions of the APB should require the affirmative vote 
of at least two-thirds of its members.
The term of APB membership should be so established 
that it will maintain a continuity of purpose and direction, 
with new replacement members coming in at suitable intervals 
of time on a staggered basis.
The financing of the program should be undertaken 
on some equitable basis by the independent accounting firms. 
This manner of funding it would assure uniformity in 
spreading the cost of this activity over the entire business 
community through the accounting fees paid by business 
concerns.
The research facilities of the AICPA and similar 
research resources of business financial management and
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other groups should be made available to the APB. The newly- 
constituted APB, from the time research studies are commenced, 
should seek the advice and participation of all parties on 
such studies; it should also conduct information conferences 
and public hearings on the subject matter. It should expose 
drafts when appropriate, disseminate information concerning 
pertinent views expressed by respondents, and provide for 
rebuttal-type responses to such views.
In summary, the committee believes that business 
financial management is in a unique position of accountability 
to its stockholders, to the general investment public, to the 
financial community, to governmental agencies and to others 
for the accounting principles relied upon in keeping its 
accounts and records.
Accordingly, it carries with it a right and an 
obligation to play a major role in the establishment of 
such principles and reporting practices.
I think that summarizes our position. I’m sorry 
if I took too long to read it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Not in the slightest. I have one 
question. Mr. Keller, representing the National Association 
of Accountants, indicated that his team wanted substantial 
representation from business financial management, but he 
specifically wanted the body to be under the basic sponsorship 
of the American Institute. I notice that you indicated that 
the financing should be by independent accounting firms, but
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I didn’t find in your paper any specific comment as to 
whether you believe that the sponsorship should be under 
the American Institute. Could you clarify that for me?
MR. ALLEN: I think the feeling of our committee 
is that the business community could make recommendations 
for board membership. Likewise, the accounting profession 
could select members from the profession.
Obviously, we don’t have answers to all of the 
questions that might come up. But it is felt that the 
business community should have an equal part with the 
accounting profession in the makeup of the board.
MR. LEVINE: I’d like to hitch-hike on that 
if I may, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Allen, did you consider the 
compatibility and feasibility of the first two suggestions 
in relationship to the full-time activity of a fairly 
expansive board?
Do you think there would be any problem in 
providing these people on that basis?
MR. ALLEN: Undoubtedly you would find some 
problems from time to time in any event. But it strikes 
me that there are people within the accounting profession, 
and within the business community, who have a dedicated 
interest in this effort. I believe you could find highly 
qualified men to fill the positions.
MR. LEVINE: Do you anticipate that they would 
be moving into this position on a temporary basis, on a 
leave of absence, or how would that work?
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MR. ALLEN: Our committee didn't face that problem 
directly. It was considered basically that they would serve 
a three to five year term, possibly subject to reappointment; 
they would be a full-time board; they would be funded through 
some means by the public accounting firms; they would be paid, 
perhaps by remaining on the payroll of the companies they come 
from. I don't think this would materially depart from the 
independence question we have today.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: I'm still somewhat dissatisfied 
with your answer to the question that the Chairman put. I 
think it's worth pressing, because it will arise again in 
connection with the position the FEI will take later this 
afternoon.
If this newly-constituted board, consisting partly 
of CPAs and partly of non-CPAs is not to be sponsored by the 
AICPA, then it had better be sponsored by somebody else--it 
can’t hang in mid-air. It has to be responsible to somebody. 
Arthur Andersen made the point in connection with a different 
kind of board, which they were rejecting, and said ”...a 
group so constituted would not be responsible to any organization 
or entity, and we believe that an approach of that type would not 
be effective." In the context in which they made that statement, 
I think that was a sound statement.
In the present context, if you accept this view that 
the board has to be responsible to somebody, not just to the 
community at large or the business world, who would your board 
be responsible to?
98
MR. ALLEN: I will give you my own opinion. I 
believe the board could very well report to or be a basic part of 
the AICPA and have it function under the auspices of that 
organization. I think it might be a very workable situation.
I think our main concern is that management have 
an equal part in the establishment of accounting principles 
and reporting standards.
I must admit I had a question I wanted to ask of 
Mr. Kapnick, but didn't get an opportunity to do so. Mr. 
Kapnick made the statement, "We are responsible to the public 
for proper reporting." My question to Mr. Kapnick was: Is 
he talking "we" the public accounting profession, or does 
he agree that that includes business management? I don't 
know his reaction.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Is Mr. Kapnick still here? 
(Mr. Kapnick was no longer present.) 
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you, Mr. Allen, very much; 
we appreciate it.
Does anybody have a question for Mr. Allen?
MR. OLSON: I'd like to ask one question, if I 
may. Mr. Allen, I'm still a bit confused about participation 
in this body by members of industry. I can understand the 
desire to have the viewpoints, the input and the expertise 
which is available through that source. But unlike the 
accounting profession, which virtually has one organization 
representing it, I am under the impression that there are 
hundreds of organizations representing the various segments 
of industry.
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If the desire to have members on this body stems 
from a desire to be represented, who, in fact, speaks for 
industry? Who can say they speak for industry? This is 
a large segment of our society.
And if it isn't a matter of representation, if 
it's merely a matter of input, could that not be accomplished 
through other means and other machinery, such as an advisory 
group to the rule-making body?
MR. ALLEN: As some of you may know I’m very 
actively involved with FEI. That would be one means and one 
source, perhaps, of input membershipwise. There are other 
organizations, obviously, the financial analysts, the banking 
community, the investment community, that would conceivably 
be similar sources for business representation on such a board.
MR. OLSON: I gather that you're basically concerned 
with representation from industry, which is somewhat parallel 
to talking about representation from the large public accounting 
firms. Is that correct?
MR. ALLEN: That's substantially correct.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: We're very grateful to you, Mr.
Allen, thanks again, and thanks to Mr. Patrick, also.
Next on the agenda is Mr. George Gibbs, Professor 
of Accounting at Claremont Men's College in Claremont, 
California. Mr. Gibbs.
PROFESSOR GEORGE GIBBS: We've mentioned a little bit 
about self-regulation. I put in eight years on the State Board 
of Accountancy in the State of California, and I helped to
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remove two CPA licenses after due process and hearings.
So it seems to me sort of interesting that we 
worry about self-regulation when we already have self­
regulation to remove a CPA certificate. We have plenty 
of self-regulation.
I have a few written remarks; I'll try to 
summarize them. I would like to call to your attention 
that we’ve already discussed today one answer to the 
question, "What is meant by the term accounting principles?" 
There are two parts to this, and I hope we adopt the 
suggestion made by Professor Solomons in a letter to me. 
He said that the basic things be called fundamentals and the 
other things be called procedures.
So we have fundamentals and we have procedures, and 
between the two we hope to set some standards; that comes 
from a letter Professor Solomons wrote. I’m not speaking 
for him particularly, except he put it in writing.
I do think that we have to consider these fundamentals 
a little. These are things that you cannot quantify-- 
disclosure, materiality, consistency, comparability, 
conservatism, determination of income. There have been 
several efforts at trying to put them in shape without 
success.
I took up all five of the questions of the committee 
and I’ll get on very quickly. My friend, Mr. McMonnies from 
Scotland, wrote an article entitled, "Accountants Are an 
Unprincipled Lot": True or False? (Laughter)
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He reviewed three studies of the Accountants 
International Study Group, which nobody bothered to edit, 
I’m sure, because he found that consistently it was referred 
to as a standard, a convention, a principle, a requirement, 
a criterion, a tenet and an attribute.
Now, what are we talking about? No wonder the 
public is confused when we continue to repeat, as we have 
done for so many years, "generally accepted accounting 
principles."
Also, we never cleared up the idea of generally 
accepted. What groups in the financial community are these? 
That's already been mentioned, but I'll mention it again. By 
what groups are they generally accepted? My contention is 
that they cannot be made generally accepted by edict. I don't 
care who edicts it; the President of the United States can't 
make it generally accepted, if it isn't generally accepted.
Obviously, if the practice of accounting is to be 
changed, then the wording of the auditor's report letter should 
be changed. Probably there should be several versions, and I 
haven't heard that mentioned today, not just one pat statement 
that you can teach a parrot to say.
It should really tell the reader more than it does 
now as to the opinion of the auditor, and how and why he 
arrived at it.
A recent booklet, "The Auditor's Report...Its
"Meaning and Significance, prepared by bankers, says that 
102
no bank officer should make a loan without studying the 
booklet. And then it refers to Accounting Research 
Study Number 7 by Mr. Grady which lists 121 items called 
principles.
I just told you all the uses of the terms; there 
cannot be 121 fundamentals, if we agree with Mr. Solomon's 
definition of fundamentals.
Question two, responsibility for establishing the 
board--we've discussed that quite a lot today, and I agree 
it should be nongovernmental. I have just one thing to add, 
there. It would appear to me that if the revised board did 
a bang-up job, it would remove some of the tedious duties from 
Government agencies; individual standards could be referred 
by other organizations and Government agencies.
Of course, it’s obvious some Government agencies 
would need to supplement basic standards with rules, and 
I suppose we had better use the word rules.
I have only one additional comment on the 
composition of the board. I just went a little further, 
like the Supreme Court, and said it should not be more than 
nine men chosen for life tenure, serving full-time with an 
adequate salary. I didn’t guess what the salary should be.
And then I suggested the majority represent the 
medium and small practitioners rather than being dominated 
by the larger firms. I admit I'm prejudiced because I have 
an office and I'm the sole practitioner.
Then I suggested that board activity be directed 
from a city other than New York--and this may be prejudiced, 
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too--to avoid undue influence of the financial world.
Of course, the cost of board activity should be 
borne by the members of the profession.
I think that alternative procedures should be permitted, 
provided that the significance and results of the choice of the 
particular alternative are disclosed.
The basis must be straightened out and we must stop 
being illogical. Rule 58.1 of the California State Board of 
Accountancy is a good example of being illogical. It says 
term accounting principles is construed to 
include not only accounting principles and practices, but also 
the methods of applying them. How can intelligent men have 
rules like this; how can A include A plus B plus C? It is 
logically impossible, and yet I'm stuck with it because it's 
Rule 58.1.
Having recently commented on drafts of six proposed 
pronouncements of the present Board, I'm convinced the operation 
could be improved. In one case I recommended the deletion of 
forty-six repetitions of the phrase, "Generally accepted 
accounting principles." I counted them--forty-six times that 
same phrase appeared and it didn't mean a thing, because it 
was circular reasoning.
You don't say to yourself, "I hereby develop a 
principle because it's generally accepted." You haven't 
even got to the principle yet.
Now what about research? Being that some of us 
here today are semanticists, I suggest perhaps it should be 
called "search." What are you doing a "research" for? Let's
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do the search; we haven't done that, yet. (Laughter)
I have often thought of this, and it should be search if 
it's the first time a subject is really being studied.
I have a comment on interpretations. A very 
recent ruling by somebody said that any written procedures 
promulgated by the Board will call for interpretation. 
However, it seems improper to me to suddenly state that 
interpretations written by two staff men bring about a 
situation wherein it can be stated, "members (AICPA) should 
be aware that they may be called upon to Justify departures 
from the interpretation."
Now we do need investigation before any action 
is taken toward adoption of the procedure. The staff 
should investigate the problem and report to the Board. 
This report should include references from many sources, 
including the results of the more systematic searchers. 
I tried to break this up into three parts, both in the 
United States and in other countries.
I would like to conclude by saying that it is 
hoped that the new Accounting Standards Board--it’s a good 
phrase--if it acts promptly, will restore the confidence 
of bankers, Government officials, labor, businessmen, 
investors, analysts and the general public in the reports 
made by certified public accountants. Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I take it that you would prefer 
to get through this semantic haze with at least a change in 
the name to something like the Accounting Standards Board?
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PROFESSOR GIBBS: I just added that. I think that’s 
the best thing I’ve heard today (Laughter)--Accounting 
Standards Board. I just had the word "board" and added 
"accounting standards." I didn’t invent it; it came out of 
the meeting today.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: What should the members of this 
board be paid if they're full-time? What should be the range 
of the salaries?
PROFESSOR GIBBS: I admitted that Professor Dickey 
and I were not in that bracket. But if we’re applicants for the 
job, we’re not talking about the same scale. I have heard all 
your discussion, Frank; I’ve been here all day.
I didn’t realize until today that we considered that 
the Accounting Principles Board was to such a degree subsidiary 
to the SEC. I didn’t remember the formulations of Congress on 
the SEC until you read them today. And I haven’t studied the 
SEC as much as other people have.
If that’s true, I think your point is well-taken 
that we might have difficulty in paying $75,000 to $100,000.
I appointed them for life tenure because I didn’t 
think about the age. But, if you're up to the age of fifty 
to fifty-five, as you’ve already mentioned, a ten-year term 
would bring them to the end of their active career. I said 
life tenure because I thought that then they’d really be 
independent.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Just a short question: Suppose, 
for example, that you have a salary range of $35,000 to $40,000 
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a year. Would you be able to get people on that board for 
life tenure or a shorter term, who are the type of person 
now on the Accounting Principles Board?
PROFESSOR GIBBS: I think you’ve got to pay more 
and I think it would be a problem, because a lot of 
competent people have been giving free time to this Board. 
They are the leaders of the profession, and they’ve been 
doing it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: If you have a salary range of 
about $100,000, and, as you suggested this morning, a 
board of about nine people, that's a basic cost of $900,000. 
Add to that the usual cost of supportive staff and the 
overhead that goes with salaried people, which is usually 
50 per cent of their salaries, and you’re up to about 
$1½ million.
Is that amount of money raisable from the private 
accounting profession? And would you consider it better 
spent on these nine men, or would it be better to spend that 
much money on better research, higher salaries for the 
researchers and stronger staff?
PROFESSOR GIBBS: I think it should be spent on 
full-time men, because they're the ones who are bearing 
the decision-making process and responsibility. I've 
learned something else today--that their results could be 
appealed to the SEC; I didn't realize that before. They 
have to be responsible.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: You don’t consider them responsible
today?
1.07
PROFESSOR GIBBS: From what we've heard today, the
Board meets three days every six weeks or so; and we've 
heard how things are going. They’re responsible, but we’ve 
heard that they aren’t effective; they were unable to work 
consistently on things that were urgently needed, because 
they weren’t meeting.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: With matters as detailed, complex 
and difficult as some of the opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board, could they be accomplished in a few days? 
Certain things require gestation time, thinking time, reflection, 
redebate, and so forth, before they are adopted.
Do you think you could get as good a job done if 
you locked people in a room and told them to come up with a 
principle or an opinion? Or would it be better to give them 
a little time to reflect upon the comments and criticisms from 
industry and others?
PROFESSOR GIBBS: There are really two parts to the 
answer. I think some items could be decided fairly quickly 
because there's been so much done in some fields in previous 
years.
Others, I grant you, would require time. I don’t 
know, when they go off for five weeks and then meet again, 
how much time they spend in that intervening period thinking 
about these things.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I might add that we have received 
input from some of the members of the Accounting Principles Board.
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Some of the Board members represent that they spend 90 per 
cent of their entire working time on Board matters; others 
maybe 75 per cent; and in one or two instances 100 per 
c ent.
PROFESSOR GIBBS: Maybe money doesn't have anything 
to do with it if you can get all these volunteers. But a 
sole practitioner couldn't afford to give a year; he 
probably wouldn't be chosen, anyway.
Even a firm with ten partners would find it a 
burden. If a firm had ten partners and, say, sixty employees 
and one of their partners was chosen to give a year, 
certainly his year’s compensation may not be as big as 
Arthur Andersen’s,but it isn’t spread over nearly the 
number of partners.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: There are differences, as you know. 
One chairman of the Accounting Principles Board, who served 
for a period of five years, was a partner of a very small 
San Francisco firm; with substantially less than ten partners.
PROFESSOR GIBBS: Granted. But if he took full-time 
for five years, or 90 per cent of his time, then he put an 
awful burden on his other partners, did he not?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Yes
Does anybody in the audience have a question for 
Mr. Gibbs, who has come all the way from California to give 
us of his wisdom?
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: I don’t have a question, but 
just want to set the record straight. I did not use principles 
or fundamentals in my letter to Professor Gibbs.
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PROFESSOR GIBBS: Excuse me. You used the word 
"standards;" I made a mistake. I don’t know where the word 
"fundamentals" came from at the moment.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: I would like to read this 
paragraph, although the purpose of this meeting is not for 
members of this committee to reveal their position. In my 
letter to Professor Gibbs, I said that, "I am myself somewhat 
favorably disposed to the change in the name of the Accounting 
Principles Board, to something like the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board." I went on to say, that since we already 
talk about standards of air safety, engineering standards, 
building standards and the like, I see no reason why the word 
should be reserved for use in connection with auditing. I 
myself would have no qualms about extending its use to accounting 
as well.
I haven't seen any reason since I wrote that letter 
to change my position.
PROFESSOR GIBBS: I might make one comment on that, 
Professor Solomons: the fact that in auditing we have general 
standards, standards of field work and standards of reporting. 
It appears to be that we have achieved a higher degree of 
understanding with reference to auditing standards than we 
have in accounting.
Someone mentioned today that a revised board should 
take over both the auditing and the accounting functions. If 
they did, and we adopted the word standards for one, we would 
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adopt it for both. I think that probably you are right; 
the word standards doesn’t have so many philosophical 
connotations. Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you, Professor Gibbs.
MISS MULCAHY: I am Research Director of the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: We’re honored to have you 
here with us, today.
MISS MULCAHY: I really haven’t anything to say 
except to offer a word of consolation, if you’re considering 
a change in the name to incorporate accounting standards.
The English Institute of Chartered Accountants 
has a committee called the Accounting Standards Steering 
Committee, which issues pronouncements in that country.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: We’re very much interested in 
the work of the English Committee.
Our next witness is Mr. Thomas Hogan of the firm 
of Haskins & Sells.
MR. THOMAS B. HOGAN: The managing partner of my 
firm, Mr. Michael Chetkovich had hoped to be here. Un­
fortunately he's out of the country, so I'm pinch-hitting 
for him.
What I am about to say is both the view of my 
firm and his personal view.
Our view is that the Accounting Principles Board 
despite the difficulties under which it had to operate, has 
done an excellent job of establishing standards for financial 
reporting during the past twelve years. While some segments 
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of the business community may disagree with certain of the 
conclusions reached by the Boards there can be no doubt as 
to the dedication and the integrity of each member of the 
Board.
The difficulties under which the Board has had to 
operate have stemmed largely from the fact that it has had to 
react to events occurring in the business community, rather 
than being able to consider the whole question of accounting 
principles in an orderly fashion.
The problem is further compounded by the fact that 
each member of the Board has substantial outside responsibilities 
to the firm of which he is a partner, to the university with 
which he is affiliated, or to the industrial concern by which 
he is employed. No matter how dedicated he might be, or no 
matter how well-intentioned, he has had, by force of 
circumstances, to spend only a part of his time on the work 
of the Accounting Principles Board.
The Board has also been hampered, in our judgment, 
by the absence of detailed and penetrating research studies 
in many of the areas in which it has been called upon to 
express an opinion.
These probelms are not apt to go away in the future.
On the contrary, they will increase. The complexities of 
business life, the growth of multinational companies, and 
imaginative innovations in business transactions which we 
witnessed during the 1960s will undoubtedly continue in the future.
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Our proposal is intended to make the task of devel­
oping standards for financial reporting more efficient and to 
alleviate some of the difficulties under which the present 
Accounting Principles Board operates. In our view, the 
development of these standards falls into two separate 
functions: (1) the development of broad, general principles; 
and (2) the application of those principles to particular 
circumstances .
If I may borrow your illustration of this 
morning, Mr. Chairman, the recent considerations by the 
Board on how to account for certain types of investments 
illustrates the point I'm trying to make. The Board was 
faced with the problem of how to carry investments; should 
they be carried at cost, at their present values, or on 
some other basis?
The Board concluded as a general principle that 
a corporation having significant influence over the operations 
of another company should account for its investment using 
the equity method of accounting. This was a broad statement 
of principle.
The Board, having decided on this general principle, 
went forward to apply this principle in particular 
circumstances. It established some arbitrary rules as to 
when a corporation had the ability to exercise significant 
influence. The Board described the methods by which the 
accounting should be reflected in the financial statements, 
spoke of the types of intercorporate transactions that should 
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be eliminated, and established procedures for disclosure in 
footnotes. All of these latter considerations merely provided 
the rules of application of the general principle.
Haskins & Sells proposes the creation of two 
separate groups, working in parallel. The first group, which 
we have called, for want of a better name, the Commission, 
would be charged with the responsibility of developing broad 
principles of accounting.
It would be a relatively small group--large enough 
to be representative, but small enough to be effective. The 
members of the Commission would be required to sever their 
present professional or business connections and spend full- 
time working on the affairs of the Commission.
The second group, which we have called the Committee, 
would be part-time volunteers appointed by the American 
Institute in the same manner, and by the same selection 
processes as are now used with respect to both the Accounting 
Principles Board and other committees of the Institute.
This Committee would be charged with the responsibility 
of formulating the rules for applying the general principles 
established by the Commission. In establishing these detailed 
rules for recording and disclosure, the Committee would be 
required to conform to the principles enunciated by the 
Commission. The Committee would also have the right and the 
authority to interpret the general principles as to individual 
industries, classes of transactions; and, on occasion, would be 
available to respond to questions raised with respect to an 
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individual transaction or to a type of transaction.
In order to ensure that the rules and interpreta­
tions issued by the Committee were in conformity with the 
opinions of the Commission, our proposal comprehends that 
any pronouncement by the Committee would be subject to 
review and concurrence by the Commission.
If members of the business community felt that 
a pronouncement by the Committee was not in accordance with 
the principle enunciated by the Commission, they would have 
the right to appeal directly to the Commission. If the 
business community felt that an accounting principle 
previously enunciated was no longer applicable, it would 
also have the right to appeal to the Commission. Similarly, 
if the business community felt, because of changed circum­
stances, that a prior pronouncement of the Committee was 
out of date, it would have the right to request the Commission 
to direct the Committee to reconsider the matter.
Underlying all of the pronouncements of the 
Commission and the Committee must be extensive research, both 
empirical and analytical. The research effort must be 
directed to developing fundamentals to fulfill the objectives 
of financial statements, as well as the analysis of problems, 
including extensive testing of proposed principles and 
applications. We recommend that the research effort be 
supervised by a full-time director of research who would 
report directly to the Commission.
Another element of our proposal comprehends that 
a Foundation would be created under auspices of the American
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Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The Foundation 
would be governed by Trustees initially appointed by the 
Institute, but thereafter self-perpetuating, so that as a 
Trustee's term expired, or after he died, retired or resigned, 
his fellow Trustees would appoint his successor. The Trustees 
would be non-salaried and drawn from all segments of the 
community having an interest in financial statements, including 
practicing accountants, preparers of financial statements, 
users of those statements, and representatives of the academic 
world.
The Trustees would appoint members of the Commission 
and establish both their salaries and their conditions of 
employment. Our thought would be that the salary level would 
be commensurate with that which the Commissioner might expect 
to earn elsewhere. In order to provide a sufficient period of 
time for him to be useful and effective, we would think that 
his term of appointment should be for a period of not less than 
seven years.
We estimate that the annual cost of operating the 
Foundation would be somewhere in the neighborhood of $2 to 
$3 million. We would hope that a significant proportion of 
these costs would be borne by individual members of the 
accounting profession, especially the larger firms, and that 
other members of the business community would volunteer to 
absorb some part of the costs of operating the Foundation.
To the extent that these contributions were not 
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forthcoming, the cost would be borne by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The partners 
of Haskins & Sells would commit themselves to contribute 
$1 million during the first five years of the Foundation’s 
existence.
We at Haskins & Sells are dedicated to the 
proposition that accounting principles and their applications 
must be established speedily and efficiently. The first 
chairman of the Accounting Principles Boards the late 
Weldon Powell, was one of our partners.
We always have had close historical ties with 
the work of the Accounting Principles Board and have 
supported it in the past. We are committed to supporting 
the Board or whatever form of organization emerges from 
the considerations of this Study Group. What we have 
tried to do is to suggest an organizational arrangement which 
makes the work of establishing standards of financial 
reporting more relevant, more timely and more effective. 
Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Hogan, I would have to 
observe that the dedication of your firm to the task at 
hand is certainly amply indicated by this extraordinary 
commitment you have made publicly today, and I am impressed 
by it.
I am even more impressed by your statement that 
although recommending this very careful structure upon which 
you have commented, your firm would support whatever comes 
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out of this study. I think that that is a most generous, 
statesmanlike comment and I would like to have the record 
reflect it.
MR. HOGAN: That's very kind; thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I'm sure that all my colleagues on 
the Committee feel the same way about it.
MR. HOGAN: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: The history of the Accounting 
Principles Board, as I read it as a lawyer, has been one of 
a serious and strong effort to arrive at a system of basic 
principles. Back in the days when Weldon Powell was chairman, 
proposed principles were carefully put together by highly 
competent men, but these simply did not satisfy the members 
of the Board at that time.
The effort was continued over a period of several 
years with still no results. At that point it became obvious 
that there were a number of very serious matters with which 
the Board had to deal. The Board simply had to tackle some 
of those areas where alternatives existed, and proceeded to 
do so starting in about 1962 and continuing to the present.
I am a little bit concerned about how the structure 
you suggested would operate. It would seem, if first things 
come first, that you would have to put together the Board of 
Trustees; and they would then have to select the Commissioners. 
The Commissioners then would have to develop a structure of 
basic principles; a job which the most distinguished professors 
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and others have attempted unsuccessfully over a period of 
years. Only then could the Committee commence to do its 
work. If it started to do its work before that, there 
would be no principles on which to found its work.
I am concerned that this effort to narrow the 
alternatives, which everyone tells us must go forward, 
would come to a grinding halt while we went through what 
might be a substantial period of time in order to have 
these Commissioners do this task which so far has eluded 
the best minds of the profession. How do you regard that 
problem?
MR. HOGAN: I think, Mr. Chairman, two things: 
First, during this transitional period from the time the 
Foundation came into being and became an active organization, 
we would comprehend that the present Accounting Principles 
Board, which now has a fairly lengthy agenda, would 
continue to function. As the Foundation came into being, 
with its Trustees and with its Commission, the Accounting 
Principles Board would phase out of the principle-making 
function and phase into the application of those principles 
to specific circumstances. You would have a normal 
transitional period.
How long the transitional period takes depends 
upon how quickly the Trustees are appointed, how quickly 
they form the Commission, and the learning period of the 
Commission.
I think that the Commission itself would not have 
a great learning period. We would expect that the Trustees 
in their wisdom would pick the seven best accounting minds in 
the country, and put them in a locked room, somewhere. (Laughter)
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Hogan, you will recall the 
testimony of Mr. Kapnick of Arthur Andersen, whose experience 
led him to conclude that basic principles are so interwoven 
with the matter of application, that it would be exceptionally 
difficult to divorce them and put into one body the task of 
formulating the basic principles and into a separate body the 
task of developing the standards of application. He said it 
would be desirable, organizationally, for the same body to have 
both responsibilities.
Are you of the view that these must be separate 
organizations?
MR. HOGAN: I think in the natural course of events 
they should be. An accounting principle is an overall, guiding 
rule which governs a whole series of transactions. They can 
be set by a group which has considered what the principle 
ought to be.
When you come down to applying that general principle 
to a certain kind of a transaction, a certain kind of industry, 
or to a certain set of circumstances, that could be done by a 
separate group.
The Commission would deal with the theories of 
accounting and disclosure; but they wouldn’t be incommunicado. 
If you don’t mind my mixing a metaphor, they wouldn't be 
contemplating their navel in some ivory tower (Laughter), but 
they would at least be considering the theory of accounting 
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and the theory of disclosure.
They would then turn to people who are in the 
business every day and say, "Now under this kind of a 
principle, how would this be handled in this particular 
circumstance." You would have an exchange of information 
between the Commission and the Committee.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I recall that Mr. Trueblood, who 
is now working in this area, pointed to Opinion No. 18 as 
an example of a principle that could be stated in perhaps 
a paragraph or two. He said the rest of that opinion is 
application.
Judging by the experience which we have listened 
to over the period of our deliberations, a great deal of 
time and effort has been spent on the problem of the 
application of accounting principles.
I am, therefore, a little bit puzzled by the fact 
that you would have these Commissioners, whose job it is to 
develop broad principles, on a full-time, paid basis. Their 
salaries would be commensurate with what they world receive 
on the outside, perhaps $100,000 a year.
MR. HOGAN: That was the number I had in mind as 
being a fair target.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: (Continuing)--However, the 
application function, which, if I judge correctly, has 
consumed by all odds the greater amount of the Board's 
time, you put in the hands of part-time volunteers.
Don't we have the cart before the horse if the 
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time-consuming job is making sure that opinions will work in 
practice. To make sure that it’s effective, shouldn't that 
task, if anything, be in the hands of the people who are 
full-time, and the matter of the two paragraphs of principles 
be in the hands of a part-time group?
What’s your comment on that?
MR. HOGAN: My reaction, Mr. Chairman is twofold. I 
think the deliberations of the Accounting Principles Board have 
been time-consuming because they’ve been getting involved with 
both principles and applications. If you can separate them, 
you can say in effect, "First we’ll establish general accounting 
principles within the Commission. Then you fellows in the 
Committee, using that ground rule decide how to apply it."
Secondly, I think I want principles to be set outside 
the battlefield. When you start to apply those principles, I 
want it done by people who are engaged, day-by-day, in preparing 
financial statements, in reading them, and in certifying to 
their fairness.
I don’t want someone in an ivory tower deciding 
how something should be done. I want that to be done by 
someone who’s on the battlefield every day.
I can liken it to the Ten Commandments. The Ten 
Commandments don't take up very much space, but the explanation 
of those Ten Commandments have taken a great number of books.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: On the other hand, I would comment 
that the question of the application of the Ten Commandments is 
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rather important, also. It’s pretty easy to lay down a 
commandment; the application takes a lot of effort.
MR. HOGAN: Oh, yes! . It would take a lot of 
effort and time--
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: In the accounting field, is it 
possible for some group to lay down this commandment, this 
great principle, without having to intimately concern itself 
with whether or not it can be applied effectively?
MR. HOGAN: I think that the Commission, having 
arrived at a conclusion with respect to a principle, would 
then expose that proposed principle to the financial community 
through public hearings, such as this.
Before arriving at that conclusion, they might 
very well have talked to members of the Committee who would 
be on the day-by-day firing line. As to the application of 
the principle, I think that the Committee could apply that 
general principle to particular circumstances by enlisting 
the aid of experts in that particular area.
You would decide on some general principle for 
handling pension accounting. The Committee would then 
enlist people who knew how to handle pension accounting 
and get their views on how it should be disclosed in a 
financial statement and how it should be reported in the 
financial statement in accordance with general principles.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: If the Commission in charge of 
setting basic principles is going to hold hearings and 
have complete input, the input it gets will focus on whether 
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the principles are workable. How can that Commission divorce 
itself from practicability?
MR. HOGAN: I would have enough confidence in the 
Commission to say that they could sort out real problems from 
the individual likes and dislikes.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: One last question: You have 
indicated the importance of research and the significance of 
getting the best possible research. You indicated, as I recall, 
that a research director would report to the Commission.
A number of witnesses today have told us that empirical 
research is the most important form of research. To me, this 
goes to the question of application. Where is the Committee on 
application going to get its research?
MR. HOGAN: From the same group. All I'm suggesting 
is that the director of the research arm report to the 
Commission.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Suppose the Committee on application 
wants to have research done and the research director says, 
"Sorry, I don't take directions from you; you're going to 
have, to go through several other people to try to get some 
time."
MR. HOGAN: If that unlikely event happened, the 
Trustees of the Foundation would have some influence over the 
decision.
MR. OLSON: I'd like to pursue the question that came 
up a little earlier. Would you like to hazard a guess as to 
how many principles we might wind up with some day?
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MR. HOGAN: I don't know that I’d want to hazard 
a guess, Mr. Olson. I think there would be more than Ten 
Commandments, though. (Laughter)
MR. OLSON: Not as high as a hundred, though?
MR. HOGAN: It could presumably run up as high 
as a hundred.
MR. OLSON: The reason I raise the point is that, 
as Chairman Wheat said, this probably would not be a time­
consuming task. I gather that what you have in mind is 
that the Commission would spend a good deal of its time 
hearing appeals. Is that correct?
MR. HOGAN: I think the Commission might very 
well spend a great deal of its time on appeals, in two 
senses of that word. Maybe appeal is the wrong word-  
interpretations. The Committee will, from time to time, 
be issuing interpretations as to these general principles.
MR. OLSON: The Commission?
MR. HOGAN: The Committee. The Committee will 
be issuing interpretations of the principles enunciated by 
the Commission. I can visualize a set of circumstances 
arising in which the interpretation put cut by the Committee 
doesn't quite fit the new circumstance and the Commission 
will ask the Committee to review the interpretation; also, 
principles enunciated four or five years earlier may no 
longer be appropriate, in which case the Commission will 
have to issue a new principle.
MR. OLSON: Do I assume correctly that the 
Commission would also hear appeals or inquiries from anyone 
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in the financial community, or would it be particularly from 
the Committee?
MR. HOGAN: No, I think the appeal would go to the 
Commission directly from the responsible member of the financial 
community. What they did with it would depend upon the nature 
of the appeal. Whether they referred it directly to the 
Committee or heard it themselves, would depend on the nature of 
the problem; how widespread it was; what kind of appeal it was.
MR. OLSON: In a sense, this Commission is sort of 
an appeal body, with very strong emphasis on acting as an 
appeal body. Is that a correct assumption?
MR. HOGAN: It would be one of the two functions 
they have. The establishment of accounting principles would 
be their primary function. Their secondary function would 
be to make sure that these principles, in application, pass 
what I call the smell test; that they fit in the financial 
community. (Laughter)
MR. OLSON: Except that the establishing of the 
principles would not be a tremendously time-consuming task. 
Or do you think it would be?
MR. HOGAN: I think it would, Mr. Olson. For example, 
the question of income in a franchising operation, and how that 
relates to the general principle of income recognition, would 
be a time-consuming thing.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: But isn’t that application 
rather than a principle?
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MR. HOGAN: I think it would be an application. 
But I can visualize a circumstance in which the Committee, 
having decided on how it wanted to handle income in the 
franchising fields could not issue the interpretation until 
it had been approved by the Commission. So the Commission 
would have to determine that the Committee’s interpretation 
met the general rule of income recognition arrived at by 
the Commission.
MR. PRYOR: These two bodies, to a degree, 
would have to be working in parallel. Let’s take earnings 
per share as an example. I don’t know how much principle 
there is in that opinion but there’s a lot of application. 
Wouldn’t this almost have to go hand-in-hand with the 
Commission's work?
MR. HOGAN: I don't know how much principle is 
involved either, Mr. Pryor, but I think you're right. I 
believe that the Committee and the Commission would work 
not only in close cooperation, but that the views of one 
group would be communicated to and cleared by the other group.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: You don't seem to want to 
describe the Committee as, in fact, a committee of the 
Commission.
MR. HOGAN: No, I think not, for two separate 
reasons. What we're trying to do fundamentally, by the 
creation of this Foundation, is to give preparers of 
financial statements, users of them, the academic world and 
practicing accountants an active voice in the establishment of 
principles.
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That's why we have recommended the Foundation with 
its Board of Trustees.
We then recommend that we turn over to the Commission, 
a group of seven independent people removed from the business 
community, the job of enunciating principles. But the 
establishment of the application of those principles in particular 
circumstances ought to be in the hands of a separate, 
representative group, answerable to the Commission, but 
independent of it.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: In your oral statement you 
said somewhat more than you said in your written statement 
about the connection between the Foundation and the AICPA.
I didn't find anything in the written statement which 
described what support the foundation had. When you were speaking, I 
thought I heard you say it would have some distinct relation to 
the Institute.
MR. HOGAN: Our notion was that to the extent that 
the contributions to the Foundation were not forthcoming from 
the public accounting sector and from the business community 
at large, the American Institute would underwrite any deficit. 
They’d insure that the money was there every year. The 
Institute would have the power of appointing the first group 
to the Foundation, presumably by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Board of Directors.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: So that the Foundation would 
be self-perpetuating.
MR. HOGAN: They would elect their own successors, 
again to provide the apparent independence that we think may
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be essential to the business community.
And also, frankly, to give the business community 
a very active voice in the establishment of both the ground 
rules under which statements are prepared and the disclosures 
which are required.
MR. PRYOR: What else would the Trustees do-- 
appoint the Commission?
MR. HOGAN: Make sure they behave themselves and 
work; that they are responsive to the needs of the community.
MR. BIEGLER: Mr. Hogan, I'd like to get one point 
clear in my mind. The Committee which would deal with 
applications and procedures, would, in effect, be subservient 
to the Commission. Does this suggest that the Commission would 
have to approve or would have to have the right to veto the 
Committee’s pronouncements?
MR. HOGAN: Yes, very clearly;the theory being 
the Committee's interpretation of a principle would have 
to be consistent with the principle. Otherwise you would 
have two separate sets of ground rules.
MR. BIEGLER: Do you see any difficulties in 
attracting and holding the kind, of men you want on the 
Committee if, in effect, their decisions and conclusions are 
not final? This would effectively make the Committee an 
unpaid, part-time staff of the Commission. Do you see any 
problem there?
MR. HOGAN: No, I think you’re downgrading them 
far too much, perhaps for purposes of illustration. If 
the Trustees of the Foundation pick seven men or Commissioners 
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who are highly regarded and well respected by the community, 
I don’t see any problem in having a Committee, in your words, 
subservient to that Commission, interpreting on a day-by-day 
basis the pronouncements of that Commission.
MR. LEVINE: Mr. Hogan, do you envision any possibility 
that there might be an impasse between the Committee and the 
Commission at some time? Suppose, for example, the Committee 
concludes that there’s Just no logical way to apply a certain 
principle and throws up its hands in disgust. What will happen 
then?
MR. HOGAN: I think the likelihood of that happening 
is remote, because you would have on both the Commission and 
the Committee men of intelligence and goodwill. I can’t 
believe that the Commission could enunciate a principle so 
improper that the Committee would refuse to interpret it. 
Conversely, I can't believe that the Committee would refuse 
to interpret a well-conceived principle.
MR. LEVINE: Yet the very fact that the Commission 
has to approve the interpretation could conceivably lead to 
a difference of viewpoints. Although subservient in that 
respect, the Committee is not subservient in its formation. 
It seems to me that there could be an impasse.
MR. HOGAN: If an impasse developed--and I have 
difficulty, I must confess, believing that it could occur--I 
think there would be two courses of conduct available. One 
would be to refer the problem to the Trustees. The Trustees 
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of the Foundation, in my definition, are leaders of the 
business community, responsible people who would have a 
considerable amount of influence over the views of the 
Commission.
By the same token, if that didn’t work, you always 
have the one safety valve that exists today; somewhere along 
the line the problem will wind up on the desk of the SEC.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Does anyone in the audience
have a question for Mr. Hogan? (There were none.) 
Thank you again, Mr. Hogan. We greatly 
appreciate the generosity of your comments.
I think we ought to take a five-minute stretch.
(A brief recess was taken.)
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: The next witness is J. 0. Edwards, 
of the Financial Executives Institute. Mr. Edwards.
MR. J. 0. EDWARDS: I'm not sure I like that word 
"witness"!
Needless to say we are quite pleased to be here, 
and want to thank you for the opportunity to represent the 
Financial Executives Institute in these deliberations of 
your Committee on the establishment of accounting principles.
I have been told to assume that you have had an 
opportunity to read the FEI statement. Therefore, my formal 
remarks will be limited to a summation of the key points in 
the statement.
But there's another important reason, I think, for 
not straying too far from the text, and that is that our 
policy statement necessarily represents a mix of viewpoints 
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of business executives. I would like to make certain that 
what comes through to you today is a balanced representation 
of the views of our membership.
While we in business might each have some different 
views about what we’d like to see come out of your study, I 
believe it is safe to say that we are in total agreement on 
two points; firsts that the matters you are attempting to 
grapple with are extremely complex, and of enormous importance 
to both business and the accounting profession. They are 
deserving of all of the constructive assistance that we and 
others can provide.
Second, we’re hopeful that your deliberations will 
clarify any ambiguity that may have existed in the past about 
the role that each of the parties of interest should play in 
the accounting principles mechanism, so that we can get on with 
whatever we have to do to assure an even higher quality, more 
objectivity, and more credible financial reporting.
If you’ve had an opportunity to read the summary 
of supplemental comments relating to the FEI statement, you 
have about as good a flavor of the positions of individual FEI 
members towards the subject of your study as I could hope to 
give you.
If you haven’t read these, perhaps you’ll find a 
chance to do so.
As I mentioned, I will attempt to capsule the FEI 
position and will answer any questions you may wish to ask.
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Firsts FEI believes that management has a respon­
sibility for all forms of public reporting of financial 
information. This responsibility runs not only to the accuracy 
of the material, but also to the underlying principles, 
conventions or standards of reporting.
Second, this responsibility cannot be escaped.
It requires an active participation by business in the 
formulation of these underlying rules. As we see it, the 
responsibility of business and the public accounting 
profession are co-equal, as each must have an abiding 
conviction of the fairness of the financial presentation.
And this conviction must be held when a management  
reports the results of its company's operations to the 
owners. Both the reporting management and the certifying 
accountant must have this conviction.
It extends to the whole framework of corporate 
reporting in industry. Here again management and the public 
accounting profession, we think, must have equal conviction 
in the soundness of the principles.
Third, this joint responsibility can more 
effectively be discharged in the private sector through a 
voluntary mechanism than it can by pleadings and hearing 
before a Government agency.
Fourth, this voluntary mechanism, or if you 
wish board, body, council, commission or whatever, should 
have equal representation from the two groups having primary 
responsibility for financial presentations: business and 
the public accounting profession.
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Fifths other interested groups, such as the academic 
community,analysts and other users, should be represented but 
should not, in the aggregate, have a dominant role, since theirs 
is a position of advocacy rather than one of responsibility. 
They can bring much needed and valuable viewpoints to the 
process.
Sixths the members of the body--or at least most of 
them--should be part-time in order to assure participation by 
outstanding leaders of all representative groups. They should 
not be detached from the arena in which day-to-day accounting 
problems arise, and in which solutions must be implemented on 
a practical basis.
Proper utilization of support services such as 
research and full-time staff, as has been suggested here 
repeatedly today, can obviate the need for full-time participation.
Seventh, a satisfactory system of financing this body 
can be worked out with business bearing its fair share of the 
load. I don’t believe I can top at this point Tom’s commitment, 
but I think that we in FEI believe that business can fulfill its 
obligation.
Eighth, early involvement of all who can contribute 
to problem-solving should be the modus operandi. Potential 
problems should be identified early, and solutions developed 
before the problems get out-of-hand.
Ninth, there should be an appeals procedure, with 
interpretive pronouncements for unusual situations or 
circumstances. We're not talking about a court or a senate.
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Finally, the cornerstone of all actions and all 
pronouncements should be research, both empirical and 
conceptual, with case study evaluation of the alternative 
effects of various actions under consideration.
Full utilization should be made of research 
agencies of the various associations that are active in 
the field. The body should take the lead role in 
coordinating and planning the research activities of these 
agencies so as to assure maximum utilization of existing 
resources.
If your Study Group recommends some of the 
changes that we have suggested, and hopefully should the 
AICPA in turn embrace those recommendations, we are 
confident that this would do much to improve support for the 
ongoing development of accounting concepts, improve their 
acceptability, and yes, if you will, even improve their 
quality.
That’s all I propose to say. I would be pleased 
to answer any questions.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you very much, Mr. Edwards. 
I suppose the question that has been raised today 
most frequently, and on which there seems to be substantial 
disagreement, is whether this body in the private sector 
should be under the auspices of the AICPA, as has been 
recommended strongly by several of the witnesses, or whether 
it should be placed under the auspices of several groups.
The principal comment along that line in the 
Arthur Andersen paper has already been quoted; "...a group
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so constituted would not be responsible to any organization or 
entity and we believe that an approach of that type would not 
be effective.”
I wonder if you could expand a little bit on the 
reasons you would advance as to how one could avoid the kinds 
of problems and difficulties that occur when you have divided 
responsibility, divided auspices, rather than a single line of 
responsibility.
MR, EDWARDS: That question was not unexpected.
In our text we deliberately avoided being too specific 
on this point because it was the one matter on which it was 
most difficult to arrive at an FEI consensus. There was almost 
an even split on the question, with perhaps a slight majority 
believing that it can and should be under the auspices of AICPA, 
Something less than a majority, say forty-five per 
cent, feel it just isn't practical to expect the broadening 
and other steps necessary for improvement to be undertaken by 
AICPA.
There is a consistent thread running through the 
minority position, I think, that says that should AICPA 
decide to do these things that we think necessary to arrive 
at a better consensus, to get a broader representation, then 
the minority would be content to see it remain under the AICPA.
If AICPA doesn’t buy the changes, members of FEI feel 
that there should be this superbody or volunteer consortium. 
We recognize the tough questions you raised about authority, 
financing, turnover, recycling of appointments and the like.
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But, we think there are enough precedents in the public 
sector for such a voluntary consortium. It would have its 
backup through the overview of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, just as the AICPA does today.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: As you know, there is another 
rather significant issue which has been raised today: 
the basic question of whether or not this body should be 
representational. Some take the same position you do-- 
that the body should be representational. Others have an 
equally strong view that it should not be representational; 
that it should be composed of the very best qualified men 
clearly not representing any particular viewpoint. It should 
be independent and experienced in as broad an area as 
possible. Several people this morning, particularly 
expressed that view.
Among the documents we have in our records is a 
speech by Mr. Leonard Spacek who was then, I think, managing 
partner of Arthur Andersen. He spoke before The Conference 
Board on the outlook for agreement on accounting principles. 
This speech raises a question which I'd like to ask you.
Mr. Spacek talked about this representation issue. 
He says, "If representation were really essential, the 
profession would be confronted with the requirement for 
representation from labor, from investors, from investment 
analysts, from regulatory commissions, and from other 
interests that are vitally affected by accounting practices. 
...If all segments of the public claimed representation or 
courts because they were affected by the decisions handed 
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down, a good share of each segment would be required to man the 
courts. But laws which are the criteria of decision making 
make such representation unnecessary. Proper criteria for the 
Accounting Principles Board would have the same result. The 
acceptance on the Board of members who have vested interests 
in every decision may well detract from its objectivity."
There are really two aspects to the question that I 
would pose to you. First, if the Board is to be representational, 
where do you stop? How do you assure yourself that you have 
responded to all of the demands of various interests that might 
want to be represented? If you did, you would have something 
so unwieldy from the standpoint of diverse interests, that it 
wouldn't really function.
The other aspect is that many people have a strong 
feeling that independence and objectivity are the criteria 
upon which members should be selected. You have a problem with 
that if you select people who have vested interests in a 
particular viewpoint or a particular business.
How do you solve that problem?
MR. EDWARDS: To take up the question of total, 
across-the-board, representation, I think what you're asking 
is where to stop.
We are saying that there is a priority order of 
interest among those who have responsibility for reporting on 
the performance of the business.
I think both management and the certifying CPA have 
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that responsibility, and I think it's about equal. I 
think it's shared in such a way that neither can say 
it's the responsibility of the other.
I don't think users have the same kind of 
responsibility. They have an interest, and a right to 
know.
It's a matter of judgment as to where you draw 
the line. We would feel that the responsibility of those 
who have a right to know and have an interest in these-- 
I think the term we tend to use is conventions--is quite 
different from the responsibility that management and the 
certifying accountant have.
I don't have a pat answer as to how many of 
these advocacy or user groups are needed to get a fair 
cross-section, but I don't think it should predominate.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: How do you respond to the 
problem of objectivity?
 MR. EDWARDS: Is that the same as independence? 
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Yes.
MR. EDWARDS: That's been given a fairly good going 
over today, I guess. I was impressed with the comment that 
independence was a state of mind. Independence depends on 
the integrity^ ability, strength, and ethics of the 
individual involved. That doesn’t say, on the other hand, 
that appearance of independence and appearance of objectivity 
are not important. I think they are.
The question of objectivity of industry representation 
tends to be one of degree--the same as the objectivity of the 
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practicing CPA. We don't believe there's any real conflict 
of interest when men of background and experience in business 
contribute to the resolution of controversial accounting 
questions. There may be on specific issues; or in specific 
companies. If there are, I don't know why the particular 
individual couldn't abstain from participating.
Perhaps during the deliberations of this body, there 
will be a problem with a conflict of interest. If that was to 
prevent the group from having the knowledge and the in-depth 
understanding of business inputs through this process, I think 
it would be too bad.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Let me add one other question.
I think it's fair to say that we're all immensely 
concerned with the matter of appropriate, substantial input 
from business interests. It's absolutely crucial to the 
workability of whatever is done. And, of course, the responsibility 
which you have alluded to, is critical.
It has been suggested today that it would be desirable 
to have people from business and other disciplines serve on 
subcommittees of the APB rather than limiting them to members of 
the Board or CPAs in private practice. With one or two exceptions, 
this has been the case.
The ultimate question of objectivity might be solved 
by having an Accounting Principles Board comprised solely of 
independent CPAs. They, under the Securities Laws, have the 
special function of checking financial statements to determine 
that the public interest is being served.
140
That suggestion has been made, and I wonder 
how you react to that?
MR. EDWARDS: As to part of the suggestion, I 
think that FEI would react quite positively. If 
subcommittees are developing or identifying a particular 
problem and trying to do something about it, anyone who 
can say something about the problem should be involved.
This would include business or other groups. We 
think that if this is done at an early stage, more practical 
solutions will emerge.
But we would not consider this a substitute for 
participation at the policy level. This goes back to 
something that has come up several times today--the role 
FEI thinks business should have.
FEI really thinks that the role should be more 
paramount in this matter of concepts and objectives, than in 
the area of applications.
A question was posed to Mr. Trueblood about how 
long opinions should be. He said the one on equity accounting 
might have been done in one paragraph.
I think this is a very interesting idea--the use 
of concepts, principles, standards. I believe we would 
like to see, ultimately, a distinction between broad 
principles and detailed interpretations.
I think that's a good idea, and is probably the 
direction in which we need to move. The whole question of 
research bears quite clearly on this matter, because the 
quality of the research will, to a large measure, determine
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how well the principles can be applied in actual practice.
In effect, research would come up to the principle­
setting level; principles would go out for application; and 
then there would be feedback. We think this idea is probably 
good, but will have to be done a few times before we really 
know the difference between principles and applications.
I want to reiterate that the main interest of FEI 
would be in concepts--fair value versus historical cost, for 
example. I think this is where we feel there needs to be more 
involvement on the part of business members.
MR. PRYOR: I have two or three questions I'd like 
to ask at this point. Who would appoint the non-AICPA members 
of this board?
MR. EDWARDS: AICPA would make the appointments.
But we would think that they would be greatly influenced and 
would want to look to groups such as FEI, NAA and AAA for the 
candidates to represent business and the academic community.
In order to make that system work, the appointing 
level in the AICPA, whether it be the President or the Council, 
would have to be responsive to whomever the other associations 
thought were logical candidates for these posts.
MR. PRYOR: Who would designate the chairman, and 
might the chairman be a full-time individual?
MR. EDWARDS: Frankly, we didn't poll this question. I 
think, however, that the chairman--and I think our members 
would agree--could be a full-time individual. And if AICPA 
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designates the members, it would be logical for them 
also to designate the chairman.
MR. PRYOR: One other thing: Maybe I missed this 
in reading your paper, but I don't recall whether you 
indicated a majority vote or a two-thirds vote.
MR. EDWARDS: We didn't cover that. In some 
earlier committee discussion, it was our feeling that a 
two-thirds majority, or a two-thirds vote should be required.
MR. PRYOR: In effect that would give the issuer 
group forty per cent of the total. They would have a veto 
power over the decisions of the body.
MR. EDWARDS: I guess that's right.
MR. PRYOR: Then my last question is--
MR. EDWARDS: So would the certifying group.
MR. PRYOR: Do you feel that opinions of such a 
board would carry more or less confidence with the users 
of financial statements?
MR. EDWARDS: I think that in time they would 
carry more confidence, more acceptance with the users, assuming 
that we make this idea of objectivity and independence work. 
We think it can work. Users would know that the ingredient 
of practical constraints was in the decision-making process.
You'd be in a better position to form your own 
judgment about that.
MR. BIEGLER: Mr. Edwards, I'd like to raise a 
question: When Mr. Kapnick was speaking to us he said that 
the accounting profession was responsible for determination 
of sound accounting. The suggestion was that this
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responsibility was the private preserve of the accounting 
profession.
According to your proposal, as I see it, you’re 
raising a very fundamental issue in suggesting equal 
representation from the accounting profession and industry. 
This contradicts Mr. Kapnick's concept of a private preserve.
There is another consideration. Since the APB has 
the right to establish accounting principles because the SEC 
has given it that right, I wonder if the SEC would have 
difficulty in giving a similar right to a body which had a 
different composition: in other words, one with equal representa­
tion from both the public accounting profession and industry. 
Obviously, neither you nor I can answer that, but it might be 
interesting to speculate about it.
MR. OLSON: Mine is along the same line. I don't 
wish to be argumentative about it, but fundamental to the 
whole concept of an attest function, is the assumption that 
those who are being reported on could not expect to be 
objective about themselves. If that’s a proper line of reasoning, 
it would be somewhat difficult to conclude that those who were 
being reported on were being objective in the setting of the 
standards with which they had to comply.
You indicated earlier that participation in a more 
formalized advisory capacity--and I'm thinking here of an 
advisory council to the Accounting Principles Board--would not 
be as acceptable to the FEI, as participating in the final 
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decision-making.
I recognize that that might not be quite as 
acceptable. But how serious a problem would it be if there 
was more formal machinery whereby the various groups did 
participate in an advisory capacity?
MR. EDWARDS: You have asked two questions.
On the question of objectivity, I don't think 
this comes up when you’re sitting on a panel trying to set 
principles on which to report. It occurs when you apply 
those principles to a particular company's operations.
As I said, there are certain concepts or principles 
that would be so overwhelming in their impact on a 
particular company, that the question of objectivity could be 
real.
Here again we're talking about independence,and 
there are differences in degree. Independence and the 
appearance of independence are quite important; but there 
are other considerations. We must make certain that we have 
a viable, workable system of reporting for industry.
Independence is one of the ingredients and an 
important one, but there are other things against which we 
must balance it.
Your second question is a little different than the 
point we talked about earlier. I really haven't given the 
advisory council idea that much thought. I think some of the 
points covered by Tom Hogan in his remarks border on that 
kind of an arrangement. There might very well be some way 
of working that out. If however, this group was simply 
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acting in an advisory role on such important questions as fair 
value versus historical cost accounting, I don’t believe it 
would be acceptable to FEI.
They're just too important.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Your suggestion, which is very 
interestingraises a question in my mind. Let’s say for 
example, Mr. Edwards, that a certified public accountant and 
his client are involved in some substantial accounting disputes. 
The company believes that it should have several million dollars 
classified as deferred costs, and the accountant thinks other­
wise.
Further, the company has engaged in a lot of third- 
party leasing; it thinks that it's perfectly legitimate to 
proceed with those transactions and classify them as sales. 
The accounting firm is concerned and does not believe they 
should be classified as sales.
The company also has a pension plan which it would 
like to see as flexible as possible, so they can make sure 
that it doesn't have too much of an impact on income in a 
bad year. It has convertibles outstanding and doesn't like 
to show diluted earnings per share. These are theoretical 
problems.
I am a little troubled as to the objectivity of the 
financial vice president of that firm, were he to be on the 
Accounting Principles Board, on any matters of significance in 
areas of accounting principles. Wouldn't he have a conflict
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of the type that you mentioned?
MR. EDWARDS: That’s a most unusual company, 
I must say. (Laughter)
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: It’s very likely that a number 
of the people in this room have companies with similar 
problems.
MR. EDWARDS: I didn’t mean to say that companies 
don’t have the problems you've mentioned. But I don’t 
believe you’re going to find many companies with all of 
those problems. If you did, and if the FEI or the NAA 
were to recommend a representative from that company, I 
think this might be one case in which AICPA would say, 
"We don’t buy that one."
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Are there any questions from the 
audience?
MR. EDWARDS: I have one other point to make, if 
I may, before we close.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Please do.
MR. EDWARDS: I think we would like to see your 
committee--whatever comes out of it--push business to do 
whatever you see business’ role to be.
I would urge your committee to define business' 
role. If you don’t agree that they should have an equal 
role in setting the ground rules, then let us know why. 
And also, let us know what you think we should do to 
contribute and be constructive in this field. If you think 
it’s a matter of independence, we would hope you say so.
If you think it’s a question of not having the 
147
contacts or the ability to deal with problems, I think you 
should tell us so we can understand our role.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: It is in the constructive spirit 
of those comments that we will be guided.
MR. EDWARDS: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I might add that one of the main 
roles played by FEI was to publish one of the most constructive 
and prestigeous research studies done in the field of accounting 
in the past decade. The subject was segment reporting. The FEI 
bears full responsibility for the study and has the full credit.
The next speaker is Professor Robert Dickey of the 
University of Illinois. We thank him for coming all this way.
PROFESSOR ROBERT DICKEY: Thank you for this 
opportunity to speak.
I do not represent any organization. I believe, 
however, that some of the changes I propose are desired by 
a large number of accountants. As a matter of fact, several 
of the preceding speakers have already advocated some of the 
same things that I am going to advocate.
However, there is no sign that the American Institute 
of CPAs is going to change its long-established policies; and 
further, I have some different supporting arguments for some 
of these same recommendations.
This presentation is directed to two 
pertinent questions of the five listed by this Study Group.
One, should the primary responsibility for establishing 
accounting standards reside in a governmental or a nongovernmental 
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body? And two, what should be the makeup of a nongovernmental 
standards board?
I believe that the wise policy followed by the 
Securities Exchange Commission of allowing a nongovernmental 
Accounting Principles Board to issue opinions should be 
continued. In spite of some shortcomings, this arrangement 
seems to be much better in the eyes of many accountants 
and businessmen than the detailed regulation of accounting 
which governmental agencies tend to follow, as in the 
railroad and public utility field.
Further, I believe that this nongovernmental 
Accounting Principles Board should not be completely under 
the control of one organization, which is the situation we 
have today. The present APB operates more or less as a 
committee of the American Institute.
The report of the American Accounting Association's 
Committee on Establishment of an Accounting Commission, 
published in the July 1971 issue of the Accounting Review, 
described the possibility of a governmental agency, such 
as the SEC, taking over the job of the APB as, "...a move 
which most people, including the SEC itself, seem to want 
to avoid."
It should be recognized that if a governmental 
agency were to take over the work of the APB, it would face 
most of the difficulties of the present APB. It is some­
times said that members of the Institute's Accounting 
Principles Board have been handicapped in agreeing on 
149
standards by pressure from important clients, and that a 
governmental bureau would not have this pressure.
Although a governmental agency might not have these 
particular pressures, many persons feel that it might be subject 
to even greater pressures that would not be in the public interest.
Consideration should also be given to the 
generalization that it is easier to give a specific power to a 
governmental agency than it is to take away such power once it 
has been exercised.
I propose that the control and support of the Accounting 
Principles Board should be shared by the American Institute of 
CPAs and three other long-established national accounting 
societies: the American Accounting Association, the Financial 
Executives Institute, and the National Association of Accountants.
Each of these suggested organizations has conducted 
programs of research in important areas of accounting for many 
years. I believe that this proposal would have the following 
advantages:
First, the rules of the present Accounting Principles 
Board require that each member be a member of the American 
Institute of CPAs, and this means that he must be a certified 
public accountant. Although there is much to be said for the 
CPA examination as a test of accounting knowledge, I think it 
is unfortunate that every member of the Board must be a CPA.
There is a strong feeling on the part of many, not 
often publicly stated, against the doctrine that only CPAs are
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well-qualified to legislate on accounting matters.
The requirements for the CPA certificate have 
varied widely, over the years, among the fifty-four 
jurisdictions in the United States. Even today, in spite 
of the general movement among the States for many years 
past to raise the educational requirements and to reduce 
the experience requirements, there is still a substantial 
variation among the States on each of these.
For many years more than ninety per cent of all 
the candidates throughout the country taking the CPA 
examination have had some kind of college degree, a number 
of them having a master’s degree. Nevertheless, in the 
year 1971, according to the record, there are still fourteen 
States where the educational requirement for a CPA is no 
higher than a high school diploma.
I wish to mention that I have been a certified 
public accountant since 1942, and a rather active member 
of the American Institute of CPAs since 1948. I am proud 
of these affiliations. Nothing that I am saying here today 
is intended to be derogatory of the certified public 
accountant or of the American Institute.
The point is simply that the possession of a CPA 
certificate does not imply as uniform a background as 
might superficially appear.
There presumably are a number of financial vice 
presidents and controllers of large and intermediate size 
corporations, with experience over a wide range of accountin 
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and related business activities, who were barred by law from 
taking the CPA examination years ago because their State 
required one or two years of public accounting experience, 
with no substitute experience accepted.
Attention is called to the fact that a recent study 
showed that a little less than one-third of the chief financial 
officers of the largest corporations in the country possess a 
CPA certificate.
Notice the very strange contrast that we have here. 
Approximately two-thirds of the more than 400 chief financial 
officers of our largest corporations, men who presumably have 
demonstrated on-the-job, actual performance are ineligible 
to serve on the Accounting Principles Board.
On the other hand, every last one of the 80,000 
members of the American Institute of CPAs technically is 
eligible for service on the Board.
This type of policy is not designed to win friends 
and influence people for the Accounting Principles Board.
Another point is closely related to the one I've 
just made. I believe there should be an increase in the 
number of accountants from industry serving on this Board. 
Even when the Accounting Principles Board had twenty-one members 
instead of the eighteen today, the number of accountants in industry 
did not exceed three. At present, with eighteen members, only 
one of them is from industry.
There are two professors of accounting; one professional 
security analyst, and the other fourteen members are in public 
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accounting practice. As usuals the big eight public 
accounting firms have one member each, with six from other 
firms.
It has been said repeatedly that a company's 
published financial statements are representations of 
the company's management, rather than the independent- 
public accountant, This being the case, it would seem 
logical that the accountants who are closest to the management, 
and in many cases are themselves part of the management of 
business enterprises, should have a stronger voice in the 
establishment of accounting principles than they do at 
present.
Mr. Leonard Savoie, Executive Vice President of 
the American Institute, has said, and this is a pretty 
strong statement, "Corporate financial management contains 
a vast pool of knowledge on accounting and financial 
reporting matters which must be made available to the Board 
if it is to establish principles wisely. Management must be 
involved in determining accounting principles, to provide 
assurance to all that the Board is not acting arbitrarily, 
without regard to real practical problems."
I feel that the most logical way in which to 
accomplish this would be to increase the number of men on 
the Board, and appoint to it high-ranking accountants with 
a strong background in broad business management experience. 
The issuance of an official pronouncement of an 
accounting principle by such well-known national organizations 
as the American Accounting Association, the Financial
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Executives Institute, or the National Association of Accountants 
presumably would constitute substantial authoritative support 
within the meaning of the special Bulletin of the Institute of 
October 1964, which was titled "Disclosure of Departures from 
Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board."
If such pronouncement was in conflict with some APB 
opinion, this would tend to encourage the use of different 
accounting procedures in the same circumstances.
It seems fairly likely that the issuance of just a 
few such opinions would lower the status and usefulness of the 
APB, and tend to push the Securities and Exchange Commission 
toward taking over the writing of the rules.
In my written presentation to the Study Group, I 
showed that there were some signs that at least two 
organizations might, in the future, issue accounting 
pronouncements on their own. If one accounting organization 
makes public pronouncements on accounting matters, this may 
increase the likelihood that others will follow suit, in part 
to give the members of that organization "a voice that will 
be heard," in the words of Julius Underwood, current President 
of the National Association of Accountants.
It seems preferable to make an attempt, before it 
is too late, to have one Accounting Principles Board, supported 
by the four major national accounting organizations which can 
speak for the accounting profession as a whole.
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One of the proposals made by Mr. Trueblood in 
his speech at the American Accounting Association convention 
in 1969 was to increase the amount spent on research for 
the Accounting Principles Board to at least $5 million a 
year.
This is approximately ten times the amount that 
was spent during the past fiscal year ending August 31, 
1971, which in turn was substantially above the $142,000 
spent in the APB's first year of operation, fiscal 1961.
Officials of the American Institute of CPAs 
indicated in 1968 that the expanded research needed in 
accounting would soon be too costly for the Institute 
itself, even with the help of the Accounting Research 
Association. They thought that it may become necessary 
to go to the larger foundations or to the Government for 
the vast sums of money that will be needed in the years 
ahead.
I believe that the chances of getting substantial 
sums from the above sources and from business concerns 
would be improved if most of the research in accounting was 
centered in one accounting research foundation, sponsored 
jointly by the four accounting associations named above.
It would be worthwhile, in this direction, to 
examine carefully the organizational operation of the 
Accounting Research Foundation established in 1967 jointly 
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and 
the Australian Society of Accountants and also the Canadian
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Tax Foundation, now in its twenty-sixth year of operations.
The Canadian Tax Foundation is sponsored jointly 
by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and 
the Canadian Bar Association, but it is not supported financially 
by these organizations as such. Its revenue currently comes 
from about 4,700 individual members--accountants, lawyers, 
professors, businessmen--and some 400 companies holding 
corporate memberships.
It should also be noted that the Accounting Standards 
Steering Committee, mentioned early today, established in 1970 
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 
in association with the Scottish and Irish Institutes, has now 
in this year, 1971, issued the first in its series of 
statements of standard accounting practice. These will be 
similar to the opinions of our American Institute.
Now for some possible disadvantages of these multi­
association boards. It is said that when Mike DeSalle was 
Governor of Ohio some years ago, he had a little sign on his 
desk which read, "I do not know the secret of success but I 
can tell you the formula for failure--try to please everybody.” 
I believe that no principles board, no matter how 
appointed nor how constituted, is going to please everybody. 
We might take a more modest and more realistic goal such as 
that expressed by Justice Benjamin Cardoza in a complicated 
tax case years ago when he said, ”The assessor's task is to 
find the least erroneous answer to an unanswerable problem.”
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It is recognized that the establishment of a 
multi-association board would not be easy, and it would 
take some time to implement. I believe that there is a 
reasonable probability that the unfavorable aspects can 
be minimized.
Time permits the mention of only a few of these 
problems. It has been said that war is too important for 
the generals; education is too important for the educators; 
and in the last few years some critics have been saying 
that accounting is too important to be left to the 
accountants. They have been urging membership on the 
Accounting Principles Board for non-accountants, and from 
groups that use accounting reports, such as financial 
analysts and bankers; this was advocated this morning.
I believe that the representatives of these non­
accounting groups should be invited to express their views 
on exposure drafts and opinions; they might be asked to 
serve if they’re experts in certain fields; they might be 
asked to serve on the task forces and subcommittees of the 
Accounting Principles Board. But only persons trained, 
experienced and demonstrably competent in accounting itself 
should be on the board which actually votes on these 
proposed opinions on accounting.
The establishment of this proposed body would not 
rule out Mr. Trueblood’s proposed five or seven-man, full- 
time and fully compensated board, which also has been 
advocated today by several other groups, if I understand 
correctly, Arthur Andersen and Haskins & Sells.
157
Such a board would simplify the question of just how 
many members each association would appoint, as the representa­
tives of the four associations could meet and decide on the 
hiring of the best accountants available, without consideration 
of firm or society affiliation, or other background.
It seems, however, that it would be more in keeping 
with the spirit of the coalition organization, which I am 
advocating, representing a diversity of accounting backgrounds, 
to have a volunteer board no smaller than the size of the 
present Accounting Principles Board.
It might well be headed by a full-time, paid chairman, 
supported by a strong staff of assistants, larger than at 
present. This would lighten somewhat the burden of the 
volunteer members, and thus make membership on the Accounting 
Principles Board more attractive to highly competent individuals 
who feel they cannot devote an extremely high percentage of 
their time to work on the Board.
In closing, let us recognize that the Accounting 
Principles Board of the American Institute of CPAs is a very 
powerful body in the world of finance. Its rulings have an 
important, though frequently delayed effect on the reported 
earnings of corporations, large and small, and eventually on 
stock market prices.
In issuing opinions, when all the material has been 
studied and all the witnesses from many sources have had their 
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day, in other words, when the moment of decision comes, 
let’s remember, the voting is done by only eighteen 
individuals, each one of whom must be a certified public 
accountant; must be a member of the American Institute of 
CPAs, and all of whom have been chosen by the group which 
controls the electoral machinery of the American Institute 
of CPAs.
This is real power, and it’s in the hands of a 
very small group of men. On February 19 of this year at 
the Conference Board session on the prospects for agreement- 
on accounting principles, Mr. Herbert C. Knortz, Vice 
President and Controller of International Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, said in a speech that the AICPA was 
"...a comparatively small private club."
Now some of us might think this is rather strange 
language to use to describe the largest organization of 
accountants in the world, with over 80,000 members and a 
substantial net growth in membership year after year. 
Nevertheless, we should recognize that this is the view­
point of some who are outside the American Institute of CPAs.
In essence, I am suggesting that this great power 
of the Accounting Principles Board be broadened--that the 
power base be broadened somewhat--and thus be less vulnerable 
to criticism. This could be done by including some additional 
elements of the accounting profession itself. It is 
believed that this change would also improve the usefulness 
of the opinions of the Board.
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Some of these suggested changes could be accomplished 
within the framework of the present APB. The Institute could 
drop its requirement that all members of the Accounting 
Principles Board be CPAs and members of AICPA.
It could name to the Board certain individuals who 
are chosen formally or informally, perhaps, by the other 
accounting associations that I have named. It seems appropriate 
to give thought to the warning of Winston Churchill's great 
ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough, who said, "Those who resist 
improvements because they represent change may later be forced 
to accept changes that are not improvements.”
Thank you for the privilege of speaking.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you, Professor Dickey, you've 
given us some notable quotations. There was a Duke of 
Cambridge, back in those days, who may have stimulated the 
Duke of Marlborough. The Duke of Cambridge was alleged to have 
said, and I quote, "Any change at any time by anyone for any 
purpose is to be deplored.” (Laughter)
PROFESSOR DICKEY: He was a real progressive, I 
gather!
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Does anyone on the panel have 
questions for Professor Dickey? I think the Accounting 
Principles Board would be particularly happy with your quotation 
from Justice Cardoza. I think they sometimes feel that way 
about their task--the least erroneous answer to an unanswerable 
problem.
16o
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Are you really sure that’s from 
the Duke of Marlborough?
PROFESSOR DICKEY: You mean the last one about 
change?
Yes, I have the recollection that this was 
quoted in a book review in The New York Times in January 
of 1940. The reason I remember it is because the book 
review was written not by a professor of history or some 
other well-known writer, but by a successful president of 
a well-known corporation. He was not very well-known to the 
public at the time, but in the next few months he became 
very well-known throughout the United States because he 
rather unexpectedly won the Republican nomination for 
President. His name was Wendel Wilke. He wrote the book 
review and he quoted the statement from the Duke of 
Marlborough with great emphasis.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Anyone from the audience?
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: The board that Professor 
Dickey would name would not consist entirely of CPAs. Do 
you have any idea of the kind of mix that you might have 
on it?
PROFESSOR DICKEY: In my paper I quoted Messrs. 
Barbatelli and Keller of NAA. Mr. Keller gave a slightly 
different mix in his testimony today. I don't think that 
the exact numbers are too important.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Where is this?
PROFESSOR DICKEY: This is page 21, toward the
bottom.
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Mr. Barbatelli, at the Federal Government Accountants 
Association convention in June 1971, criticized the present 
APB as being too heavily weighted with public practitioners. 
He suggested that the eighteen-member Board--and I wouldn't 
hold out for eighteen members exactly--should be composed of 
nine members from public accounting, six from business and three 
from the academic world. You may have noticed that Mr. Wayne 
Keller had a slightly different lineup this afternoon. He said 
not more than fifty per cent would be practicing CPAs, not less 
than twenty-five per cent from commerce and industry, and the 
remainder from academia and finance. This fifty per cent 
outside of the practicing CPAs would not have to have the CPA 
certificate.
I wouldn't argue as to the exact number, whether the 
total board should be eighteen or twenty, and the exact percentage. 
I think the CPAs perhaps should have fifty per cent.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: The points of courses is that 
apart from the enforcement of APB Opinions by the SEC, 
enforcement depends on machinery within the Institute. Do you 
see any difficulty in enforcing pronouncements made by a body 
which had non-CPAs on it?
PROFESSOR DICKEY: If the ruling body of the American 
Institute of CPAs accepts this, presumably their members wills 
unless it's a very close fight. This is a danger.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you very much, Professor
Dickey.
I think because we’re a bit late we'll move on. 
Mr. Ralph Kent of Arthur Young & Company is next. We are 
pleased to have you here.
MR. RALPH KENT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
Members of the Panel.
Arthur Young & Company has submitted a position 
paper; I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the 
Study Group to briefly summarize our views and to respond 
to your queries.
Insofar as the auspices for determining accounting 
principles are concerned, we believe that the Institute 
should continue to perform the principles-setting function. 
We think AICPA is equipped to provide a foundation of 
authority; we believe it's equipped to provide a requisite 
supply of competence.
That doesn't mean that we necessarily urge the 
perpetuation of the status quo, nor do we believe that the 
performance cannot be improved.
On the matter of who should serve, we believe the 
preponderance of members should be CPAs in public practice. 
In saying that, we suggest that the viewpoints of others 
can and should be obtained through the process of briefs, 
public hearings, inclusion as members of subcommittees 
assigned to study special subjects, and in other ways.
Insofar as the term of service is concerned, we find 
no fault with the present setup of a maximum of two, three- 




We detect no rationale for a formal appeal procedure.
We think the analogy that should prevail is with the legislative 
function and not with the judicial function.
We believe that the SEC does operate as an effective 
restraint which may very well serve the purpose of the appeal 
function. We would be concerned if there was an appeal function 
undermining the work and authority of the Accounting Principles 
Board.
Insofar as operating procedures are concerned, it’s 
been said that opinions are too detailed at times, and possibly 
they are. We believe that the APB has the ability to decide 
this matter for itself. It may well be that certain opinions 
should be more detailed than others. Others might be quite 
brief.
On the matter of increasing volume of output, obviously 
this is a result to be desired. We think that this can be 
accomplished in a number of ways.
One of the steps, obviously--and I'm sure it's 
been mentioned by every speaker here today--is that we increase 
the number and quality of staff assistants. I'll comment 
separately on research.
We believe the present two-thirds voting requirement 
makes good sense and should not be changed to a majority.
We would seriously urge that as much time as possible 
be given before opinions must be implemented. We believe the 
Board at the present time unnecessarily irritates the business 
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community by deciding things and making them effective 
almost immediately. We think the world might go on if 
some of the implementation dates were delayed somewhat. 
On the matter of interpretation, we feel that an 
opinion should not be altered by the interpretation process. 
We do not believe that it was the intent to issue two 
classes of authorized pronouncements, one by the opinion 
process and another through interpretations. We are a 
little troubled by recent changes in the wording that goes 
with the interpretations.
Insofar as the accounting profession is concerned, 
we think the present financing arrangement makes sense.
It can be added to as reasonably necessary. This anticipates 
that APB representatives from accounting firms and from 
other occupations are paid by their employers. We think, 
in addition, that the concept of direct financial support 
by accounting firms has merit.
We believe it is possible and practicable to look 
to other organizations, not for direct financial support, 
but more for assistance in the preparation of position 
papers, research, et al.
We believe that the effectiveness of research can 
be improved. Various studies of this have been made in the 
past and submitted to the APB and the AICPA Board of Director 
One of the suggestions made in the past, which we're merely 
repeating, is the policy of giving pros and cons in research 
studies without the author necessarily faking a position.
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We think it would clearly be desirable to go into the 
prospective proposed changes more in detail. We feel that we 
haven't really tapped all available sources of research in the 
effective way that we should and need to: accounting firms can 
perform research; members of the staff of the Institute can 
perform research; and particularly, the academic community can 
be tapped much more effectively, on a time committed basis.
I will be glad to answer any questions.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you very much, Ralph.
The question that’s uppermost in my mind was raised 
today by Mr. Trueblood and was seconded vehemently by Mr. 
Catlett. Is it conceivable that the Accounting Principles 
Board--or whatever we call it--operating essentially as a 
volunteer body, meeting for three days every month and a half, 
can possibly deal with the number of important questions presently 
on its agenda, and at the same time deal with the fires that 
must be handled quickly? Can it also develop with care and make 
some progress on this business of gathering a body of fundamentals 
everyone seems to want?
Can all of this be done by a volunteer, part-time 
group, or do you really need a group of people working full- 
time?
MR. KENT: All of you have had a chance to observe 
full-time groups--the Supreme Court and many others. I don’t 
know of any group that stays on top of its work assignment, 
so we start from that perspective.
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I do believe that the APB as presently constituted 
with increased staff and a paid chairman could be much more 
effective in staying on top of its job. I think better 
organization of the research function can substantially 
ease the task of the Board, which now bogs down in writing 
its own opinions, and doing some of its own research.
This isn't a perfect world, Mr. Chairman. There’s 
no way that any group can stay totally on top of such an 
assignment. 1 believe the Board as presently constituted 
with additional research, additional staff assistance, a 
paid chairman, can satisfactorily stay on top of the job.
The existence of a paid chairman would make a 
big difference because he would then be thinking about the 
job full-time. He presumably would be someone with a 
practice background; he would be able to anticipate 
problems and do a better job of observing these sparks in 
the woods and the fires which are about to ignite. He can 
start the spade work to prepare the Board to deal with those 
things.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: A number of people, both those who 
are accountants in public practice and those who are not, 
have advised us that it is extremely difficult in this day and 
age and at this stage of evolution, to justify the matter of 
having automatic seats for each member of the Big Eight firms.
We have had people comment to us on the importance 
of objectivity and independence, Something about the 
automatic seat troubles them as to that particular objective.
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Could the Board continue to function adequately on a 
volunteer basis if the Big Eight no longer had automatic seats?
MR. KENT: I'd like to add number nine, number ten, 
number eleven, and number twelve, also, Mr. Chairman. I don't 
think it stops at the so-called Big Eight. The facts of life 
are that the larger firms, wherever you draw that line, are more 
deeply involved with public financial reporting requirements.
I think the world of experience that comes to people in those 
firms is valuable to the APB. Obviously, the Board would survive 
if six out of the twelve top firms were on it, but that isn't our 
question. Our question is what should we do to make our process 
more meaningful? I do believe that when you begin to draw away 
from the larger firms and the world of experience they have, 
you're beginning to erode the pool of competence that is available 
and is needed by the Board.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: You do not regard this as a critical 
matter of principle; it is a matter of what is the most efficient, 
bringing the greatest depth of knowledge to bear. Is that what 
you're saying?
MR. KENT: Yes, I think we're looking for the most 
competent people, and I think we're going to find the most 
competent people in the organizations that have the greatest 
amount of experience.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: One last question. On the subject 
of the two-thirds vote which you mentioned, a number of people 
have made the comment that this requirement invariably, or in
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many instances, results in an extraordinary amount of 
compromise, which not only dilutes the product and makes 
it more complex and difficult to understand, but produces 
something which is not satisfactory to anybody.
Therefore, a number of people have strongly 
urged us to deal with this two-thirds vote. They note 
that other bodies-~the SEC, the legislatures, the courts— 
handle controversial matters on a majority vote basis.
What is your reaction to that viewpoint?
MR. KENT: Admittedly, compromises are required in 
reaching even a majority vote on a difficult and complex 
question. I think there is greater security, greater 
consistency of well-rooted thought if you require two-thirds. 
I think when you’re dealing with controversial matters it 
probably isn't sound to say that they should be determined 
on the basis of a vote of seven to six, or nine to eight.
I personally like, and our firm likes the two- 
thirds vote and don't think it has been a handicap.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Gentlemen?
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: This is a repetition of what 
the Chairman has been asking, and I know it’s quite late in 
the day for repetition.
I'd like to come from a different angle on this 
question of representation. There is this sentence in your 
written statement, Mr. Kent: "...we think it unlikely that 
the accounting firms would uniformly and effectively support 
statements of a body on which they were not represented."
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You make that statement in a paragraph in which you are 
rebutting the people who want quite a small boards possibly 
six members.
Now if the Big Eight are to be guaranteed membership 
on the board at all times, then this Study Group could hardly 
recommend a board smaller than the present one. Suppose we 
decide that a board of twelve men would be more effective, 
then there couldn't be eight members from the Big Eight all 
the time without their dominating it to quite an excessive 
degree.
How would your firm feel about an arrangement whereby 
you are more or less guaranteed that every second go-around, 
so to speak, your firm had a member on the board; but didn't 
have a member on the board every year.
Would that kind of representation be satisfactory to 
secure your support?
MR. KENT: I think the support we're talking about in 
our presentation relates to the fact that the APB is sponsored 
by the American Institute, which subjects its members to the 
various restraints and controls of the professional body.
To go to the question as to whether our firm would 
feel happy to have a seat every other time, I think if you were 
able to find people more qualified to serve, and could 
demonstrate their competence to serve, we would have no basis 
for complaint.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Anyone from the audience?
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(There were none.)
Thank you very much.
MR. KENT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: The last gentleman on our 
program today is Mr. David Norr, a member of the Accounting 
Principles Boards a CPA, and also an experienced financial 
analyst. Mr. Norr, we appreciate your willingness to talk 
to us.
MR. DAVID NORR: I appreciate the opportunity 
to make some observations.
I think the Board should have the best brains 
among CPAs. An analyst need not be on the Board. Service 
on the APB is demanding; it's a full-time job; it is not a 
part-time Job as some have suggested. I would strongly 
oppose forty per cent management representation; I would 
strongly oppose twenty-five per cent management representation; 
I would strongly oppose equal representation of management 
and accountants.
The veto possibility is frightening.
If anything like that were to be done, I would 
question the progress made in narrowing areas of difference. 
The business community, from my experience, makes its voice 
heard now, loudly, clearly, directly and indirectly.
I have developed a healthy respect for the 
knowledge of accounting practitioners, especially from the 
major firms. And I doubt the efficacy of economists, lawyers 
and non-CPAs. I think they have limited expertise.
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My suggestion for improvement is through research, 
a massive stepup in the work. Firsts help finance it. Besides 
the accounting profession’s help, we need increases in analysts’ 
dues, contributions from banks, publicly owned companies and 
stock exchanges.
Regrettably, some of these fields--including my own-- 
have limited views of their responsibilities.
Secondly, what kind of research? More accountants 
taking time from staff duties, and more professors to be hired 
to do studies. More staff should be employed to do this work 
full-time; conceptual work and empirical work.
Staff should be increased. Each committee of the 
Board, I think, should have one full-time staff member. Board 
members who feel the need could get full-time staff help.
J. 0. Edwards issued a call on the role of business, 
and I would like to take advantage of it and call on the FEI, 
the NAA, the trade associations, industry by industry, to set up 
accounting standards; industry by industry to inventory their 
accounting principles. Then, stimulated by the office of the 
Chief Accountant of the SEC, we could quickly settle some of 
these areas of difference.
Closely related, I suggest the start 
of self-policing by the business community of its members’ reports.
This morning, George Catlett referred to the cumbersome 
mechanism of the APB. A good case study might be the problem of 
foreign translations which suddenly arose in mid-August. I 
think it most important to handle this in the annual reports of
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1971. We must work under forced draft on several of these 
problems.
Would a small, full-time, independently financed 
group reach prompt answers? Perhaps so.
Perhaps with the existing system all Board members 
and their very substantial support staff could renounce all 
other duties in their firms; and perhaps for some this is 
exactly what is now done.
It means more meetings and more time on. Board and 
Board-related activities. This is vital. The source of 
payment I think is less consequential. The Board and its 
activities, I feel, are a full-time job.
Will a majority vote be helpful? That, I think, 
is something to be studied more. Quite possibly the answer 
is yes.
In summary, my solution is more fire-power through 
the AICPA. It means more men on accounting research; more 
dollars on research; more time from staff; more staff; more 
time from Board members; more time from task forces and 
professors and others, all providing input to the Institute.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Norr, when Mr. Edwards was 
speaking to us we discussed the possibility that task forces 
of the Board, sometimes called subcommittees, working on 
particular projects include financial executives and accountants 
from industry who have a particular expertise in that area.
What is your reaction to this?
MR. NORR: Fine! If they are bright and knowledge­
able in their area, it would be good, helpful input. I think 
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they nay have asked an analyst to be part of the recently- 
formed real estate committee.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Professor Solomons has noted the 
suggestion that a board of eighteen or twenty, with their 
supporting staffs is a rather large and possibly unwieldy group 
when it has to consider complex matters. A board of maybe five 
persons is arguably too small, and maybe there is a compromise 
area of eleven or twelve.
Would you have any strong feeling about a board of 
a slightly smaller size?
MR. NORR: I really don’t. I don’t think I have 
any clear view as to which way it should fall.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Do you have any views on the subject 
of the automatic seat for each member of the Big Eight?
MR. NORR: I’m impressed by their knowledge and 
experience. It makes considerable sense.
MR. LEVINE: I’d like to ask a question that’s 
related to that one, Mr. Norr.
I would ask that you pause to reflect upon your 
answer. Since you as a member of the Board could be considered 
to be from one of the non-pressurized groups, would you have any 
feelings about independence, in fact as well as in appearance, 
of public accounting members?
MR. NORR: There can be pressures on me, too. I 
have not been concerned about a lack of independence. The men 
seem independent, dedicated and call the shots as they see them.
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But I could not object if the commission were to decide that 
the board should be independently financed with men severing 
their ties to firms.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: You draw a very striking 
distinction between the independence of the practitioner and 
the incapacity for independence which you attribute to 
representatives of management. It’s one of the most striking 
things that’s been said here today.
I don’t really have a question on it, except to press 
you to tell us on what this is based.
MR. NORR: Experience. (Laughter) Perhaps we can 
cite, for example, Mr. Hornbostel's speech before the American 
Petroleum Institute meeting in Miami.
I don’t see, in the business community, the seeking 
out of abuses; the willingness, let us say, to expand SEC funds 
to search out the problems. Yet in the FEI talk, it is suggested 
that the APB should not go after problems. I think it important 
for the APB to also go after problems.
So that, among other talks and statements, is what 
led me to my conclusion.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I suppose beyond that there is, at 
least in theory, the proposition that the independent practicing 
accountant has a professional job to do which is partially 
statutory. He's supposed to be a surrogate, in a sense. He is 
to make certain that the financial statements of a corporation 
submitted to stockholders and proposed stockholders under the 1933 
and 1934 Securities Acts, represent fair and full disclosure.
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There is no such obligation under the law, at least, on the 
businessman, except to the extent that a businessman and 
businesses have to face severe penalties if their disclosures 
are incorrect or false.
It was deemed appropriate at the time these Acts 
were established, to have this additional safeguard. Does 
that proposition reflect itself in reality: does the 
independent practicing CPA tend to look upon matters of 
financial reporting with a greater degree of objectivity than 
do the chief financial executives of business corporations?
MR. NORR: This is possible, and of course the 
Board member who is from industry now behaves in the most 
responsible professional fashion.
Perhaps some of the fault may lie with a financial 
community that produces pressure for improvement in earnings 
as representative of progress, so that all--including accountants, 
management and analysts--seek out those systems that will 
produce the best improvements and the best showing.
MR. OLSON: Do you have any feelings as to what 
specifically has contributed to these abuses? Do you lay 
them primarily at the door of industry, or do you place 
equal blame on the practicing public accountant?
MR. NORR: All of us seem to be involved in the 
problem of abuses and their proliferation. One could perhaps 
philosophize and say that it’s all of society. And as I 
said, perhaps it's the mechanism of earnings per share;
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improved values that make all want to do better. Somehow 
this system has produced, I think, the pressure for less 
conservatism in our statements.
MR. PRYOR: Don't you think that part of the 
problem is the pressure on the part of investors and 
management for more prompt performance? The whole of 
society has become more equity oriented than it was twenty 
years ago.
MR. NORR: Yes, we're all involved.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Does anybody in the audience 
have a question? Mr. Edwards!
MR. EDWARDS: You said that you would be very 
unhappy with forty per cent representation from business; 
and you'd be just as unhappy with twenty-five per cent 
representation. You stopped there. Do I assume you'd be 
more comfortable with zero representation? If this is the 
case, would you please elaborate on why you think that 
business representation should not be counted on to act 
responsibly.
My second question is this: You say you're 
frightened at the idea of a bloc vote of industry 
representation. Do you seriously believe that industry 
representatives could get together and vote as a bloc; is 
it possible to have that kind of a dream?
MR. NORR: In answer to the first, my experience 
says one in eighteen is quite good; perhaps it could go, as 
it was before, to two representatives from industry.
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As to the second part, I think there is too much of a 
feeling that management should pick the principles it wishes. 
It came through in some of today's papers and statements. I 
think there is an important need for checks and balances.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: You've all been extremely patient.
We conclude this first day of the hearing with 
renewed appreciation to all of you for sticking with us and 
giving us the benefit of your wisdom, your thoughts and 
suggestions. We will reconvene again tomorrow morning at 
ten o’clock. Good night.
(The meeting closed at six-ten o’clock.)
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THURSDAY MORNING SESSION 
November 4, 1971
The Thursday morning session of the Study on 
Establishment of Accounting Principles convened at ten 
o’clock on November 4, 1971, Mr. Wheat presiding.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome 
to the second day of our seance. (Laughter) There is 
no need for any remarks on my part. As I said yesterday, 
we all know why we’re here and we continue to be most 
grateful to all of you for participating with us.
We’ll follow the practice we did yesterday of 
affording the audience an opportunity to ask questions of 
the gentlemen who are giving oral comments, unless any of 
the gentlemen would prefer not to have that done.
Before the day is over we will have a chance to 
open ourselves up to comments, suggestions, or questions 
from the floor, to which we would be most receptive.
At the outset of our program this morning, we 
have the privilege of having with us four gentlemen from 
the Machinery and Allied Products Institute: Mr. Derr, 
Mr. Schirmer, Mr. Steward and Mr. Wearly.
MR. CHARLES DERR: As we presently appear I am 
more nearly a ringmaster than a witness.
I am Senior Vice President of the Machinery and 
Allied Products Institute. We are a national organization of 
capital goods and allied industrial equipment manufacturers. 
The Institute very much appreciates the opportunity of 
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appearing before this committee. The Institute, and particularly 
its executive committee--its board of directors, as it were--has 
long been especially interested in the work of the Accounting 
Principles Board and its parent body, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants.
On October 25, 1970, in a letter to the Executive 
Vice President of AICPA, we suggested that the AICPA consider 
the possibility of appointing a senior business executive to the 
APB. We have referred to this in our written statement, and will 
elaborate upon it in the course of our testimony this morning.
Our testimony is to be presented, in order, by
Mr. Walter Schirmer, Chief Executive of the Clark Equipment 
Company, and Mr. William Wearly, Chairman and Chief Executive 
of Ingersoll-Rand Company.
I should add that Mr. Frank Foster, Chairman of 
Sperry Rand Corporation, desired to be with us but could not. 
However, he prepared a statement addressed to Mr. Wheat, and 
with the Chairman's permission, I would ask for leave to include 
it in the printed record of the hearing.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: We'd appreciate it.
MR. DERR: Thank you.
If time remains, and again with the permission of 
the Chairman, at the conclusion of our testimony by these two 
gentlemen, Mr. Charles Stewart would appreciate the opportunity 
of addressing a question or two on the general philosophy of the 
Accounting Principles Board.
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One more word and I shall desist. Mr. Schirmer, 
our first witness, intends to discuss generally our 
suggestions on the advisory committee, along with a number 
of other matters on his mind.
Mr. Nearly intends to illustrate and to 
exemplify to this distinguished committee the need for 
input from top management to APB deliberations, by 
discussing the potentialities for his business and for 
industry generally of a matter now under active consideration 
by the Accounting Principles Board. With that, Mr. Schirmer.
MR, WALTER E. SCHIRMER: Thank you very much, 
Charley.
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Commission:
I'm going to be very brief, speaking only to 
certain points in the statement which MAPI has produced. 
It has always been my philosophy that business is not run 
by numbers alone; that there are elements of judgment and 
decision completely unrelated to the figures which the 
accounting profession produces.
I believe that in some of the things which are 
under consideration by the Accounting Principles Board, that 
advice and counsel, or at least the opportunity to discuss 
these problems at their inception, is of considerable importance, 
After an exposure draft has been made, it is almost too late 
to provide any basic comments of this type, as the comments 
are directed mainly to the specifics of the exposure draft.
I also believe that the Accounting Principles Board 
should have the advice of what you might call the industrial 
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advisory committee, in order to solve problems which industry 
itself may offer and which do not arise as a result of government 
bodies or the professional people themselves.
I believe also that the Accounting Principles Board 
should adopt or develop basic accounting principles and 
standards. It is very difficult from the industrialist’s 
point of view to have to worry about the detailed rules and 
opinions which are provided in some of these draft exposures, 
and which are immediately scrutinized, I believe, by those who 
would like to avoid them through possible loopholes. This 
produces a second round with more detailed rules and regulations, 
and still further opportunity for lawyers as well as accountants 
to see how they can be avoided.
I think that we should all accept the fact that the 
great majority of business is honest and tries to do a good 
job of disclosure, and that most of these opinions are for 
the purpose of trying to fence in and prevent the unscrupulous. 
I think there are other ways of dealing with those who would 
like to make exceptions to generally accepted accounting 
principles.
I have two other points which I will mention very 
briefly--the investment credit; the Board has produced an 
exposure draft recommending a way of handling this credit. I 
believe the principle of the credit, the reason that Congress 
probably will adopt it, is to provide a stimulus for business, 
and a stimulus for capital expenditures. That stimulus will 
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be a deferred stimulus, if we follow the APB proposal. This 
seems to be completely contrary to the purpose of the credit. 
If it is, in effect, a tax reduction, it ought to be taken 
in the year when the tax is being paid.
Another example is product-line reporting, upon 
which Mr. Wearly will comment from a slightly different 
standpoint. I comment on it from the standpoint of the 
difficulty involved in doing this for an integrated 
corporation.
A specific example is my own company. We 
manufacture fork-lift trucks, construction machinery, 
trailers, all of which receive certain automotive 
components from our automotive division.
It would be completely arbitrary, in my opinion, 
to develop product-line reporting for these individual 
products. Our automotive division sells about 50 per cent 
of its output to outside customers. How do we classify 
the machinery and equipment which they use, as to capital 
employed in the business? How do we allocate certain 
overhead, certain general administrative overhead, between 
these divisions?
We have tried to develop specific earning statements 
and we think that we would hesitate very much to spend the 
amount of money and effort to develop this.
We also have some nineteen overseas companies each 
with different methods of accounting. When we try to combine 
them with our methods, we run into exceptional difficulties.
183
The final point is the question of including in 
financial statements the 20 per cent or more joint ventures 
that you may have. This is very difficulty because of the 
differences in accounting and the differences in fiscal periods. 
We would probably have to have our accountants go overseas and 
develop a whole new set of books that might not be compatible 
with the local requirements in those countries.
We think that in certain cases, where there is a 
minimum of influence on the basic corporation, that you ought 
to be excused from that kind of accounting. Thank you very 
much.
MR. DERR: Mr. Wearly, you're next.
MR. WILLIAM L. WEARLY: Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:
I have given you a copy of my proposed testimony, 
and in the interests of time I would like to briefly cover 
certain parts of it and dwell more on other parts, particularly 
those parts at the end of the paper.
As a starting pointy I would like to remind you that 
I am quoting from the October 4 issue of Industry Week, that 
as of right now "...nine out of ten home radios used in the 
United States are produced in foreign countries. One out of 
six new cars is produced in a foreign country, and this ratio 
is rapidly changing; seven out of ten sweaters, nineteen out 
of twenty motorcycles... . "
I won't read any further.
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I'll identify my company briefly, just to give you 
an idea of what I mean in the way of world competition. 
Ingersoll-Rand will have total sales of approximately $800 
million this year, of which $300 million is outside the 
United States, and $200 million of it is exported from the 
United States.
I'm going to deal with the principle of separate 
accounting for product lines. It is not clearly stated 
why this is necessary. I believe regardless of the 
necessity that it does, in fact, cause disclosure of 
confidential information which is important to the future 
well-being of the company. It would be very damaging to have 
this type of information get in the hands of worldwide 
competitors, or for that matter any competitor.
This is not materially different than requiring 
a company to disclose its product research and development 
programs as they are being formulated. I think you will 
agree that if an individual employee or an outsider were 
involved in disclosure of a research program, or of a 
marketing strategy program, he would be subject to discharge 
and a suit for damages.
I will try to demonstrate that the proposed 
disclosures might become even more damaging and broader in 
scope. I will deal for a few moments with things that are 
particular to the Ingersoll-Rand Company.
Our business segments, product-lines, are by intent 
designed to have certain relationships to each other. Mr.
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Schirmer made the same comment about Clark Equipment Company.
Our so-called segments involve some 27 product divisions, 
and 300 or 400 different lines. We charge our management--and I 
want to emphasize this--we charge our management with creating 
and putting together our divisions in such a way as to optimize, 
again I repeat, to optimize customer service, impact, engineering, 
technological proficiency and deployment of fixed assets for the 
most efficient production. This is management’s stock in trade. 
If we succeed, we have a highly profitable growth; conversely, 
stagnation may indicate failure to develop proper relationships.
Thus we do not feel that our various businesses, units 
or segments can have the same vitality if operated in separated; 
unrelated units. If they do, there is little purpose in putting 
them together.
Clearly, there should be no inference made that 
segments could or should perform the same if operated independently. 
Therefore, what is a valid reason for an investor to have this 
information? He cannot invest in a segment. Is it to permit him 
to invest in a new business venture to compete with only the 
favorable segment?
The management of Ingersoll-Rand would like to know 
many things about our competitors; we try to find out these 
things; we don’t know them for sure. These disclosures, as I 
see it; would lead to a list of things--I’m not going to enumerate 
them--but it’s things such as unit production of various product­
lines, the growth rate by product-lines over a period of years,
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profitability and cost trends, and so forth.
We believe the proposed APB opinion would 
effectively lead to disclosure of this type of information. 
And I remind you that a little bit of disclosure ultimately 
leads to greater disclosure. Pretty soon the whole 
picture is disclosed, as I see it, to not only domestic 
competitors, but to worldwide competitors.
I doubt if you have had experience with what I 
call the "experience curve." I'd like to ask you to take 
some time and look at Chart A at the back of my paper.
Chart A is a price pattern. Price Pattern X is 
rather a normal pattern. Let me show you what the ordinate 
means. We have accumulated volume over time. We don’t 
plot it in time, but rather we plot it in cumulative units 
of volume. On the vertical ordinate we have unit prices.
So the price volume, in constant dollars, of most 
products follows this over the years; and over increasing 
volumes the price actually reduces. Now Price Pattern Y 
shows a company that held the price too high, and at some 
point in time found its competitors chewing it up. They 
tried to lower their price, but went out of business because 
they couldn't turn the company around in time.
Price Pattern Z is also very common, in that the 
company does hold too high prices for a period of units or 
years, then they lower the price and again they become 
competitive.
Now if you turn to Chart B you will see the typical 
Price Pattern B plotted on top of a cost--a unit cost per.
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Typically, these unit costs, when plotted, are a straight line. 
They are a straight line having a slope somewhere between 70 
per cent and 90 per cent. This is a typical pattern.
On Chart C you can see the price pattern when they 
introduced the product at low cost; after a number of units were 
built they began to come down; finally the price was ahead of 
the cost and showed profitability, and the price followed the 
cost curve down over a period of units or years.
On Chart I am actually showing you an Ingersoll- 
Rand product which is, needless to say, not disclosed. This 
cost curve is the actual cost curve for this product. If you 
will look down in the right-hand corner you will see an X on 
the cost curve marked "I". "I” represents the actual cost
achieved at the end of the year, December 1970, for this product.
If you will move up, the price curve shows where our 
price was, actually, at the end of the year 1970. I have further 
projected where I think our cost experience curve will go in 
1975. That's what is called "I 75” on this curve, on down a 
number of units.
Now I have competitors A & B. I think competitor A's 
cost experience is where we have shown it on this curve. I 
don't know that, but I think that. B is where he thinks he 
rests.
Now let me show you what I can do. If I know for 
sure that A is the correct number for competitor A^ I can 
drop my price down to below A's level, and certainly discourage
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him from making any further investments in this business.
He will probably gradually retire from the business.
If I knew for sure where B was, I could drop 
down there and project myself in a low profit position 
for four or five years, until I got out to my next cost 
experience point and be profitable; have my units out 
and have most of the competition effectively stifled.
I suggest to you gentlemen this is precisely 
what the Japanese are doing to us in America today. Will 
you look at Chart E. Chart E is from MITI, the Japanese 
Government agency, and it shows the cost price experience 
curve on monochrome television receivers.
I need not tell you what has happened. The 
American television industry is out of business.
The next one shows only the price curves, because
I could not get the cost curve on the Japanese steel 
industry. I remind you that steel and television are highly 
visible industries. They stand on their own. They don’t 
need disclosure because the disclosure already exists, in 
this industry. That's all I have to say.
MR. CHARLES W. STEWART: Would it be permissible 
for me to take a couple of minutes?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Please do.
MR. STEWART: I think that it’s perfectly clear 
that what we were trying to do here was not only address 
ourselves to some of the matters that are before you, but 
also to illustrate the kind of interchange that we recommend 
the Accounting Principles Board undertake through regular 
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consultation with chief executives of companies. These men 
should be a combination of those who have not come up the 
financial route, with a sprinkling of men who have come up 
the financial route.
We think also that such consultation should take 
place at an early stage in the conceptual period of a new 
opinion or directive. We do not say this in any way to demean 
the role of the financial officer of a company. You have him 
represented on the Accounting Principles Board, and as an aside 
I think this committee might want to take a look as to whether 
the representation is adequate in terms of numbers. We think 
perhaps it should be enlarged somewhat.
With due respect to the financial officer, it is 
our judgment, and has been our prior recommendation and we 
reiterate it here and illustrate it here, that you would benefit 
by the exchange with chief executive officers of the type who 
are with us today. They are not necessarily volunteering for 
the job, but we are glad to try to give you a picture of what 
we have in mind.
I’d like to say just a few words about philosophy 
beyond the question of organization. I think, really, that 
your agenda is too limited in terms of your scope of 
assignment. You really ought to be looking at the thrust, 
the philosophy of the Accounting Principles Board activity 
in addition to the organization of that activity.
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I was struck, for example, in reading a little 
pamphlet that the AICPA issues called The Accounting 
Principles Boards with the last two paragraphs, which read 
as follows:
"The information produced by accounting
is used by different groups for different purposes-- 
credit grantors, investment advisors, stockholders, 
regulatory agencies, and by management. In 
performing its work, the Accounting Principles 
Board keeps all these diverse interests in mind 
but its primary concern must be for the investing 
public and credit grantors.
"By adopting this position in the 
development of accounting principles, the APB 
contributes to preservation of confidence in the 
free enterprise economy--and thus serves the 
long-term interest of business as well as the 
public."
I have two comments. First of all, it seems to me 
that the flat statement that the primary concern of the 
Accounting Principles Board must be for the investing public 
and credit grantors is not wholly appropriate and reasonable. 
Obviously, as suggested earlier in one of these two paragraphs, 
the Accounting Principles Board must and should keep all the 
various diverse interests in mind.
On the other hand, financial reporting is not reporting 
in the air. It is financial information which in turn in many 
instances reveals, as Mr. Wearly has demonstrated,, directly or 
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indirectly corporate facts which are not necessarily financial 
in character.
It is our judgment that the Accounting Principles 
Board has indeed been following the criterion to which I have 
just referred. We believe that business management considerations 
should be larger than they appear , to be from the conduct of the 
Accounting Principles Board as we see it, and from the statement 
which it attributes to itself in terms of its motives.
Now again with regard to philosophy, it seems clear 
that the Accounting Principles Board concerns itself with two 
important motivations--not exclusively--but certainly it is 
giving high priority to these two motivations.
One is the matter of further disclosure; the other 
is the matter of comparability in terms of being able to compare 
one company, or one group of companies, with another company or 
group of companies. This again goes back to some extent to 
what these gentlemen have said.
In this connection we have one general observation 
to make. It seems to us that there is some evidence that the 
Accounting Principles Board on these two points is operating 
either deliberately or Inadvertently on the theory that it 
should anticipate what the Securities and Exchange Commission 
might do in the foreseeable future. This, presumably, in order 
to keep rule-setting under the aegis of a private institution 
as distinguished from a public regulatory body.
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A private institution, at times, has some 
responsibility to hold the line. If it believes that a 
trend in government regulatory matters is not the 
appropriate answer, it should resist, rather than merely 
attempting to anticipate government action.
To cite as an example, look at the history of 
the development of the concept of uniform cost accounting 
standards. This has now proceeded to the point where a 
board is actually developing those standards. The AICPA 
started out as resisting this concept in kind of a qualified 
manner, and then progressively softened on the issue. Now-- 
and I don’t think the word is entirely inappropriate--it 
is almost in the position of a collaborator.
This is not to say that AICPA or the Board should 
not maintain its independent professional integrity and 
status, but I do believe that it’s going down a fairly 
dangerous road. And I think with respect to those two 
objectives of disclosure and comparability, that some rule 
or reason must be applied. Some of the total top management 
objectives must be taken into consideration in connection 
with the activity of the Board.
Organizationally, we have a further recommendation. 
I'm a little fuzzy about the organization of AICPA in total; 
I know that there's a Council; I know that there's a Board 
of Directors, and I know that there's an Accounting Principles 
Board. Recently we watched an interesting exercise when there 
was a difference of opinion, apparently, between the tax 
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division and the Accounting Principles Board. It was resolved 
by the President, who appointed an advisory committee, and 
then the Board of Directors issued a statement, this one being 
addressed to the problem of conformity of tax and book 
accounting.
This was a rather unique approach, and it raises the 
question in our minds as to whether or not an appeal procedure, 
beyond the APB, might be worthy of your consideration.
It is interesting, incidentally, to look at the 
rationalization in the statement of the Board of Directors 
with respect to conformity between tax and book accounting. 
One of the important points made in the rationalization was 
that certain things are done for tax reasons, in terms of 
national public policy objectives. These have nothing to do 
with accounting, in a theoretical or practical sense, and there­
fore, it would make no sense to act to enforce conformity between 
tax and book accounting.
I would suggest that if you apply that same reasoning 
to the investment tax credit, which clearly has an objective 
that goes beyond anything approaching an accounting question, 
you might come out with a totally different answer than is in 
the present proposal of the disclosure report.
In brief, we're suggesting--and we do this quite 
humbly, at least I do, because I'm not an accountant--that you 
enlarge the scope of your inquiries; that you examine the 
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philosophical aspects of the work of the Board; that you 
look at its prime motivations or prime goals or thrusts; 
that you look at the question of whether or not there should 
be some guideline or deadline or cutoff with respect to 
some of those individual thrusts.
We made our suggestions regarding organization, 
principally the creation of a kind of 
advisory committee, perhaps enlargement of financial officer 
representation from industry on your board, perhaps an 
appeal procedure.
But the thing that concerns us most of all is 
not organization. It is the direction in which the 
Accounting Principles Board is moving, and particularly with 
regard to those two key objectives of disclosure and 
comparability.
I think there's one other thing to keep in mind, 
and that is that a security analyst has an insatiable 
appetite for information, whether it's relevant, misleading, 
or whatever it is. You'll never satisfy it, and the impact 
on top management in an effort to satisfy it to a maximum 
degree, we feel might be quite serious.
Speaking for MAPI, and for the gentlemen who 
have helped with the illustration of an approach that I 
would like to see you consider, we greatly appreciate the 
opportunity to be here. I have gone beyond your time 
limits; my sincere apologies.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: We are greatly honored to have a 
group of distinguished chief executives like yourselves take the 
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time and trouble to come and talk with us. The comments you've 
made are very significant. I'm sure that the gentlemen who are 
sitting with me have these interests in mind, but it's well to 
be reminded of them.
I would like to comment on your statement, Mr. 
Stewart, on the question of philosophy and objectives of 
financial statements. As you know, for historical and other 
reasons, the American Institute decided to put together two 
committees to work simultaneously on these problems. The 
Trueblood Committee has as its chief task the business of 
trying to determine the objectives of financial reporting, and 
in particular just exactly for whom are financial statements 
intended.
I would hope, and urge you, to make your presentation 
to that committee at the appropriate time. They could benefit 
from the things that you are commenting about.
MR. DERR: If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, we're 
actively working on it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Our objective, as you know, and 
our assigned task is more limited. And although inevitably 
we need to be apprised of the particular areas of criticism 
of the work of the Accounting Principles Board, as well as 
any other comments on that work, we are not in a position to 
delve with great depth into the details of the opinions or 
proposed opinions of the Board itself. That project would 
take us several years, and would be far beyond my competence 
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as a layman. I have had some experience of another sort 
with the matters about which Mr. Wearly talked. When I 
was on the Commission we had this problem. And I am sure 
that all of you gentlemen recognize the various counter­
vailing pressures which operate in this field, including 
the very real concerns of business, which you have so 
eloquently commented upon.
I think it might be well for the record just 
to reflect for a moment on the fact that when rather severe 
demands for product-line reporting were being made in 
powerful Congressional committees and by powerful agencies 
of the Government, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
elected to hold up on this project until a study could be 
made under the auspices of the Financial Executives Institute. 
We were impressed by the progress of that study and it rapidly 
became apparent that the author, Professor Mautz, was a man 
of great competence and diligence. He proceeded swiftly 
about his task. He was, to my way of thinking, very much 
aware of some of these difficulties which Mr. Schirmer 
mentioned: allocations of costs, and so forth.
His report and recommendations so commended them­
selves to the Commission that when it acted in this area, 
it did so greatly influenced by the work that had been done 
under the auspices of this private organization.
It is, in my judgment, the best example of the type 
of cooperation between Government and the private sector 
which one looks to find. The matter has been, and is in kind 
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of an experimental stage. It obviously has to be reexamined 
and looked at carefully.
There are increasing demands for expansion on what 
has already been proposed and embodied in the rules. It’s 
highly significant that the matters upon which Mr. Wearly 
commented be, taken into account. I’m certain that if you look 
at the record of the Securities and Exchange Commission in this 
area, you will find a caution which should commend itself to you.
And of course, I think personally that it’s encumbent 
upon the Commission. After all, the accounting profession has 
awaited the action of the SEC in this area.
But certainly it is encumbent upon the accounting 
profession to examine with great care whether or not it is 
feasible for the auditor to perform an attest function with 
reference to these figures which become very important in the 
minds of some investors. I think that you would find, as we 
have, that there are increasing numbers of investor-oriented 
groups which consider this information very important.
It is important, of course, that this be done with 
great care, and I am sure that it will be.
I would like to make one comment by way of a question 
and comment together. This is a point that Mr. Stewart made 
about the philosophy of APB activity. We should--he is entirely 
correct--be concerned about that and be alert to it.
As you know, it has been recommended to us that 
opinions of the Board have not adequately, in the judgment of
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the critic, set forth the purpose of the particular 
opinion; what it is designed to accomplish from the 
standpoint of the public investor, and what alternatives 
were rejected.
The question which this raises is whether or not 
these opinions on financial accounting, as opposed to 
management accounting, are really for the primary purpose 
of maintaining the information and confidence level of the 
investing public.
As I judged your remarks, your principal concern 
with that objective is that adequate attention is not being 
given to the harmful effect the opinion might have on the 
corporation.
In other words, the question is one of making sure 
that this is being considered. I wanted to be sure that 
that’s correct.
I have an example with which I'm working at the 
moment. Corporate management is very much concerned about 
its reputation and the difficulties it will have with the 
stockholders and others if it cannot maintain a sizable 
quantity of deferred costs on the asset side of the balance 
sheet. And management doesn't want any qualification in 
the auditor's report as to recoverability of those costs.
It's a question, in this instance, of management’s 
concern for its reputation, with a lesser regard for the 
problem of the person who may invest in that company based 
upon undisclosed deferred costs.
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The areas of accounting standards which apply here 
are designed to protect the public investor. I wanted to be 
sure that it wasn’t your feeling that that particular aspect 
of management, which one encounters from time to time, should 
be taken into account as opposed to the interests of the public 
investor.
MR. STEWART: The implication of your question is 
perfectly appropriate. Under no circumstances do I suggest 
that a coverup be tolerated. On the other hand, I do feel 
that there’s quite a difference between what might be called 
a selfish coverup and the revelation of information which does 
not involve any impropriety on the part of management, but does 
have some serious management impacts.
If you break down product-lines in a way that reveals 
where a particular product is manufactured, a union is then in 
a position to pinpoint the profit center that is doing the best 
job. I do not think that is in the interest of accounting; I 
do not think it is in the interest of management; I do not 
think it is in the interest of stockholders, and it does not 
involve anything approaching an impropriety such as you 
suggested.
I do not wish to imply what is implicit in your 
question. Could I comment just for a--
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Excuse me just a moment. Just to 
be sure that I understand what you are saying--it is not the 
precise interests of management that you’re concerned with. 
It’s the interest of stockholders in a broad sense. It will 
200
be injurious, in your judgment, for certain things to 
be revealed; injurious to the stockholders of the company. 
That interest has to be taken into account along with the 
interest in full disclosure. You want to ensure that the 
broad interests of investors are taken into account. Isn’t 
that a correct statement?
MR. STEWART: It's a correct statement except that 
you end up with the word "investor", which is not an 
inaccurate terminus to your point, but really doesn't put 
the proper emphasis on what I'm saying.
I'm not speaking of management as an individual 
interested in what his profit performance as an individual 
is going to be next year, except to the extent that our 
system happens to reward that. I'm not interested in the 
selfish protection of individual members of management; 
when I refer to management I'm referring to the responsibilities 
of management to the corporation, to the stockholders, and I 
think to the system that we live with.
There is no difference of opinion between the 
manner in which you have stated these propositions, as long 
as proper weighting is given. If you read the statement of 
the AICPA, it is clear that a heavier weighting is being 
applied to two areas--credit grantors and investing public-- 
than is applied to the company in terms of its proper 
functioning.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: The question that I'm raising is 
the correctness of that statement as it stands. The reason 
I raise the question is because it seems to me that, properly 
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interpreted, management's role is to do the best job it can 
for the stockholders--not for the management.
If that’s true, management should be concerned about 
the interests of stockholders in accounting and financial 
accounting matters. It is obviously apparent that those 
charged with developing standards for financial accounting— 
and I'm limiting myself, now, to financial accounting--must 
take into account all these aspects that you gentlemen have 
been reciting to us this morning.
But I do not comprehend that meaning that there are 
interests of a significant nature to be protected apart from 
the interests of the stockholders. I'm a little puzzled as 
to what those interests might be. I'm not terribly concerned 
about credit grantors. I put this to you in order to elicit 
your reaction, because I have the strong feeling that the 
major banks can take care of themselves (Laughter). They get 
from you all kinds of information, not necessarily appropriate 
for public distribution nor would anyone deem that appropriate, 
necessarily.
The public, however, is not in a position to demand 
those things from you and to secure them. And accordingly, 
the interests of the public in financial reporting and 
accounting seems to me to be a relatively paramount interest. 
No one is going to look out for the public unless the accounting 
profession, and ultimately the Government, hopefully to a 
greater degree, watch out for this matter.
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Our whole system is based upon the investments of 
more than thirty million Americans. I just want to make 
sure that the concern I have is adequately reflected, at 
the same time that your concerns are given their appropriate 
weight.
MR. STEWART: Really, we’re not very far apart. 
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I'm glad to hear it.
MR. STEWART: We're stating something in different 
terms. When I say you need to look at management's 
considerations, management, obviously, even to the question 
of susceptibility to suit, has a responsibility to the 
corporation as an entity; to stockholders. It is in that 
context that I am referring to it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I don't think we're far apart 
at all.
MR. STEWART: We're not far apart, but I want to 
be absolutely sure that I am not leaving the record unclear 
as to the point which I'm trying to make: and that is that 
there are management considerations in the interests of 
stockholders, present and potential, which should be given 
a proper weighting in the development of the opinions of 
the Board.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I am in one hundred per cent 
agreement with you.
MR. STEWART: I would like to say one thing about 
your opening remark regarding the scope of your assignment. 
Of course, it is for you to judge that scope.
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I believe that it is almost impossible to make 
intelligent judgments regarding organization by itself; that 
you do have to take into consideration these other factors to 
which I have referred.
I am also a little bit mystified about the overlap 
between the two groups to which you refer. There’s a third now 
active on the matter of segmented reporting.
Obviously, if you want to play on words, it appears 
that AICPA is segmenting its effort by having these three groups 
operating somewhat autonomously, but I hope not in terms of 
playback among the three groups. I suggest, as I already have 
mentioned, that you can’t separate organization from substance; 
you can’t separate organization from philosophy, because they 
have a bearing on how you organize.
The committee that you referred to, or the study 
group, which I believe Mr. Trueblood is responsible for, deals 
with the question of financial reporting. Another group is--
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Forgive me, I think that the Trueblood 
Committee is dealing on a much broader scale than that; it's 
financial reporting and all other kinds of financial statements, 
for various types of users —
MR. STEWART: I see; I abbreviated it too much.
There is another committee which has the assignment 
to come up with something on segmented reporting, a much-- 
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I believe that that is a committee 
of the Accounting Principles Board.
204
MR. STEWART: That's all right. My point is 
that the last committee mentioned is dealing with a very 
important aspect of financial reporting, and apparently 
has a mandate to come forward with a proposal before the 
very broad study--which I believe is contemplated to be 
a two-year study--is completed.
So that to the extent that the larger scope study 
brings light upon the subject of financial reporting in 
other matters, we could argue that it would be premature for 
the Accounting Principles Board or the AICPA to address 
itself to such an important segment that has been assigned 
to the other committee.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I recognize the thrust of your 
argument, and it has been well-stated. You will recall 
my questions yesterday to the gentleman from Haskins & 
Sells. They were addressed to this same problem; can you 
wait to make progress until there is a final decision on 
some of these broad fundamentals. His testimony yesterday, 
if you will recall, was no; you must proceed while you 
phase in.
I suppose you might say that that is a practical 
judgment by the gentleman?
MR. STEWART: Incidentally, I would anticipate 
that that would be the practical or pragmatic answer; the 
only question is whether you are really making progress, 
or merely making decisions.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: That’s a debatable question.
(Laughter)
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I would like to ask one more question before turning it 
back to the committee. The proposal you have made of a senior 
advisory committee to the Board is an extremely interesting one.
I wonder if you could take just a moment to tell us 
whether or not you have viewed that matter from the standpoint 
of its specifics. Have you considered how many persons should 
be on such a committee; how they should be selected; would it 
be designed to be representative of all aspects of publicly- 
held business, or only a selection of top executives who have 
an interest in these matters and are therefore willing to spend 
the time? Under whose auspices would they be selected, and 
would they contemplate any given amount of time?
MR. STEWART: We spelled out some of that in a letter 
which is attached to our statement, but I welcome the opportunity 
to abbreviate what we have in mind.
It's been our experience that very large committees 
do not function well. Our thinking has gone this far, and 
assuming some receptivity to the notion of its general terms, 
it should be a relatively small group, five, six, or something 
in that range.
I believe I mentioned previously that I would mix 
those who had financial background and had reached chief 
executive status, and those who have not. I believe that in 
our letter we indicated that the advisory group should be 
representative, consistent with its size, of segments of 
business in the United States. In this way you would not get 
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the point of view of only, let us say, heavy goods manufacture.
I think these men have to be chief executive officers 
or men who have advanced from that level to long-range 
planners. I would distinguish clearly from the chief 
financial officer.
I would assume that it would be selected by the 
President of AICPA or by some appointed individual; I would 
obviously avoid--because we have a stake in the public 
interest just as the Accounting Principles Board and the 
accounting profession do -- I would avoid loading the 
committee. And I think that a further stipulation would be 
that these men would be brought in at an early stage on 
conceptual matters, as distinguished from a disclosure report.
We do a great deal of work with Government, and our 
experience has been, for example, that when something is 
printed in the Federal Register under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, there's quite a bit of ice on that particular 
proposal. I have a hunch that a similar experience occurs 
within the operation of AICPA.
That's about where our thinking has gone. I think 
that there is a growing recognition in business today that, 
to a large extent, it ' s business' own fault because there isn't 
a proper communication between the accounting profession and 
top management.
We do not recommend that you fill that gap by 
placing chief executive officers on the Accounting Principles 
Board. I think your present system of using industry 
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representation in terms of financial officers--although that 
might be enlarged--is appropriate.
I think that you mentioned time. This will take 
time. But business has to learn, if it hasn’t already, that 
if it’s going to get input it has to take time. And I think you 
would find competent, interested, broad-gauged chief executives 
who would welcome an invitation. They should be rotated probably 
in order that you have exposure to various segments of the 
economy.
As I say, we deliberately structured our presentation 
today along the lines that we did in order to illustrate the 
heart of our suggestion.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you very much, Mr. Stewart.
Anyone on the committee?
MR. PRYOR: I have one question I’d like to ask and 
one comment I'd like to make. Did you seriously suggest that 
corporate disclosure was the basic reason that imports from 
foreign countries have become as large in this country as they 
have?
MR. SCHIRMER: I guess you’re aiming that at Mr. 
Wearly.
MR. WEARLY: The reason why I said that is because 
their thrust has been at visible industries. I can't disclaim 
the fact that low labor rates give them a big advantage; but 
I would point out that we can compete today in the world in 
many, many products because we have a productivity advantage.
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They have great difficulty in finding out what I'll 
call the thousands of hidden products that lie in the 
industrial world. But steel is visible. All they have to 
do is analyze steel reports, and they know how much tonnage 
is produced in the different classes of steel; they know 
what the labor rates are; and they could plan and did plan 
roughly ten years ago to invade the world steel market.
They did it first by tieing up raw materials; 
they tied up technology, and then they went to work. 
Television became a visible industry. It didn’t require 
segmented reporting; it was already out in the open. They 
did that.
Now, as you know, in the invisible industries, if 
I may call them that, the Japanese have not been particularly 
successful. This is a factor; not the only one.
MR. PRYOR: I don’t want to debate the question, 
but the basic economic realities of size, profit opportunity, 
and return on investment far outweigh corporate disclosure 
as a factor in producing the effect that you describe. One 
other point--
MR. STEWART: May I supplement that statement, 
because I think you may.be overlooking something. One of 
the great mistakes that we made in the United States for 
many years was to assume that we know more than our foreign 
friends about a lot of things.
Technology in many areas, even in the so-called 
high technology areas, has caught up, and in some respects 
has gone beyond. And Mr. Wearly was not implying that import 
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competition which has already taken place, is primarily 
attributable to information in the form of disclosure. He’s 
not implying that. He is saying, however, and if you will 
analyze some of the dumpling applications that have been made 
by the Treasury Department, that where the foreign competitor, 
as able and as shrewd as the Japanese, can break down a product­
line into the most profitable sizes and types of goods, it will 
move accordingly. He is being anticipatory to some degree.
But it so happens that I know of situations in which 
breakouts have enabled foreign competitors to be very selective 
about the products they hammer at. Miniature bearings is one; 
it happens in that particular instance that there is a sufficient 
number of exclusive manufacturers of miniature bearings so there 
wasn't any breakout problem.
But you get into the other types of bearings and the 
selectivity technique, for example--and I’m just using it as 
an example--of the Japanese is very clear. The same thing has 
happened in certain types of machinery.
There isn’t any difference between you and Mr. Wearly 
on the point. Is that not true, Bill?
MR. WEARLY: They have only so much capital to deploy. 
If they deploy their capital in the most favorable spot, they 
can be vicious in their results, because they don’t make any 
mistakes.
We go around making, let’s say, fifty per cent of 
our decisions wrong, just because of the lack of disclosure of
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the real market.
You can't believe how many wrong industrial decisions 
are made because we don't have the facts when we start. The 
Japanese made a remarkable number of right guesses, because 
they have the facts. If we give them more facts, I think 
they will be more right. That will enable them to exploit 
their low labor rates and their good productivity to knock us 
off on products one by one.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Are there any questions from 
the audience?
MR. WEARLY: I would like to make one more comment.
I think we all believe in proper, conservative reporting.
I think what some people seem to get away with is abominable. 
As a company that is fairly conservative, we don't like to see 
wild accounting practices used, because it puts us in an 
unfavorable light with others. I don't think any of us will 
be advocating that.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I appreciate that.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: Could I just comment on one 
thing? I've been restraining myself somewhat because it seems 
to me that if I were asked to sum up what the witnesses have 
said about disclosure and comparability, they would sum it 
up by saying they were against it; it's as simple as that.
MR. STEWART: That's quite erroneous.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: Well, that will give you an 
opportunity, Mr. Stewart, of making a more positive statement 
on what you think the philosophy of the APB should be. You 
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told us, on the whole, what you thought it should not be. 
Could you make a more positive statement on what you think it 
should be?
MR. STEWART: My central point, with which the Chairman 
and I have reached an agreement, is that the philosophy should 
properly weight. By philosophy I mean your operating theory, 
management considerations which are in turn related to the 
interests of the corporation, and the interests of the stock­
holders, present and prospective.
You misread me completely if you thought that I was 
suggesting that we're against disclosure and that we're against 
comparability. We are suggesting that--and I'll spell this out 
in the written supplement so that there will be no ambiguity-- 
there is a reasonable line beyond which you perhaps should not 
go in terms of the degree and the depth of disclosure, and in 
terms of your notion of achieving comparability. I'll give you 
an example which is not necessarily attributable to the APB, but 
it is an example of what I'm talking about.
We have proposed changes in Regulation S-X of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. In a number of places you 
will see that if the proposal sticks, the reporting company is 
required to report in the alternative. This applies to several 
accounting items. Compute one way; compute another way.
My personal judgment is that this is going to produce 
very little more than confusion among the investing public, 
which you have a responsibility to protect.
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I would suggest that that is the kind of thing that 
goes beyond the line of reasonableness.
I think that the Accounting Principles Board has 
accelerated its activity, and there's nothing inappropriate 
about that per se; it is moving more aggressively; it is 
active in more areas than before. It is not for me to say 
that is wrong. But I do feel that there isn't any action, 
be it governmental or otherwise, that can be workable or 
sensible, unless it has balance.
How much disclosure in a particular case is necessary 
to accomplish your objective?
To what degree are you, by taking a certain action, 
really improving the comparability, and to what extent do 
the stockholders or the investing public really have anything 
more than they had before?
There is no difference of opinion between you and 
me with respect to the fact that there should be proper 
disclosure and that there should be a reasonable goal of 
comparability. We’re talking about degree; we’re talking 
about balance, and we’re talking about using just plain old 
common sense.
So your summary of our position is wholly in error.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you, gentlemen. I think we 
should probably move along. We appreciate the time you’ve 
taken with us.
MR. STEWART: We appreciate this opportunity.
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CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Next on the agenda is Mr. LeRoy Layton, 
Managing Partner of Main Lafrentz & Company. Mr. Layton was the 
last previous chairman of the Accounting Principles Board.
MR. LEROY LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this 
opportunity to present my views on the subject before you.
I will attempt to offer fewer solutions than I might 
be expected to. But the main purpose of this presentation is 
to afford a better understanding of present problems and thus 
aid your Study Group in arriving at sound and lasting solutions.
The main thrust- of the presentation that you have 
before you is in Appendix A of our position paper. It is a paper 
that was presented several weeks ago at a Northwestern University 
conference. It is entitled "A Critical Analysis of the Present 
Institutional Framework For Formulating Financial Reporting 
Standards.”
It includes, among other related matters, a candid 
review of the Accounting Principles Board's role in history; 
its strengths, its weaknesses, and its relations with other 
groups. It is felt that this information is relevant, and there 
is much to be learned from the present system; its struggles to 
cope with changing conditions, as well as its problems, and in 
some areas its failures in so doing.
The Appendix is 30 pages long and would take far more 
than the allotted time to cover. The area on the changing 
conditions that it did cope with is presented because I believe 
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that any organization that comes out of this study must also 
have the capability to change with changing times. Conditions 
existing today will not be the same as those that will exist 
ten years from now.
I thought a review of the APB's current problems 
was important, because from my standpoint, as a member of 
the Board for seven and one-half years and as chairman 
for almost three of those years, we covered most of these areas; 
Board manpower; voting rule; the quality of opinions; the need 
for quick decisions; the need for an early warning system, and 
the appearance of independence.
I won't cover all these in my oral presentation; 
but will try to hit a few of the highlights.
First, as to loss or erosion of confidence in 
financial reporting. This has been one of the main concerns, 
certainly, of all of us. The Accounting Principles Board has 
attempted to make sure this does not happen. I believe, how­
ever, that the primary cause of the erosion of public confidence 
in financial reporting stems from the action of a very few 
managements and independent auditors. I stress auditors here 
rather than accounting principles, because I think this is 
part of the problem--the auditors' inability or unwillingness 
to cope with these situations.
In this area let me be a little more specific. I 
won't waste time on the management portion of this; but will 
discuss my own profession. I think CPA firms must improve 
their performances.
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Firsts I think most are already spending large sums 
in recruiting, training, developing and supervising professional 
staff. These programs apparently need to be more effective. 
Each firm should consider having key decisions and work papers 
reviewed by or under the control of an independent partner, 
prior to the issuance of reports.
Accounting gimmicks--innovative accounting approaches 
apparently within the confines of generally accepted accounting 
principles, but of questionable soundness, should be reported 
to the AICPA as part of an early warning system, rather than 
being used, as I believe they have in some cases, to enhance 
client relations.
Let me add that more effective auditing could do much 
to control accounting gimmicks, even with today’s accounting 
alternatives.
If the Utopia of accounting principles is ever reached, 
I think effective auditing will be needed to control a whole 
new set of accounting gimmicks. When I say effective auditing 
I mean the use of sound judgment, and the guts and the willing­
ness to lose clients on occasion.
Now as to the independence of the Board, I firmly 
believe that the independence issue is a false one and has little 
to do with either the loss of public confidence in reporting, 
or the Board’s inability to operate more satisfactorily.
The eighteen-month struggle with business combinations, 
and its final conclusions have subjected the Board to the 
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criticism that it was too responsive to the wishes of 
management. Some elements of management, however, have 
been equally critical that the Board was not sufficiently 
responsive to its expressed viewpoints.
In my personal experience, I flatly reject both 
criticisms as being completely groundless.
I appreciate that the appearance of independence 
or the appearance of lack of independence is a different 
matter than actual independence. However, I recommend 
strongly against making any changes solely for the sake of 
appearances.
I feel quite strongly about the Board’s voting 
rule, although I may be in the minority. The necessity for 
a two-thirds majority vote to issue an opinion or a statement 
has taken its toll on both the quality of opinions and the 
efficiency of the Board’s operations.
On a number of occasions, periods of constructive 
analysis and consideration of the input of others were 
followed by voting which left the Board short of a two-thirds 
majority. There was then no other course but to redebate the 
issues and seek compromise solutions. It is my estimate that 
the rehashing and compromising on Opinions 16 and 17 added at 
least six months to the time schedule, and caused a 180 degree 
shift in the purchase-pooling conclusion.
If lack of confidence in the organizational structure 
or performance of the present Board or a similar type board is 
such that it cannot be endowed or entrusted with a simple 
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majority vote, then I would favor whatever changes are necessary 
to create an organization that could be so entrusted.
And I am hitting only the highlights.
As to the small,full-time, paid board, I am concerned 
that proponents of this solution may not have given it as much 
depth study as I believe it must have. This, of course, is now 
the responsibility of your Study Group. My chief areas of 
concern are five.
It is assumed by those who propose it that better, 
sounder opinions will flow from a small board. This may be 
so but is this a safe assumption, and if so, why?
Second, no matter how sound future opinions may be 
or how efficiently the new organization performs, or how it is 
constituted--whether it is interdisciplinary or AICPA sponsored-- 
its actions will affect many, and it will be subjected to 
criticism and severe pressures. Under the circumstances, real 
acceptance of a small board in the private sector can last 
longer or evaporate sooner than a broader-based board. That’s 
the second question I think must be answered, if you move in 
that direction.
If at a later date a degree of disenchantment develops 
in a smaller board, will the source of its operating funds 
continue or will they dry up? Today the major portion of 
operating costs represents donated time and out-of-pocket 
expenses borne by the Board members and their firms.
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In my opinion, a larger firm would be extremely 
reluctant to withdraw from a larger board similar to the 
one that exists today. To do so would put it at a competitive 
disadvantage in serving its clients. That may be a wrong 
reason but I think that's a practical situation as it exists 
today.
Much has been made of the off-again, on-again 
inefficiency of the present, part-time Board, and the 
greater added efficiency that a full-time board would have in 
being able to continuously consider a single matter.
Actually, neither type board can give continuous 
thought to any one subject. Both must pause for gestation 
periods, while other views are being sought, while public 
hearings are being tabulated and digested, while decisions 
are being drafted on opinions after exposure. On balance, 
though, I do believe a small board would spend less time on 
deliberation than would a large board.
My last concern is the manner of selecting members 
for a small board. This must be given very careful consideration 
to avoid any suspicion of "packing the court."
My seven and one-half years on the Board convince 
me that the experiences and nature of individual members and 
their firms have molded them so that their voting pattern was 
predictable, to some extent. Some were basically conservative, 
and by this I mean less susceptible to consider change. Others 
were more liberal or progressive, and far. more willing to 
consider new approaches.
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The last general problem area is research. I've 
spent a full page on my ideas there, and also included 
recommendations made by the APB to AICPA.
I won't repeat them here, but the problem of realizing 
more support for research must be solved. It will represent the 
same challenge regardless of the structure of the board itself.
Now for some personal conclusions. There is no question 
that continued improvement in financial reporting is needed and 
will be accomplished, if not by an arm of the private sector 
then by some agency or board of the Government.
There is also no question in my mind that the 
initiative should stay in private hands. To accomplish this 
there are two basic requisites as I see them: general acceptance 
of the changes that are promulgated; and second, there must be 
some method of enforcement.
Presently, the APB strives for general acceptance 
through close cooperation with other organizations whose interest 
in accounting principles is just as great as theirs. This effort 
includes public hearings.
Second is a structure which provides broad representation 
from firms handling the bulk of publicly-held opinion work.
Hopefully, sound opinions will be the product of the Board's 
semi-public, legislative-like procedures.
The enforcement factor is at the moment a tenuous 
linking of the accounting profession's discipline, which binds
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practicing public accountants to its official pronouncements, 
and the insistence of the SEC and stock exchanges on opinion 
reports. At the moment, without legislation of some sort, 
I see no substitute for this in the private sector, and, 
therefore, believe that the Board should stay under the 
control of AICPA.
I have one further observation. The APB is 
currently moving at the fastest pace in its history and 
has just issued its fourth opinion in eight months. It 
has at least fourteen projects on its current agenda, in 
varying degrees of development.
Also, there are ten research projects scheduled 
for publication in the next three years.
I hope that the recommendations of your group 
will ensure that this momentum be maintained. Of course, 
while most critics want faster action, there is a limit as 
to how fast the preparers of financial statements can safely 
absorb intricate changes in accounting principles.
This concludes my oral remarks.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you, Mr. Layton, I have 
several questions. A recommendation was made yesterday 
that it might be desirable for the board to allow a longer 
lead time between the publication of its rulings and their 
effective date.
What's your reaction to that point?
MR. LAYTON: The Board has given thought to this 
fact; it was always a matter of concern. If you prescribe 
a principle that eliminates an alternative or selects one 
221
out of several, you’ve now cast doubt on the one eliminated. 
What happens when you come to this conclusion, but allow three 
years to make a change?
If something goes wrong in the intervening three years, 
and someone was using the principle that’s been eliminated, he 
might be hard-pressed to say why he had not adopted the change 
much sooner.
In other words, it could be dangerous not to adopt the 
change once it had been put into print.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Layton, you referred to the 
desirability of having the experience and input of the major 
firms in public practice. What is your reaction to the 
desirability of maintaining what has been a kind of automatic 
seat for members of the Big Eight accounting firms? What impact   
does this have on the objectivity and status of this body in the 
private sector?
MR. LAYTON: I think this is indefensible. I was 
asked that question after becoming Chairman, and I gave the 
same answer. I said that so long as I’m Chairman, I hope all 
eight are on the Board. Their input in terms of time, money, 
and other resources is tremendous; not only a tremendous amount 
of time by the individual himself but the time of his advisors 
and other staff. While I was Chairman, from a practical 
standpoint, I was pleased to have all eight.
I was told that Cliff Heimbucher was asked the same 
question and gave the same answer. In principle, I don't think 
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you can defend it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: You have heard the strong recom­
mendations for strengthening the role of the task forces to 
this board so that they have the benefit of more regularized 
input from financial officers in business. These task forces 
would have a staff member assigned to them to help projects 
along, and would have the benefit of highly experienced public 
accountants outside the membership of the board.
Along with that suggestion, in part, has come the 
suggestion to reduce the board to a size which would not be 
as small as you have spoken of in your testimony, but to an 
intermediate size, say eleven or twelve members. This final 
decision-making body, proponents say, would rely heavily 
upon the work of the staff.
What is your reaction to that suggestion?
MR. LAYTON: All right. There are in existence 
already special industry committees which are appointed 
by the AICPA and operate outside the aegis of the APB. 
These special committees are preparing audit guides which 
involve both audit and accounting principles considerations.
So what you suggest is already functioning in special 
industries. I don't know why it could not be expanded upon 
to give subcommittees of the Board added strength, or to take 
the place of special committees of the Board. I think this 
would be practical.
I think that an intermediate size board, with 
proper input, could function. It would have to satisfy the 
five questions I have raised regarding a smaller board.
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From my standpoint I would like to see it operate with a simple 
majority. If you pick an even number, a simple majority gives 
you an edge of two votes which is maybe a little more acceptable 
than a one majority.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Layton, you have heard the 
recommendations of a number of people that the board should be 
representational. In other words, there ought to be a certain 
number of seats on this group for accountants in public practice, 
and that there should be an equivalent number of seats for 
financial executives in industry. Along with that suggestion has 
been a series of suggestions as to who might be appointed to 
represent other interests, including lawyers, investment 
bankers and others.
Would you comment on that?
MR. LAYTON: You’re speaking of what I call an 
interdisciplinary board. I’ve had trouble defining its 
authorization and its legal backing. These are necessary for 
the enforcement factor, which is one of two things I think it 
ought to have.
I can assure you also that you would need a simple 
majority, because of the diverse views. I think you’re bound 
to come up with four or five solutions to any one subject.
I do believe you will have to solve its legal 
foundation and the measure of its authority before that is 
practical at all. Lacking that, I favor continuation of the 
AICPA's control.
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MR. BIEGLER: Mr. Layton, you expressed concern 
about the legal foundation of an interdisciplinary type of 
board. This suggests to me that you’re satisfied with the 
legal foundations of the present Board.
Would you like to amplify that?
MR. LAYTON: I said before that enforcement is a 
tenuous linking of the accounting profession's discipline, 
our respect for the pronouncements of the Institute.
MR. BIEGLER: Do you think that the Board's 
opinions have any legal backing?
MR. LAYTON: I think they have a practical backing.
MR. BIEGLER: I'm trying to distinguish between 
your concern over the legal backing of an interdisciplinary 
type board and your apparent lack of concern over the legal 
backing of the present APB.
MR. LAYTON: I said it's tenuous and I see no 
substitute. Am I satisfied? No, not particularly.
MR. LEVINE: Mr. Layton, being a past Chairman of 
the APB, do you have any views about the need for a full- 
time chairman?
MR. LAYTON: Yes, I would favor that. It came 
up while I was Chairman, and the Board voted quite strenuously 
for it--I think the vote was something like 14 to 4, or 15 
to in favor of a full-time chairman.
I can assure you that no matter how many hours a 
chairman might spend, he can always spend more.
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MR. PRYOR: Mr. Layton, I would like to summarize 
your views as I would understand them: you would be willing 
to have a full-time, full-paid chairman; you would like research 
to be somewhat better than it is now. But by and large, however, 
you are satisfied with the system as it now stands. Is that a 
fair summary of your views?
MR. LAYTON: I was not satisfied with the performance 
of the APB while I was Chairman. However, I was always comforted 
by the knowledge that I had done the best I could and I hoped the 
Board had done the best it could. We were constantly looking for 
better ways of accomplishing what we were doing.
To say I’m fairly well satisfied is not really putting 
it properly.
MR. LEVINE: To put it a little differently, these are 
the only changes you would suggest to make it more effective?
MR. LAYTON: My position paper more fully discusses 
the changes I think necessary.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: Mr. Layton, you have placed 
considerable importance on a change to majority rule--simple 
majority rule. In your Northwestern paper, you said that the 
initiative should stay in private hands. You went on to say 
that this could be accomplished in two ways. First, there must 
be general acceptance of the changes that are promulgated by the 
APB. I find it difficult to square the emphasis placed on 
general acceptability with your advocacy of a simple majority.
226
It seems to me that the best way to secure general 
acceptance within the Board itself is to require something 
more than a simple majority.
MR. LAYTON: I am sure that when the two-thirds 
majority was proposed it was with the belief that twenty-one 
men, eighteen men, any number of men would thrash out the 
issues until two-thirds were certain that the best solutions 
had been obtained.
I think my paper also says that that has been 
accomplished in some cases; not in all cases. If it's not 
in my Northwestern paper, it’s in one of the other speeches 
I've made.
But in a number of areas, the will of the majority 
has, in effect, gone down the drain. I think the compromises 
that came out represented poor solutions and satisfied almost 
nobody; neither the dissenters nor the assenters.
Quite frankly, at the time the final vote was 
taken on Opinion 16, there were still twelve Board members 
who would have preferred purchase accounting rather than 
pooling. You may find that hard to understand, but it's 
a fact.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: You aren’t concerned that an 
opinion pushed through by a simple majority would leave such 
a large body of dissidents that the opinion itself would 
lack cogency; would lack support outside the Board? I don’t 
mean to push this too hard, but it would seem to me that the 
two-thirds rule does, in fact, on the face of it, provide 
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some assurance that there is a body of support for the opinion 
before it’s promulgated.
MR. LAYTON: My paper says that if a large board 
cannot be entrusted or endowed with a simple majority, then I 
would favor a size that would permit a simple majority. Does 
it bother you to say that seven could decide something on a 
four-to-three basis?
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: If we had a board as small as 
seven, then a simple majority would be much easier.
MR. LAYTON: I think the voting rule is extremely 
important.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: You heard the very strong 
representations made to us about the need for more effective 
representation of the views of industry and management.
I'm not going to ask you what your opinion is on 
that. But it would be useful to us, I think, to hear from 
your experience as Chairman of the Boards how you would 
evaluate the inputs that the Board received from the representa­
tives of industry. I don't mean the representatives of industry 
who were members of the Board, but the representations made to 
you by outside bodies?
MR. LAYTON: I think their criticism was constructive 
and helpful during the period in which we were developing 
opinion. I found it a little difficult to reconcile that with 
the lobbying that went on once we had determined our position 
and moved on an opinion.
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Upon reflection, I said to myself that perhaps 
this is properly part of the process that a quasi­
legislative or a semi-legislative body is going to have 
to go through.
On balance I would say the efforts on behalf 
of industry to make constructive input was just that. I 
think in a number of cases they felt that they had failed 
if they didn’t gain all the points they were mentioning. 
This, of course, is an impossibility, because you’re getting 
opposite views from different groups.
I don't think our methods of involving other 
groups were consistent. I think in some subcommittees the 
flow of information and communications started early, and 
were quite effective; in other cases the procedure left 
something to be desired.
It was a procedure that we kept working on and 
trying to improve. We held meetings between our planning 
group and their steering groups, and worked out improvements 
in it. Even these were not as effective as they should have 
been, so we turned to public hearings.
A letter from the Machinery and Allied Products 
Institute was one of the factors that led to public hearings. 
Certain exposure drafts went to chief executive officers and 
chief financial officers of companies.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: Did you detect any tendency 
on the part of industry representatives to maintain the 
status quo?
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MR. LAYTON: On balance, I would say the answer would 
be yes. I think in some respects, and with some individuals, 
that might be an unfair answer. But on balance, they preferred 
to hold the status quo, or to hold the line as much as possible.
MR. OLSON: Mr. Layton, in your oral comments you 
expressed concern for confidence in public reporting, but said 
that the appearance of independence or the independence of Board 
members was a less serious issue.
You seemed to indicate that one of the greatest 
contributing factors to the erosion of public confidence in 
financial reporting was the performance of auditors. Does that 
imply that you consider the machinery for setting accounting 
principles a less important factor than the erosion of 
performance?
MR. LAYTON: By emphasizing one I'm not trying to 
relieve the other. Most concentration seems to have been on 
principles; that doesn’t need further spotlighting. I think 
that our performance as auditors deserves more attention, and 
I tried to be specific in that area. There are many other 
areas that I could have commented upon.
MR. SMITH: I’d like to ask a question pertaining 
to the desire of industry representatives to maintain the 
status quo. Would you also say that was a trait exhibited 
by other members of the APB?
MR. LAYTON: I said that after a period of time I 
could judge a man’s tendencies, and I categorized vote patterns 
as to those who appeared to be conservative and those who
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appeared to be progressive or liberal.
The conservatives were those who were less willing 
to accept change. I attribute that not to pressures brought 
about by a client or any series of clients, but to the 
experiences and nature of the people themselves.
Members of the Accounting Principles Board, I can 
assure you, have clients on both sides of every issue.
MR. SMITH: I'm trying to clarify your answer to 
Professor Solomons question: did industry representatives 
appear to exude a quality for retaining the status quo? 
Your answer was yes, I believe.
Is that correct?
MR. LAYTON: A qualified yes.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I'm not sure, just for 
clarification, that Professor Solomons' question had to do 
with industry financial executives who were on the Board.
MR. LAYTON: I assumed he meant input and not 
members of the Board.
MR. SMITH: Is that a tendency peculiar to industry?
MR. LAYTON: It's a tendency on the part of anyone 
whose ox might be gored. Let me give you an example: We 
wanted to do something on price level accounting, and the 
biggest complainant was the Government. Price level accounting 
would really show hidden taxation and many other things that 
the Government would have a very difficult time in living 
with.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I might ask just one more question. 
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You referred to the Machinery and Allied Products Institute 
and its influence upon the Board in holding public hearings, 
I think there have been a number of references during these 
hearings to the expanded due process considerations of the 
Board. Various people have commented upon the absolute necessity 
of proceeding with this development so that all major matters are 
exposed and there is complete opportunity for input.
My question is: In your judgment, is it practical to 
expect a volunteer board to keep up with these demands, or must 
it, from the standpoint of efficiency, evolve into a five or 
seven-man paid board as recommended by Mr. Trueblood?
MR. LAYTON: Well, the eighteen men today with their 
ten or twelve advisors are putting in more than five or seven­
man years at the present time.
A five to seven-man board can only put in five or seven- 
man years in one year. You will have to back them with far 
greater staff than presently is available to the APB. And maybe 
Mr. Trueblood’s cost estimate is more nearly right than Haskins 
& Sells.
Also, I ask again how fast do we want to move in this 
area? Do we want to do everything all at once? Obviously, you 
can’t wait until all principles fall beautifully into place.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: You referred to the necessity for 
periods during which there would be digestion of drafts, and 
there would be careful scrutiny of input, briefs and recom­
mendations; that these periods are necessary in order that the 
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fullest considerations be given before something is finally 
adopted.
I take it that it would be your view that the 
larger volunteer group could effectively keep the pace 
you deem appropriate, and at the same time conduct the 
public hearings and the processes you consider necessary?
MR. LAYTON: I would think so; I would hope so.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Layton, we're very grateful 
to you; thank you very much.
The next gentleman we have with us is Mr. 
Philip Defliese, who is Chairman of the Accounting 
Principles Board.
MR. PHILIP L. DEFLIESE: My name is Philip L. 
Defliese. I'm presently Chairman of the Accounting 
Principles Boards and I'm also Managing Partner of Lybrand, 
Ross Bros. and Montgomery. You'll have to forgive me 
for not having provided the group with advance copies of my 
presentation. It was my original intention to remain 
neutral due to the fact that I am presently Chairman.
But I do believe that in the light of the input 
that has been made to this group, I am obligated to state 
my position.
I'd like to do two things: first, to submit to 
the group for the record the report dated November 24 1970
made by the Accounting Principles Board to the Board of 
Directors of the American Institute of CPAs. This report 
was a survey of the Board’s operations conducted intro- 
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spectively, obviously, and contained a number of recommendations 
to the Board of Directors of changes to be made in the structure 
of the Board and its mode of operations.
I think that you should recognize that this report is 
essentially one year stale, but nevertheless it represented the 
consensus of the Board at that time.
I don’t believe that I want to go into it in any great 
detail; it indicated the thought that there was a need for 
improvement in its operations. It recommended the appointment 
of a full-time chairman; it recommended increasing the size of 
membership to twenty-one in order to provide representation of 
more viewpoints from industry, analysts, investment bankers and 
perhaps more practitioners from smaller, national and regional 
firms.
It recommended the continuance of the two-thirds vote, 
and recommended considerable improvement in the research and 
technical support that the Board needed.
I think I’ll leave the rest for the group to read. 
There are copies.
As to my own statement, I will furnish the group 
with a printed copy later. I have been out of the country and 
have been working hard, so you’ll have to be indulgent with me 
in making this direct oral input.
I’m sure you’ll be as indulgent as the Board is in its 
public hearings in taking late starters. We’ve certainly 
attempted to give everybody an opportunity to be heard.
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In its 12-year history the Accounting Principles 
Board has produced four Statements, 21 Opinions, and a 
thousand critics. Criticism of operations of the Board 
comes from many sources. Too often, perhaps, the criticism 
veers from a constructive to a superficial base. Even 
within our own profession we hear some strident cries of a 
few who wax vocal whenever their pet theories are rejected-- 
or their viewpoints fail to withstand the two-thirds vote 
of the Board.
I am happy today to set the record straight, as 
I see it, since, in all hearings of this nature, those not 
seeking radical changes rarely come forward.
I think it essential that this Study Group examine 
the current status and operations of the APB, and the promise 
they hold for the future, rather than to concentrate on the 
past. The APB has had a tumultuous history in its short 12 
years; it has dallied, procrastinated, erred, and even 
reversed itself. But, in all of this, it has achieved 
maturity through experience.
It would be foolhardy, indeed, to dismantle a 
machine that is now coming into its own. Further improvements 
are, of course, necessary and will be made unless the present 
forward thrust is seriously interrupted.
Both the responsibilities of the public accounting 
profession to the American investing public and the need for 
improving financial reporting to fulfill that obligation are 
well documented. Although the American investing public is 
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the best informed, much still needs to be accomplished in the 
area of standardizing and restructuring the accounting principles 
upon which our capital markets must depend. In this respect I 
am in agreement with much of what has been said at these hearings. 
I am convinced, however, that the present APB--or a simple 
modification of it--is the best vehicle for the task. The reason 
is simply that the Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board 
and the monthly Interpretations now published under its aegis are 
generally accepted and followed by business, the SEC, and the 
profession.
This is because the Board includes representatives 
from all the major accounting firms and most other large firms, 
and these practitioners operate with a sense of dedication and 
objectivity that cannot be surpassed. By virtue of their 
involvement, their firms in recent years have naturally committed 
themselves to adherence. Despite threats to the contrary, recent 
opinions have not been judicially challenged.
Moreover, the SEC has indicated publicly--and proven 
in practice--that it will support the opinions and interpretations. 
This has not always been the case, but has come about in recent 
years only because the Board has demonstrated its ability to cope 
with the issues. For many years the SEC was critical of the 
Board's reluctance to move rapidly or even adequately. In those 
years the Commission went so far as to threaten to exercise its 
legislative right to set accounting principles. It must be 
remembered that the ultimate authority for establishing accounting 
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principles for most publicly held companies does rest 
with the SEC. The Commission has in effect delegated 
this authority to the APB, with some strings attached, 
and I believe that it is satisfied that the Board is 
now moving along rapidly enough to merit that delegation.
Also, the financial executives of this country-- 
no matter how much they may disagree--consider the opinions 
and interpretations as generally accepted and adhere to 
them. They know that the SEC is backing the Board, and 
they now have reason to be confident that the opinions will 
neither be far out nor incapable of reasonable implementation.
Finally, the publishing of opinions and interpretations 
is no longer inordinately delayed. The nterpretations, 
although they are American Institute publications, frequently 
receive the attention of the full Board. These are issued 
on a timely basis, and give prompt assurance that practices 
will not diverge. The procedure assures quick answers to 
knotty questions. In a business environment that is becoming 
more complex and innovative daily, this promptness is 
essential.
What, then, is the problem? Some critics, 
particularly financial analysts, refer to the accounting 
transgressions that occur through the use of allegedly 
liberal--vs. conservative--principles. They do, however, 
concede for the most part that the disclosures are such 
that they can spot these and adjust. Some analysts consider 
it more important to expand and improve disclosures than to 
create rigid conformity. Of course, this is not good enough 
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for the typical investor, and financial reporting needs our 
attention even if, in some cases, we must become somewhat arbitrary 
in establishing greater uniformity.
In my view, much of the furor about accounting principles 
and the Board's alleged failures are, in many instances, the red 
herrings of publicity-seeking critics that divert attention from 
other and more serious problems, many of which are not directly 
related to accounting principles. Those problems fall within the 
purview of the Institute's auditing procedure committee, which 
is trying valiantly to catch up. For example, many of the "horror” 
stories of accounting--those involving lawsuits and accusations of 
fraud against the auditors by the SEC--are not as much a matter 
of accounting principles as a matter of auditing and reporting 
standards. These involve independence of auditors, valuations of 
reserves and realizability of assets, material accounting changes 
that are not disclosed because they offset, and interpretation 
and disclosure of relevant facts regarding transactions. Many 
of these are auditing questions, not questions of accounting 
principles.
In some instances, the issue may be one of materiality. 
The Board is criticized for not speeding up its study and issuing 
an opinion on this subject. But materiality is more a matter for 
the conscience and integrity of the auditor than pure theory, and 
no amount of study or opining will alter that.
I feel that however important criticisms of the ethics 
of the profession and the enforcement mechanisms of the Institute 
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are, they simply have no place in a discussion of the 
procedures by which accounting principles should be set. 
These are separate issues, and they merit the attention of 
those within the Institute who have the responsibility for 
dealing with them.
It is said that the APB has failed to fulfill one of 
its primary charges: to develop a statement of basic objectives 
and concepts of financial statements upon which all opinions 
could rest. It is generally conceded that the Board is working 
hard on the other charge, that of narrowing alternatives.
In the early years of the Board--soon after the 
first research studies--the debates on this subject quickly 
indicated that there was widespread confusion about the concepts 
as they existed vs. what they should be. The urgently needed 
brush-fire opinions got mired in this debate. The vexing 
question was: On which premise should these opinions rest? 
The Business Combinations Opinion was one that bogged down 
on this point. The Board committee that was formed in 1965 
to formulate a statement on future concepts ultimately decided 
that it first needed to reach agreement on present concepts. 
And so it did. In 1968 another committee was formed to study 
future concepts. The latter, headed by a vocal critic of the 
Board's procrastination on this subject, awaited the results 
of the first committee’s work and only recently began to work 
itself. But agreement on present concepts did not come easily. 
And so far, no one, not even one of the vocal critics, has come 
forth with any reasonable, well-integrated approach to future 
concepts.
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It seems eminently clear that we need to narrow the 
alternatives and firmly establish present concepts before we 
move into a futuristic approach to accounting. While it is 
generally recognized that the historical cost basis of accounting 
falls short of presenting economic reality, we cannot move into 
an unchartered area without considerable esoteric, empirical, 
and implementary research. The underpinnings of our economic 
stability cannot be tampered with until the new foundation is 
firmly laid. Our recent attempts to give greater recognition 
to market values in accounting for marketable equity security 
portfolios is ample evidence of the profound effects such 
attempts can have.
In the meantime, the APB should continue its efforts to 
further the evolution of accounting principles. This can be done 
within its structure or through timely special efforts such as 
the Trueblood Study Group. The important element is the assurance 
of practical implementation before pronouncements are made.
The Board is scored for its long discussions and delay 
in issuing opinions. Arguments are repeated and changed; drafts 
and redrafts made. But anyone who has observed this process 
cannot help but acknowledge that no matter how time-consuming it 
may be, it ultimately provides the most workable answer. I have 
seen responsible people change their views radically through this 
process. The give-and-take debate among the top technicians of 
the country produces a far superior product than that which would
result from a quick vote based on briefs. Here, again, one
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should be realistic enough to expect intemperate criticism 
from some of the dissenters. When a better result is obtain­
able through reasonable debate, then I am all for it.
The Board is assailed at times for operating too 
slowly and at other times taken to task for moving on a 
"crash basis.” Again, this "damned if you do and damned if 
you don't” attitude is something that must be accepted and 
dealt with. As Truman said, "if you can't stand the heat, 
get out of the kitchen.” When you're charged with decision­
making, the heat is an occupational hazard. Actually, when 
time permits, ad hoc committees of other Institute members 
are formed to produce a specialized paper or industry guide, 
as has been done in the land development and real estate 
fields. The results can be implemented with deliberation. 
When events create an urgency to move faster, the interpreta­
tion route is taken and the effect immediate, as in the case 
of computer leasing. This procedure is a recent development 
in the Board's operations, and many critics have not yet 
digested the full significance of it.
It has been said that many of the opinions involve 
matters that have faced the profession for many years, and 
that the Board, by not dealing with the issues earlier, let 
too many things get away from them.
This is true. But we are living in an imaginative 
and innovative business environment where things change very 
fast. Who, for example, could have anticipated some of the 
"funny preferreds” of the Sixties? During that go-go era we 
did not have the mechanism of the "official” Interpretations 
241
of the Institute to which the SEC could refer its questions and 
problems, as it now does.
It has also been charged that there is absolutely no 
appeal from an APB opinion. In point of fact, in our country 
there is an appeal for everyone from anything. Rulings of 
regulatory agencies, for example, are constantly being 
challenged in the courts. In accounting we have a built-in 
appeals mechanism in the SEC. The SEC, as indicated previously, 
has the legislative right and responsibility to set accounting 
principles, and it has informally delegated this to the APB. 
Thus, appeals from APB opinions can be made directly to the SEC. 
This was done officially once, resulting in the issuance of 
Accounting Series Release 96, which permitted flow-through 
accounting for the investment credit despite APB Opinion No. 2, 
which forbade it. However one might feel about the merits of 
that issue, he must concede that the appeal worked. I know, too, 
of other cases where the SEC has issued rulings which departed 
from APB opinions because of unusual circumstances, and I feel 
that in most of these cases the decisions were Justified.
Furthermore, rulings of the SEC can be taken to the 
courts, although this is rarely done. Nevertheless, the process 
is available.
Much is made of the fact that the Board members are 
voluntary, part-time people who, because of their responsibilities 
to their firms, cannot devote adequate time to the task.
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What is overlooked is that these people, when not attending 
Board meetings, are Just as deeply involved in Board matters 
as anyone could be. By virtue of their positions, these 
executive practitioners are making decisions hourly on all 
aspects of the issues confronting the Board. This hands- 
on experience adds a practical dimension to the theoretical, 
and provides insight that assures the workability of 
opinions. Board members who take this broader view of their 
efforts readily concede that they are, in reality, full- 
time members.
Are the Board members pawns of their clients? Are 
the Big Eight a united fraternity functioning as an arm of 
business? A quick look at the voting records should quickly 
dispel any such notions.
Let’s examine the independence question more 
closely. When the size test for pooling was being debated, it 
was claimed that the Board "backed down" because of client 
pressure. Of course, clients were outspoken, and they had 
every right to be heard. But in this case, the exposure 
draft that called for a size test lacked the necessary two- 
thirds support when it was published. It was inevitable 
that it could not be passed without modifying or eliminating 
the size test. As a result of this experience, the Board's 
policy now precludes exposure of a draft before it has the 
necessary vote. This is probably unfortunate because a trial 
balloon is sometimes needed.
Some say that the top rule-making authority should 
limit itself to formulating broad principles and leave their 
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implementation to a lesser group. One suggestion would require 
the senior group to approve pronouncements of the lower group. 
This sounds fine--but it won't work. Under this system, broad 
pronouncements would need to be delayed until it became clear 
that their implementation was sound; practical, and feasible. 
The Board has frequently gone down a wide path only to back 
away when it was realized that practice could not follow. Once 
the Board unanimously issued an opinion embodying a very fine 
theoretical concept requiring allocation of the proceeds of 
convertible debentures between debt and conversion features, only 
to rescind it when the Board found that it was impractical and; 
in some instances, produced bizarre results. Since that time 
the Board has stressed detailed procedures.
Perhaps the most alarming of all the new proposals is 
that calling for a small full-time super-board. This proposal is 
categorically unsound.
First, this super-hoard implies a politics of selection. 
The biases of prominent accountants are pronounced and well known. 
Will we have a "Nixon Board” or a "Warren Board," or will we have 
a "balanced group" so that 4-3 decisions will set the future of 
financial reporting? The concept of a small group further implies 
decisions by an elite. I would rather have a larger group of the 
best volunteers--all peers--so I could rely on the safety of 
numbers to balance off the strong biases.
Second; the small super-hoard would slow, rather than 
speed; resolution. The small isolated group, withdrawn from the 
practice arena and restricted by new administrative rules, would 
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have more difficulty than the present Board in obtaining 
the necessary input. The result would be a need for expanded 
hearings and virtual dependence upon the submission of briefs 
and counterbriefs. Those being "regulated" by this process 
would require more opportunities to be heard. A look at the 
"speed" of our regulatory bodies and our courts should be 
convincing.
Third, it is the participation of all segments of 
the profession in the present body that provides an in-depth 
democratic support.
Fourth, a small courtlike body does not make for 
economies of either time or money. The efforts presently 
expended by accounting firms in the rule-making process would 
need to be increased in order to monitor the board’s activities, 
prepare formalized briefs, request hearings, see what others 
are doing, respond to client requests for briefing, etc.
Finally, I would prefer that those formulating 
the opinions be deeply involved in day-to-day decision-making. 
The crucible of practice is the only test which tempers the 
most extreme theorist. And, in accounting, principles and 
practice cannot be separated. The term "generally accepted 
accounting principles" has been deemed to include the methods 
of applying them. This has been discussed before. I have 
also observed over the years the frequent metamorphosis of 
the charged-up theoretician into the pragmatic practitioner 
through close association with those Board members making 
day-to-day decisions.
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I have said earlier that much still needs to be done 
to improve the rule-making function. Here are my recommendations.
A broader research program supporting the present 
Board is needed. The emphasis should be on both empirical and 
experimental research designed to satisfy the implementation 
demands of new opinions. Researchers recruited for a period of 
from one to two years from the major firms could augment the 
present research group. Drafting assistants are also needed. 
This follows closely the recommendations made by the APB to the 
Institute’s Board of Directors in late 1970.
A full-time chairman would be able to monitor the 
research program more closely, be available for meetings with 
interested groups, and generally guide the Board better than 
a part-time chairman. Not that the chairman presently isn’t 
almost, in fact, full-time; but some of his APB-related time 
is devoted to his firm and its clients; a responsibility he 
cannot completely shake off. This is not suggested to indicate 
that there is the need for him to be independent of practice; 
rather it is a matter of concentration. It should be possible 
to obtain at least one prominent accountant--at the peak of 
his career—to accept a full-time term of three years, with 
possible renewal. Apart from having occupied the top technical 
position in his firm for many years, he should be a good 
administrator and leader. This is a tough combination to find; 
but I am sure one can be found every three to six years.
246
Because the resolution of an accounting problem 
requires complete exposition of all its aspects and the 
need to consider all viewpoints, I feel strongly that it 
is undesirable to limit the number of those charged with 
the decision-making obligation. Some limitations must of 
course be set, as it would be impossible to accommodate an 
overly broad spectrum of views that could arise on some 
issues. Consequently, I am recommending both a fixed and 
a flexible Board membership, with wide representation, one 
that will provide for expansion and contraction, as need 
dictates. A frequent criticism from industry is that it is 
inadequately represented. I am sympathetic to this complaint.
I feel the Board should consist of 21 members, 
rather than the present 18, as follows:
One full-time chairman.
Thirteen practitioners--selected to 
include people from the major national 
firms at all times, the lesser national firms 
and the regional firms (on a rotating 
basis), and one small firm.
Three CPAs occupying responsible accounting 
positions in industry.
Two academicians well-known for their 
qualifications and interest in accounting 
theory.
One financial analyst.
One investment banker or practicing attorney 
active in securities registration work 
(alternately).
When the Board undertakes an issue that is 
concentrated in a particular industry or involves a special­
ized area requiring an expertise that may not be found among 
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the regular Board members, the membership should be temporarily 
enlarged by the appointment of four ad hoc members:
Two practitioners who are specialists in 
the area under study, selected to bring 
varying views to the Board.
Two industry accountants drawn from the 
affected industry, or who have had similar 
industry experience, chosen from the related 
industry or ad hoc committee, also to bring 
varying views to the Board.
These four members would join the three permanent 
members of the Board designated by the chairman to form a 
committee of the Board to oversee research, drafting, hearings, 
discussions, etc., needed to publish an Opinion. For this 
purpose, the four added members would be considered as voting 
members of the Board.
Most Board members should be CPAs, because many of 
the discussions and decisions require a profound understanding 
of the technical accounting and auditing procedures underlying 
the issues. This might seem to discriminate against some highly 
qualified non-CPAs in industry and universities, but since their 
qualifications are more difficult to assess, it had better be 
played safe. There is an ample supply of highly qualified CPAs 
in industry and in universities, so I consider it better to 
maintain this requirement at present.
Obviously, the practitioners chosen should be the 
best technicians their firms have to offer, with years of 
decision-making under their belts. Accounting decisions are 
frequently predicated upon a keen comprehension of the relevant 
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facts and the ability to ferret out those facts. And 
a sharp auditing sense is a prerequisite.
The permanent members of the Board should be 
named by a standing committee of the AICPA consisting of 
the President of the Institute and the four most recent 
past presidents. This would provide for considerable 
continuity in the selection group, making possible an in­
depth survey of possible candidates in ample time before 
selection. Nominations should be solicited regularly from 
all the appropriate sources, and the candidates for selection 
should be investigated and interviewed in order to ascertain 
their availability, attitude, and competence for the task.
The ad hoc members should be selected by the 
Executive Vice President of the AICPA, with the approval of 
the Chairman of the APB and President of the Institute.
The present rule providing for a maximum of two 
full three-year terms seems appropriate. Interim appointments 
may sometimes extend a person’s tenure to about eight years, 
but this, to me, is the outside limit. In rare instances, 
it may be appropriate to re-elect a highly qualified person 
who has had maximum tenure after an absence from the Board 
of at least one year.
In light of the recent record of progress, it is 
decidedly preferable that the Board continue operating as it 
is at present. The public hearings are developing well and our 
procedures are continually improving. It should be noted that 
hearings of some sort or other were begun in 1966. The
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"official” interpretations aid in improving practice although 
they occasionally take too much of the time of the full Board. 
Committee delegation should ease this load and expedite issuances.
The present two-thirds rule is a great safety valve, 
providing the essential safety in numbers I referred to earlier. 
I would not like to see far-reaching changes in accounting made 
on the strength of one vote. On the other hand the two-thirds 
rule may strengthen the opposition unduly. I would recommend a 
60 percent approval vote--13-8 for a 21-man body; 15-10 for a 
25-man body. I would insist on similar proportions for votes 
on exposure drafts of proposed opinions.
Dissents and qualified assents should not be published 
or voters identified. These serve no useful purpose, and just 
provide a forum for tirades that are not only frequently 
irrelevant and demeaning, but also definite impediments to 
progress.
In summary, I believe that the Accounting Principles 
Board is a workable vehicle, that it has proven eminently 
progressive, and that it offers the financial community and 
the American investing public a good chance for bringing 
financial reporting up to a new level of dependability. I hope, 
in this spirit, that my own recommendations are weighed fairly 
and that the basic concept of the Board receives the support 
it deserves. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Phil, I would like to clarify one point. 
You referred to the SEC having delegated the formulation of
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accounting principles to the APB. I'm a little troubled by 
that term; I wonder if it wouldn't be more accurate to say 
that the SEC has been willing to urge the private sector 
to take the initiative, with the SEC assuming the role of 
reviewer and retaining responsibility for accounting 
principles?
MR. DEFLIESE: I'll accept that qualification.
In fact, I think I said, "delegated informally with strings 
attached," perhaps shortening it too much.
MR. PRYOR: Phil, I think you said that most 
members of the group should be CPAs; but the tenor of your 
remarks made it sound as though all of the group should be 
CPAs.
MR. DEFLIESE: Generally, I think there might be 
an exception; I wouldn't make it a very hard and fast rule. 
I think we might occasionally find a non-CPA who was 
eminently well-qualified, and we could make an exception.
MR. PRYOR: Nearly everybody but not mandatory.
MR. DEFLIESE: That's it.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: Do you have any opinion on the 
Board's name? I know this isn't a matter of vast importance, 
but some people feel that it may be a stumbling-block.
MR. DEFLIESE: A rose by any other name is just as 
sweet (Laughter), and I haven't gone into that.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: I've heard some dissatisfaction 
expressed with the status of Statement No 4. Why was 
Statement No. 4 issued as a Statement and not as an opinion?
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MR. REFRIESE: To expedite the process of publication. 
Most members of the Board take their responsibility with respect 
to opinions very seriously, and want to fine-comb the language. 
We felt that to go through that process and also to go through 
the exposure process, required of opinions, would delay it and 
not necessarily improve it to any great extent. There was a 
need to indicate to the public that the Board had reached these 
conclusions, and that was a starting-point from where we would 
go in the future.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: I had it in mind when I asked 
Mr. Layton before about the input from industry, to put the 
same question to you.
Did you hear my earlier question?
MR. DEFLIESE: I believe so. I think there has been 
a tremendous improvement in input from industry; as this whole 
process has developed over the last twelve years, the various 
industry groups have been organizing themselves to cope with 
the problems and have furnished us with greater input as we 
have proceeded.
The evolution of the public hearing is part and parcel 
of that development. We started off with informal meetings of 
related committees of these various associations. This moved 
into "mini-exposures," symposia, and finally public hearings. 
I think we're getting substantially more input now from these 
groups than we've ever had and I think there’s a great need for 
it. Does that answer your question?
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PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: I was rather concerned with 
quality rather than quantity.
MR. DEFLIESE: I think the quality is improving 
considerably. Many of the groups--which formerly opposed 
any change--have come to recognize that change is needed.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Defliese, were you here when 
the gentlemen from the Machinery and Allied Products Institute 
were here?
MR. DEFLIESE: I didn't hear the entire presentation.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: One of their concerns was that the 
interest of management as well as the public interest, be 
considered in the development of accounting principles. They 
said that many potential risks or hazards arise for business 
from particular kinds of disclosure, which risks and hazards 
also affect the shareholders of that business. These are 
concerns of the chief executives of business; they're related 
to competitive pressures with particular emphasis upon the 
competitive pressures from Japan.
Does the Board take these matters into account?
MR. DEFLIESE: Yes. In my opinion,the views of 
management are given considerable weight in all respects. I 
think Board members attempt to weigh the public interest and 
the private interests.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Is there any real private interest 
here, or isn't this a public interest just as well?
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, of course it is. In the final 
analysis the shareholders represent their own public interest 
and they need protection against themselves in some respects.
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CHAIRMAN WHEAT: There’s a balancing of all of these 
interests. Thank you very much, Mr. Defliese. We hope you will 
all bear with us as we’re running a little bit late.
Next on our schedule is Joseph Cummings of Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Company.
MR. JOSEPH P. CUMMINGS: I'll try to be as brief as 
I can because you do have our paper.
I'm here on behalf of Walter Hanson who could not make 
the meeting because of a long-time commitment on the West Coast. 
He wanted me to be sure to express to this group his deep 
concern with the mission that you are undertaking.
We have written our paper in the light and expectation 
of very substantial output from the Trueblood Committee. We 
think that the work of your Study Group and the work of the 
Trueblood inquiry are inseparable in many ways. Therefore, we 
have to look forward to perhaps some far-reaching changes in 
the ways that financial information is communicated to the 
public; and in anticipation of that, the way this board should 
be structured to handle those communications.
I certainly don’t mean to prejudge what they decide, 
but I’m sure their decision will be something that will get us 
away from trying to repair the old Graham-Paige as we are doing 
today. It is most important for the public and all users of 
financial statements.
We think there is very definitely going to be a 
concentration of public interest in terms of information flow: 
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whether they go to forecasting cash flows for the benefit of 
lenders, or the benefit of potential investors who are 
looking for dividends; whether they go to revaluing assets 
in terms of their current fair value; whether they go to 
the value of underground reserves upon discovery.
We would like to have you consider the possibility 
of replacing, over a period of time, some of the people who 
feel now that they should be represented on the Board, with 
people from other disciplines who can aid accountants in 
evaluating just what financial statements should be doing 
for the public.
We’ve looked at all the written proposals and 
believe that they fall into two or three basic patterns. We 
reject them for reasons which have been set forth by many 
others.
We think that the small, full-time, in-house 
board could not stay current. We don’t think that a full- 
time board would sit in a room even four days out of the 
week; it would spend time doing much of the same things that 
the part-time members do when they're not at meetings or 
subcommittee meetings.
We find it difficult to avoid the bias which would 
naturally arise in that group and we question the ability to 
pay them. Most important, we question the ability of that 
board to get the empirical research which each of the present 
Board members can get now from his own organization.
We deplore the lack of any public interest 
representation on that group.
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We resist the solution that the job be turned over 
to Government for many reasons that have been stated; we think 
that would stultify to a great degree the progress which we 
hope will be made.
We have also come to the conclusion that if there are 
just a few limited spots available in addition to practicing 
public accountants, that those spots could be better filled by 
representatives of other disciplines who are public interest 
oriented and not affiliated with any organization; are not locked 
into any policies set by the Board of Directors of their 
organization. We have reached this conclusion despite the 
substantial contributions made by industry representatives and 
groups like the FEI, API, and MAPI. These organizations have 
set up committees parallel to committees of the APB and who 
work with us very diligently in terms of input.
But generally speaking, industry groups are not 
decision-making vehicles. They are too diversified in their 
views. If you took the API representatives, the independent 
producers and the pipeline companies and some of those who are 
vitally interested in our accounting for extractive industries 
today, and tried to select one man that could represent the 
industry, you'd have two or three others who would be vehement 
in terms of their not getting a fair shake.
If you take an executive from a lease company and put 
him on the Board, you get one point of view. But I'm afraid 
there would be resistance to any change which would substantially
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reduce income.
Board members need substantial input from all of 
these groups, but the decision-making and voting should not 
be in their province.
We have heard the recommendations for two or three 
separate groups, and believe it would be impossible to 
implement that kind of structure. We cannot in our own 
minds very clearly divorce concepts, principles, and 
applications. I think Phil covered that point; others have, 
too.
I won't dwell on it, but we think there should be 
only one body. The body should be guided by committees, such 
as the Trueblood Committee that have broad representation from 
many disciplines. But to give them voting power, or ask them 
to coordinate with the decision-making on a week-by-week basis 
would be impossible.
We finally come to our proposal, which we think 
will permit maximum utilization of the structure we have 
today. We think it should be gradual, and that there should 
continue to be eligibility for ten or perhaps twenty major 
national and international accounting firms. We believe this 
representation is important for several reasons: their input; 
the ability to communicate with clients and get their reactions 
to events as they are being considered; the ability to generate 
empirical research; the dedication an organization of this 
size can give to the problem.
I would say that any firm of this kind will
certainly comply--we would comply if it became an Institute 
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policy. That isn't my point. I just think that something would 
be lost and unbalanced if at least ten of the major firms were 
not constantly there.
The selection process is open. Someone suggested a 
fifteen-man committee to pick five or seven; I think we’d be 
inclined to have five or seven men pick fifteen eligibles.
As far as research is concerned, we think that, in 
addition to a financial commitment, a firm should commit 
individuals as well. Perhaps firms should have the opportunity 
of sending staff people to the Institute for a period of time. 
Enough of these men who are skilled in auditing and accounting 
principles could be made available. It could be of great benefit 
to them individually, to their firms, and, I think, to the 
Institute and the financial community at large.
Below the voting body should be a structure of task 
force committees comprised of representatives of all phases of 
industry that relate to the problem. Someone mentioned the ad 
hoc committees on insurance, banking and other special areas; 
these could be expanded.
Similar subcommittees could be working in the inventory 
area, on depreciation consolidation, foreign exchange, and all 
the other areas which are on our agenda. That kind of input is 
most valuable. By denying the vote to these special interest 
groups,, we are not suggesting that they not be heard, or not 
take a very direct part in the whole process.
We think the two-thirds vote is satisfactory. We 
would not like to see a simple majority. I think it's 
healthy that when a proposition is put to the Board and 
receives a ten to eight vote, that it is not considered the 
end of our deliberations.
Many bad decisions, I think, would have resulted 
from that. Perhaps many bad decisions result from two- 
thirds, because of compromise.
Certainly, if the body was structured as we 
propose, with fourteen public accountants and seven 
disciplines other than accounting, we would like to see the 
vote sufficient among the accountants to be sure that there 
is a two-thirds majority in that group. We think there is 
a safeguard in that procedure, and that any opinion or series 
of opinions that comes out with a negative vote from the 
public interest group would certainly dictate a change in 
the organization.
The term of membership is open. A full-time 
chairman and perhaps two or three other full-time people 
would accommodate the ability of a financial officer to leave 
his company for a period of time in order to become one of 
the full-time members of the board. An economist at a bank 
could do the same thing. An attorney need not necessarily 
sever his relations with his firm entirely, but he should 
sever his relationship from activity. Although an attorney 
is an admitted advocate, we don't feel that the independence 
of the accountants on the board will be impaired.
I've heard this time and again, but there is no
question in my mind that no one goes to Board meetings with 
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a fixed position. Client views are all over the lot. I can’t 
even get a fixed position from my partners, so I don’t see how 
I can get it from my clients.
I think that’s the sum and substance of the material 
in our paper. In view of the time I would stop there and be 
happy to answer any questions which you have.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you very much Mr. Cummings, 
I regret to say that I haven’t had a chance to read your paper 
as yet, because, as you know, it reached us rather late.
MR, CUMMINGS: It was late this week and I apologize 
for it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: We will read it with the greatest 
of care. I’ll just ask one question.
A number of comments have been made about the 
Accounting Principles Board reversing itself. Mr. Defliese 
made a passing comment to that effect. On the other hand, some 
have said that the Board should have an ongoing procedure for 
reviewing and rediscussing opinions after some relatively short 
period of time; and should not be afraid to reverse itself if 
its experience indicates that there might be a better way.
What’s your reaction to that? I’m a little puzzled 
by the problem that seems to be raised by those who think it is 
bad for the Board to reverse itself.
MR. CUMMINGS: I don't think it’s all that bad. If 
you think you have a final answer imbedded in cement at any time, 
it seems to me that you're misleading yourself. It’s embarrassing 
to reverse, as we have been doing on a couple of occasions,
26o 
decisions that seemed to have been made without all the 
testing and research necessary.
Part of the solution to that problem will be 
additional empirical research before the decision is made. 
I don't agree with the need for an appeals procedure, though, 
because it would, in effect, put the question of acceptability 
in limbo during the appeals period. On the other hand I 
have no objection whatsoever to some task force from the 
Institute, whether working directly with the board or apart 
from the board, evaluating the application of opinions and 
making suggestions for changing the agenda. This could be 
part of the coordination with others that a full-time chairman 
and his planning committee could undertake.
MR. LEVINE: Have you considered how your full-time 
chairman and planning committee might affect or displace the 
composition of any of the other members?
MR. CUMMINGS: If the planning committee included 
an accountant, he would have to sever from his firm to take 
that position. If it were an economist, or a lawyer, he would 
have to sever his connection in order to become full-time.
We have accommodated that full-time opportunity 
solely to give the board some flexibility in using talents 
that we think are presently in the private sector. We want 
to broaden it to the public interest .
MR. LEVINE: Would you say then, that it might reduce 
the respective composition as you have outlined it in your 
statement?
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MR. CUMMINGS: No, they would be among the twenty-one.
MR. LEVINE: They would be among the twenty-one, but 
if it was an accountant, for example, would it reduce representation 
from the international or national firms?
MR. CUMMINGS: No, they would be both. A man from a 
national firm can serve in one of those positions and also be on 
the planning committee.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: Clearly the most striking part of 
your proposal is for public interest representatives as full 
working members of the board. I take it that you wouldn’t be 
satisfied with something like a panel of public interest 
representatives which might provide input to the board and 
perhaps react in print to opinions of the board, but would not 
be full working members.
MR. CUMMINGS: I think that would be an improvement 
over what we have today. I would say that all these men should 
have business and financial background; it has to be something 
they're interested in, otherwise they'll go to sleep at the meetings 
(Laughter)
The panel would be an acceptable alternative to what 
we have today, but I don't think it would be the same as having 
direct participation in decision-making.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: Would these public interest 
representatives be paid?
MR. CUMMINGS: Yes. We haven't resolved that problem, 
but we said that perhaps the Institute budget could be fattened 
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to take care of this ongoing obligation. They might 
associate themselves with some trade association or some 
other national group.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: But wouldn’t that run afoul 
of your other rule about associating with special interest 
groups?
MR. CUMMINGS: We don’t associate the American
Bar Association or the University of Oklahoma with any 
special parochial interest! (Laughter)
MR. PRYOR: How would you select these public 
interest people?
MR. CUMMINGS: There are a number of organizations 
that would be consulted: American Philosophical Association; 
American Political Science Association; Academy of Political 
Science; National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science; 
The American Sociological Association, and American Economics 
Association. These groups would have to be consulted.
MR. PRYOR: By whom?
MR. CUMMINGS: By a committee of the Institute which 
would have to screen them and approve them.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Mr. Cummings, when you referred to 
the public interest members being paid, you. didn't have in 
mind that they would serve full-time?
MR. CUMMINGS: No.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Just be paid something for the 
time that they spend, is that right?
MR. CUMMINGS: Yes, I think they will have to remain 
associated with some kind of organization. Some of them may 
263
now be associated with corporations, and they would have to 
sever that connection in order to qualify under this proposal.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Excuse me. The last time we had a 
gentleman here we failed to ask if you in the audience had any 
questions. I’ll repair that omission by asking if anyone has a 
question for Mr. Cummings.
QUESTION: Mr. Cummings, as I understand your remarks, 
you would be willing and feel it desirable to utilize 
representatives of the business community, their intellect, their 
intelligence and their experience in the affairs of the APB. 
But you wouldn't give them a vote.
Would you elaborate a little on what would disqualify 
them for voting?
MR. CUMMINGS: It’s a difficult thing to say. I 
tried to illustrate by using the oil and gas industry. If you 
were to give a vote to a man who was a total coster, for example, 
the successful well coster is going to be injured. He will feel 
that his position is not being given an adequate hearing.
We have found that the FEI and other groups are adding 
great imput to the deliberation effort. But it’s very difficult 
to get a firm position because of the diverse positions on 
various issues.
What I’m saying is that the man sitting on the body 
who is attached to a corporation is not as free, as independent, 
and as objective as he might otherwise be. I don’t mean in any 
way to demean the contribution made by those who have been with 
us over the y^^s^but I just have to believe that as a fact.
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QUESTION: What if he disassociated himself from 
his firm?
MR. CUMMINGS: Then I would have no problem.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you, Mr. Cummings, very, 
very much.
Mr. Norby, we have tried your patience; I'm sure 
that we have tried the patience of all of you this morning, 
but you’ve been very considerate. We apologize and thank 
you.
We are delighted to have Mr. Norby here. He is 
Chief Executive of the Financial Analysts Federation. With 
him is Dr. Frances Stone who is Chairman of the FAF Financial 
Accounting Policy Committee.
MR. NORBY: Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your adding us to 
your deliberations. We had deliberations with your committee 
some months ago, and in the last few days, our Financial 
Accounting Policy Committee has submitted a position paper.
My purpose today is to elaborate on that statement and 
to give your committee some of the views of our senior members. 
Our organization, perhaps, illustrates a point Mr. Cummings just 
made--it’s hard to get monolithic opinions from voluntary 
groups.
Perhaps the conveyance of some impressions of our 
members will be valuable to you. We don’t want to stress too 
much any specific mechanics.
First, I would like Dr. Stone to summarize the paper 
that has been submitted on behalf of our Financial Accounting 
Policy Committee.
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DR. FRANCES STONE: I am only going to take a very 
short time because we have spelled out some of our ideas in this 
area, and we have talked with the committee before.
I'd like to emphasize that I think this overall statement 
of principles which the Trueblood Committee is charged with is 
very important, and that the combination of the two committees-- 
both the Trueblood and the Wheat Committees--is an excellent thing.
I feel that we've gone a long way in the last few years, 
and I'm a little surprised, now, to find that I've been involved 
with this process longer than I thought. It has seemed to me 
that we're doing a great deal of patching. The analysts, I 
think, are aiding and abetting in that process.
I would like to see the SEC a lot more directly involved 
with the setting of accounting principles, or guidlines, because 
I'd like to see them have the force of law.
That, I think, would be a welcome step forward. Then 
we'd have no problem about going to the courts on this.
I would like to see a full-time, independent, highly 
professional board. I would like to see them serve for a limited 
time. In this way you could select high caliber people with 
sufficient experience in the field of accounting to make an 
effective contribution.
I think if you would ask them to serve on a very short­
term basis--say nothing less than three years--that you would be 
able to tap a really large pool of good talent.
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I'm going to suggest that the decisions be made on 
a majority vote, because the two-thirds rule is too restrictive. 
And I would like to ask for a much quicker reaction to poor 
accounting practices.
I think the long period of time some practices have 
been used before they've been cited, works to the detriment 
of financial users.
I would like to suggest that there be some kind of 
tax or dues on all of the members, and all of industry as well, 
so that we have sufficient funds for research. Not only should 
the group have its own research staff, but it should call on 
all of the other disciplines. They should have the money and 
authority to call on other groups as well.
I’m going to stop right there.
MR. NORBY: We had a conference a couple of weeks 
ago and we took the occasion to discuss this subject with 
our Board of Directors. I wanted to reflect some of their 
views, which some of you may have already heard privately.
I think it can be said that our members have 
generally expressed conservative views on this whole problem 
of establishing accounting principles, which I see can be 
divided into two parts. The first would be who is going to 
have the responsibility, and secondly how will they be 
organized.
Concerning the question of who will have the 
responsibility, I think our members have consistently held 
the view that professional accountants should establish 
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accounting principles. There is a particular fear of Government 
responsibility for this function, having in mind political 
pressures, legal roadblocks to progress, and the slow pace that 
usually characterizes Government bureaus when it comes to change.
This is not to say that Government agencies have not 
made many contributions to reporting, and that they have not 
prodded the private sector to action on accounting matters. But 
we believe that an organization in the private sector will have 
greater flexibility and show more responsiveness to the needs of 
investors in business.
When we say professional accountants should have the 
responsibility, we mean exactly that. Not only do they have 
professional competence, but we feel that they have the independence.
Numerous commentators in the past few months have 
suggested that the Financial Analysts Federation or the financial 
analysts, should have a role in decisions. We are complimented 
by this but we do not think it appropriate. By the same token, 
we do not believe organizations representing business management 
should have a role in decisions, either. Business is the subject 
of accounting measurement, and therefore should not be a 
participant in establishing the standards of measurement.
We agree that financial analysts, business management, 
and any other parties affected by accounting rules should 
participate in the decisions and should have positions of 
advocacy. In this way they can make an effective contribution 
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to the development of accounting principles. But they 
cannot be both advocates and judges.
I think that the development of public hearings 
is a very fine forward step in bringing about the participation 
of many organizations and the interchange of ideas.
This is not to say that if you conclude that other 
organizations should have a role in decision-making on 
accounting principles beyond what we have suggested, that 
our organization would not try to cooperate. We would want 
to have a part in representing professional investors.
Linked to the determination of responsibility, 
of course, is the problem of enforcement. The APB and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission have a relationship, 
developed through custom and practice. It is this relationship, 
derived from the SEC's legal powers, that gives implied force 
to APB opinions.
We think this relationship could be strengthened 
or made more explicit, as Dr. Stone has implied in her statement. 
The principle of the self-regulatory agency as related to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission does provide a model, perhaps. 
Admittedly, the self-regulatory concept is currently being 
questioned in the securities business, but I think the 
circumstances of accounting principles are somewhat different.
I would also suggest that the SEC's authority in 
accounting matters be primary among Government agencies, so 
that other regulatory bodies do not require public companies 
to issue statements that are not consistent with general 
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principles. The separate ways of several agencies in the past, 
I think, has been a disservice to investors.
Secondly, voluntary membership organizations have 
difficult organizational problems. They are not really 
equipped to respond quickly to increasing demands, nor are fast 
decisions usually feasible. We believe the APB in recent years 
has made extraordinary progress in the pace of its opinion 
issuing, relative to the inherent organizational limitation.
Yet the problems do seem to be multiplying and greater 
speed is demanded from all quarters. Thus, reformation of the 
organizational structure is a very important subject.
Our committee has recommended full-time membership of 
professional accountants for limited terms. We recognize that 
the present volunteer members of the APB are devoting practically 
full-time to the task. But from an organizational point of view, 
the full-time, fully-compensated member would appear to have 
two advantages--first, greater continuity of effort; and second, 
complete independence.
In saying this we do not mean to imply in any way 
that present members have not been faithful to their mission 
on the APB. But independent stature, would give the APB 
increased credibility in many quarters, I believe.
As I have indicated, in our organization, as in others, 
there is a diversity of viewpoint. Many of our directors prefer 
the present voluntary membership of the APB. This preference is 
based on the idea that voluntary members through their firms, 
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will be closer to the current practical problems and their 
decisions would gain more acceptance than decisions made by 
an independent group which might become, let us say, too 
academic.
They believe the establishment of accounting 
principles is a pragmatic, quasi-legislative process, and 
that it is not necessarily bad if members are close to che 
pressures of practical problems.
Mr. Defliese's statement seems to be in that same 
general direction.
Within our group, we also have different views as 
to the composition of the full-time, independent board. I 
should mention the excellent paper by Mr. Ellis at the recent 
Northwestern University Symposium. Mr. Ellis is a member of 
our Financial Accounting Policy Committee. He proposed a 
broader group than professional accountants, but nonetheless 
would require independence. No member, he said, would retain 
any employer or a vocational tie.
The purpose would be to bring to bear on the total 
problem of reporting, a wider range of viewpoints. I think 
in the key requirement for independence, he was not at great 
variance from the other viewpoints expressed among our members.
I'd like to state my own view, based on observation 
of voluntary organizations over a number of years. I tend to 
favor full-time, compensated board membership. I believe this 
is the only way the APB is going to be able to keep pace in 
the next few years. I believe these board members can be 
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selected in a way that will ensure continued responsiveness to 
practical problems.
The criticisms of the APB seem to rise in part from 
the desire for speedier action. When we have our problems 
identified, we'd all like a quick solution. However, there are 
many parties of interest, and their acceptance of final opinions 
rest on their opportunity to present recommendations and listen 
to arguments.
This takes time, and it will be difficult to speed up 
the process no matter how the APB is organized. These other 
parties of interest are also voluntary organizations, in many 
cases. Accounting is not their primary objective or concern, 
although it is very important.
Speaking for the Financial Analysts Federation, we 
recognize that we must expand our capability to provide input 
to the APB, because it is desirable to settle accounting issues 
more rapidly. Nonetheless, I have to say that our ability to 
provide this input is going to be in the nature of evolutionary 
expansion.
Consequently, I believe we reflect the proponderent 
opinion of our organization, that we're suspicious of some of 
the grand, sweeping reorganizations in the accounting principles 
process that have been proposed. An evolutionary change and 
improvement, building on what has already been developed by the 
AICPA and other organizations, seems to be a more practical 
approach to us. In that connection I will state that our 
committee's position is consistent with that approach.
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Thank you.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you very much, Dr. Stone and 
Mr. Norby, Let me probe for just a minute your comment 
about the full-time professional hoard. A number of people 
have commented to us that if you wanted the most qualified, 
most experienced, vigorous, professional accountants, it 
would be extremely difficult to get them on a full-time 
basis. They would have to leave their firms, and the ladder 
of success, if you wish, that they’re on; they would have so 
move their families, which is quite a significant thing to 
do. If they were employed as professors and were going to 
be away as long as three years, they would have to give up 
tenure.
Lawyers frequently move in and out of Government. 
It's no great problem. But it's extremely difficult for an 
accountant near the top of his firm to leave for a period of 
three years, and have any assurance as to where he's going to 
fit when he returns.
It’s a contrast, apparently, between the two professions. 
Accordingly, the question has been raised as to whether it would 
be desirable to take the risk that, in order to get five or 
seven full-time professionals, one would have to take men who 
are substantially less experienced and had substantially less 
prestige than present APB members.
How do you react to that?
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DR. STONE: I think that one of the things that could 
be done is to make service on the board as prestigeous as service 
on the Council of Economic Advisors. I think that it could be 
done. In this way, someone who is at the top of his firm could 
feel that he could leave that firm; the firm would regard this as 
a favorable step and keep room for him over a three-year period.
It really isn't that long a time to be gone from a 
firm. If a firm has plans for the future, they usually don’t 
come to fruition in three years. They have five-year plans or 
ten-year plans.
I think that problem could be coped with. It’s an 
image problem, I think, more than anything else.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: One of the gentleman who appeared 
at these hearings stressed the desirability of substantial 
continuity and experience in this process. Members of the 
Board today serve for two terms, gaining experience and judgment 
in that process.
He referred to it as possibly the last ten years of 
a man’s career, because he was looking to people over fifty. 
How do you react to that?
DR. STONE: Since I’m going to reach that age sooner 
or later myself (Laughter), I guess I had better react properly!
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I was assuming that we'd get the 
youthful viewpoint from you! (Laughter)
DR. STONE: Actually, I was supposed to be presenting 
the radical viewpoint, and Bill the conservative viewpoint.
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Age is really no barrier, one way or the other.
What I am looking for, really, is the maintenance of an open 
mind and that is true of any age. If you get somebody who’s 
thirty who has decided that all the decisions have been made 
and wants to maintain the status quo, he's of no use.
If you have somebody who's fifty and has lived 
through the changes and is extremely flexible, I'm all for 
him. I don't think age really matters.
MR. NORBY: I would concur that the full-time 
position on a board of this type would be quite prestigious 
in the accounting profession. I think it would be possible 
to attract the best people.
Length of tenure might be a problem; this is an 
organizational and management kind of thing that would have 
to have more detailed study. Possibly one solution or one 
compromise might be to make the term longer and have seven 
members, each serving seven-year staggered terms.
It was interesting, though, that a lot of our 
Board members felt that the shorter term would keep the 
member closer to reality, so to speak. Whether this is a 
real risk of a longer term, I don't know. I'm a little 
doubtful, myself.
MR. PRYOR: Bill, did you favor a small board? You 
didn't say that in your first testimony, but you just mentioned 
seven.
MR. NORBY: I don't think we have a firm position on
the precise size of the board. It seems to me that 
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the implication of a full-time, fully-compensated board would 
probably be a smaller body.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS: It’s true to say, isn’t it, that 
your Board of Directors was unanimous in recommending a full- 
time board? I was really quite surprised that they would come 
out with that view.
MR. NORBY: I want to make it clear that our Policy 
Committee tended to favor the full-time board, and that is also 
my position. Our Board of Directors strongly favored the 
voluntary board.
MR. PRYOR: How knowledgeable would you say the 
Directors are, as a whole, about the whole problem of how 
accounting standards ought to be set?
MR. NORBY: I would say they are not extremely 
conversant with the details, but I think that they represent an 
impression in the financial community that is worth taking account 
of; that's the way I want to put it in the record.
I think you have to be concerned with the net result 
of how things appear to people.
MR. SMITH: Mr. Norby, would you reread the part of 
your testimony that discusses industry representation? There 
was a point I didn't get.
MR. NORBY: Well--
MR. SMITH: It was where, I think, you were saying 
that you didn't favor them and expressed an opinion on this.
MR. NORBY: I said first of all that various parties 
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had suggested that financial analysts have a role, but we 
did not think it appropriate. By the same token we did not 
believe organizations representing business management 
should have a role in the decision either. We felt that 
business was a study of accounting measurement, and, therefore, 
should not be a participant in the establishing of standards 
of measurement.
MR. SMITH: That's the phrase. You’re not saying 
that business should not have a voice in the laws that govern 
them. What is it that makes you think that industry should 
not have a voice in setting standards?
MR. NORBY: Business through accounting and 
corporate reporting is giving a report of its stewardship; 
it's being held accountable for its performance. Therefore, 
others should establish the measurement of that stewardship.
I would like to say that on this point we would 
have virtually unanimous views throughout the Federation.
DR. STONE: I want to reinforce what Bill has just 
said. I don't think that there is a place on this permanent 
group for a business member. Nor do I think that the FAF 
should be represented as a permanent member. I think we should 
give input; I think business should give input, but that the 
decisions should be made by the professional group.
MR. NORBY: Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Wait just a moment, Mr. Norby; let's 
ask if anybody from the audience has questions.
Mr. Defliese has a question.
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MR. DEFLIESE: I’d like to know whether the proposal 
for a full-time hoard was dependent upon the availability of 
speed in operations, or was it the appearance of independence?
MR. NORBY: I would say that the general viewpoint 
would lean toward the appearance of independence.
MR. DEFLIESE: That seems to conflict, then, with the 
thought that a person could return to the firm from whence he 
came.
MR. NORBY: Well, if he came back to the firm where 
he had a prior relationship, there would be no conflict.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: At this point, despite the fact that 
it’s late, and I'm sure you're all hungry, I would like to ask 
if there is anybody in the audience that has a question to raise 
with us, or has a comment that he wants to make which would be 
beneficial to us.
I hope that you would keep it relatively short, but 
nevertheless we’re very much interested.
Let’s ask the lady down here who hasn’t spoken, yet.
MISS GERTRUDE MULCAHY: I'm Gertrude Mulcahy of the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Oh, I beg your pardon! We heard from 
you yesterday.
MISS MULCAHY: I had a number of questions that I 
wanted to raise, but they have been answered this morning.
There is one thing that has been mentioned quite 
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frequently by many of the speakers, and that is the need 
for more research to support the work of the APB.
As a foreigner looking at what happens in the
United States, I never cease to be amazed by the amount of 
research that seems to be done. But it seems to be in a spirit 
of competition, rather than in the spirit of getting together. 
I look at AAA, NAA, and FEI; each one tries to outdo the other. 
Maybe I’m wrong.
It seems to me that when your committee looks at 
this, you should not ignore the work done by other organizations.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: Thank you, Miss Mulcahy.
QUESTION: My name is Luke Patrick. I want to 
commend the committee for doing a fine job during the two days 
of looking into this matter. We've heard a little bit about 
independence, but there’s one phase of independence that I 
don’t believe is a matter of the record.
In the interest of serving the appearance of due 
process being reported here at this hearing, I want to look 
into that a little bit and see if maybe some members of the 
committee or some of the witnesses might have some clarification 
for me on this point.
We think of independence in terms of certification or 
attestation, and we’re thinking about an unsavory relationship 
or a savory relationship between the independent accountant, 
who is going to attest and certify, and the firm whose reports 
and business he is going to attest to.
But the Accounting Principles Board is not in the area 
of certification or attestation, but in the area of enunciating 
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accounting principles by which business reports its transactions. 
So what I think we’re really talking about, and the thing that’s 
important, here, is a conflict of interest.
It seems to be accepted by most of the speakers that 
the independent accountants, by being made independent would not 
have a conflict of interest.
I want to point out that independent accountants owe 
their very existence to the fees they get from their clients. 
There have also been records of numerous multimillion dollar 
lawsuits against accountants for their certifications and I’m 
sympathetic to their position in this thing. I’m not critical 
of them in any way whatever.
But I say that in the area of enunciating and establishing 
accounting principles that independent accountants are not dis­
interested. They do have imbedded interests in the problem; they 
do have perhaps even conflicts of interest as between their 
interest in the accounting principles established and the interests 
of business or the financial community.
My question is, is this something that is given due 
consideration by the committee that we’re meeting with here 
today, and will it be given due consideration?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT: I can assure you, Mr. Patrick, that 
it will be given due consideration. We appreciate your statement 
and we recognize the significance of what you say.
Is there anyone else?
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Thank you all, again. I guess we're closed. 
We'll have a hearing record if anybody wants to have a 
look at it.
(The meeting adjourned at one thirty-five 
o'clock.)
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